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ABSTRACT
TEAM FORMATION AND INCENTIVES
Ashwin Kambhampati
George J. Mailath
This dissertation analyzes the incentives of workers in organizations that utilize teams.
In Chapter 1, I study a moral hazard in teams model in which a principal knows that the agents she
compensates are identical and independent, but does not know all of the actions they can take. In the
face of this uncertainty, the principal chooses a symmetric contract that yields her the highest worstcase expected profit. I show that, counterintuitively, any such contract exhibits joint performance
evaluation—each agent’s pay is increasing in the performance of the other— and is nonlinear in
team output.
In Chapter 2, Carlos Segura-Rodriguez and I study profit-maximizing matching in the presence of
adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that when productive complementarities between
workers are weak and e↵ort costs are high, expected wage payments increase in the assortativity of
the matching the manager implements. Hence, either random or negative assortative matching can
be profit-maximizing, even when positive assortative matching is efficient.
Finally, in Chapter 3, Carlos Segura-Rodriguez, Peng Shao, and I study the efficiency of decentralized team formation inside research organizations through the lens of a one-sided matching model
with non-cooperative after-match information production. Our equilibrium analysis identifies two
inefficiencies observed inside of non-hierarchical organizations. First, productive teams composed of
workers producing complementary information may form at the expense of excluded workers who
must form relatively unproductive teams consisting of workers producing substitutable information.
Second, even when productive teams are efficient, they need not form; a worker in such a team may
prefer to join a less productive team if she can exert less e↵ort in this deviating team.
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CHAPTER 1 : Robust Performance Evaluation
Ashwin Kambhampati

1.1. Introduction
Both team-based incentive pay and the use of teams are on the rise (Lazear and Shaw (2007), Deloitte
(2016)). This can be rationalized by appealing to teamwork : if a worker’s success depends on the
actions of others, then team-based incentives have the positive e↵ect of encouraging help (Itoh
(1991)) and discouraging sabotage (Lazear (1989)). But, such incentives also arise in settings in
which work is done independently and individual performances are uncorrelated. For instance, each
member of a sales force may make sales calls alone and oversee a distinct market segment; members
of a start-up may contribute to the same “vision” of an entrepreneur, but perform independent
tasks. In these cases, team-based incentive pay is also common: salespeople receive bonuses for
their division’s performance and start-up members are compensated using equity or stock options
in addition to wages.
This paper shows that team-based incentive pay for independent agents is optimal when robustness
is a concern. Specifically, if a principal knows that the agents she compensates are identical and
technologically independent, but does not know all of the actions they can take, any worst-case
optimal contract exhibits joint performance evaluation. Furthermore, the optimal form of joint
performance evaluation is nonlinear in the value the team produces. This result departs from
the classical theory of incentives, which finds independent performance evaluation to be Bayesian
optimal (Holmström (1982)), and from the recent literature on robust contracting in settings with
unrestricted productive interdependency, which finds linear joint performance evaluation incentive
schemes to be worst-case optimal (Dai and Toikka (2018), Walton and Carroll (2019)).
Formally, I study a model in which a principal writes a symmetric contract for two agents who have
access to a common set of actions. Actions are costly and unobservable, and a↵ect the probability
with which each agent succeeds at her task. There is no productive relationship between the agents
and individual success is statistically independent, across agents, conditional on the actions they
take. All parties are risk-neutral and the agents are protected by limited liability.
In contrast to standard models, the principal knows only a subset of the common actions available
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to the agents, and there may be others she does not know. For instance, a sales manager may know
that her sales representatives can follow the company’s script. But, there are a myriad of ways
in which a sales representative might deviate from this script. Hence, the principal evaluates each
contract according to its worst-case performance across all action sets containing the ones that she
knows. An optimal contract with respect to this criterion is a worst-case optimal contract.
My main result, Theorem 1.1, is that any worst-case optimal contract exhibits joint performance
evaluation—each agent’s wage increases in the other’s success–and is nonlinear—agents are not paid
a constant share of the total value of completed tasks. Moreover, a worst-case optimal contract
exists.
The logic behind the suboptimality of linear contracts is as follows. Suppose, towards contradiction,
that there was a worst-case optimal contract that was linear, i.e. a joint performance evaluation
contract in which agents are paid a constant share of team output. Then, each agent would be paid
strictly positive wages for the success of the other agent, even when she herself does not succeed. But,
given productive independence between the agents, one agent’s action cannot a↵ect the probability
of the other’s success. So, the principal could simply reduce wages by a constant and leave individual
incentives unchanged. This adjustment strictly decreases expected wage payments without a↵ecting
productivity, thereby strictly increasing the principal’s expected payo↵.
To understand the intuition behind the optimality of joint performance evaluation, it is instructive
to consider the following benchmark contract: Each agent receives w ⇤ > 0 if she succeeds and zero
otherwise, unconditional on the other’s success or failure. Moreover, w ⇤ targets a known action
a0 . This contract exhibits independent performance evaluation since it does not link one agent’s
compensation to the performance of the other.
I argue that the principal can improve her worst-case expected payo↵ by calibrating a joint performance evaluation contract to the pair (w ⇤ , a0 ). Suppose, relative to w ⇤ , the principal increases
the wage of an agent when she succeeds and the other does as well, but reduces her wage when she
succeeds and the other fails. If this adjustment keeps her expected wage constant, conditional on the
other agent taking the targeted known action a0 , then her incentive to take an unknown, less productive action is exactly the same as if she were o↵ered the unconditional wage w ⇤ . Crucially, however,
if both agents take this unknown action, then the principal reduces her expected wage payments;
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joint performance evaluation implies that each is paid less when the other is less productive.
The key finding of my analysis is that the basic rent-extraction benefit described in the preceding
paragraph can be made to dominate any negative e↵ects such contracts have on efficiency, even
though such costs can be considerable when there are many unknown actions.1 Specifically, there
always exists a calibrated joint performance evaluation contract that strictly outperforms any independent performance evaluation contract. Moreover, the best joint performance evaluation contract
strictly outperforms any other contract, including those exhibiting relative performance evaluation.
This paper makes four main contributions to the literature. First, it sets forth a principal-many
agent model in which the principal has bounded, non-quantifiable uncertainty about the agents’
production technology.2 The pioneering work of Carroll (2015) considers a principal-single agent
model in which the principal has non-quantifiable uncertainty about the actions available to the
agent. His main result is that there exists a worst-case optimal contract that is linear in individual
output. My model and analysis enrich that of Carroll (2015) by introducing a seemingly irrelevant
agent and showing that multiple agents lead to the optimality of joint incentive schemes.3 Dai and
Toikka (2018) extend the analysis of Carroll (2015) to multi-agent settings, but consider a model
in which the principal deems any game the agents might be playing plausible. In this setting, they
find that linear contracts are robustly optimal. This result is driven by the finding that any contract
that induces competition between agents is non-robust to a game in which agents sabotage one
another, leading the principal to a worst-case payo↵ of zero. In contrast to Dai and Toikka (2018),
I consider a setting in which the principal knows that success is independently distributed across
agents. This has the immediate e↵ect of ruling out sabotage and ensuring that linear contracts are
suboptimal. It also necessitates new techniques to analyze the principal’s worst-case payo↵s.4 In
1 I exhibit a n-sequence of dominance solvable games with n unknown actions in which agents “undercut” each
other as dominated strategies are eliminated, taking progressively less costly and less productive actions. Efficiency
losses are maximized as n grows large (Lemma 1.6).
2 Related work not discussed here include the papers of Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978), Garrett (2014), and Frankel
(2014), who consider contracting with unknown preferences; Rosenthal (2020) who considers contracting with unknown
risk preferences; Marku and Ocampo Diaz (2019), who consider a robust common agency problem; and Chassang
(2013) who studies the robust performance guarantees of a di↵erent class of calibrated contracts in a dynamic agency
problem.
3 Building upon Carroll (2015)’s single-agent model, Antic (2015) imposes bounds on the principal’s uncertainty
over unknown actions (see also Section 3.1 of Carroll (2015), which studies lower bounds on costs). In particular,
Antic (2015) posits a lower bound on the distribution over output given any unknown technology. In contrast, my
model places no restrictions on the technology available to each agent in isolation beyond those of Carroll (2015).
Instead, the restrictions I impose concern the relationship between the agents.
4 For instance, the worst-case payo↵ of the principal at the optimal contract is achieved by a sequence of games in
which the number of actions grows to infinity, rather than one additional action for each agent as in Dai and Toikka
(2018).
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spite of these di↵erences, the results of this paper complement Dai and Toikka (2018) in terms of
their management implications. Agents in Dai and Toikka (2018)’s model are a “real team” in the
sense that they work together to produce value for the principal, while agents in my model are best
thought of as “co-actors” given the assumption of technological independence (Hackman (2002)).
Yet, in either case, joint performance evaluation is optimal. What changes is the particular form of
the optimal joint performance evaluation contract—in the case of a real team, optimal compensation
is linear in the value the team generates for the principal, while in the case of co-acting agents it
involves nonlinear bonus payments that reward agents when all succeed.
Second, this paper establishes a fundamentally new channel leading to the unique optimality of
joint performance evaluation. In the Bayesian contracting paradigm, the Informativeness Principle
of Holmström (1979) and Shavell (1979) prescribes independent performance evaluation whenever
one agent’s performance is statistically uninformative of another’s action. Hence, the literature has
sought justification for interdependent incentive schemes, such as relative performance evaluation and
joint performance evaluation, by introducing productive or informational linkages between agents.5
My model explicitly rules out these channels in order to isolate the e↵ect of robustness considerations.
I thus rationalize empirical evidence documenting firms’ preference for joint performance evaluation,
such as team bonuses, in cases in which the production and information technologies are independent
(Rees, Zax, and Herries (2003)). I also o↵er an explanation for the use of stock options to compensate
members of start-ups.6
Third, this paper formalizes a longstanding idea that interdependent incentives have an advantage
over individual incentives because of their flexibility. As Nalebu↵ and Stiglitz (1983) write,
“The incentive compensation scheme that is “correct” in one situation will not in general be
correct in another. In principle, there could be a di↵erent incentive structure for each set of
environmental variables. Such a contract would obviously be prohibitively expensive to set
5 In the absence of productive interaction, joint performance evaluation may be optimal if agents are a↵ected by
a common, negatively correlated productivity shock (Fleckinger (2012)). In the absence of a common shock, joint
performance evaluation may be optimal if e↵orts are complements in production (Alchian and Demsetz (1972)), if it
induces help between agents (Itoh (1991)) or, alternatively, if it discourages sabotage (Lazear (1989)). Finally, joint
performance evaluation may be optimal if agents are engaged in repeated production and it allows for more e↵ective
peer sanctioning (Che and Yoo (2001)). See Fleckinger (2012) for a comprehensive analysis of the Bayesian version
of the model I study, and Fleckinger and Roux (2012) for an excellent survey of the above literature.
6 Understood through the Informativeness Principle, such schemes are puzzling given the premise that all members
exploit the same underlying technology. If anything, this seems to suggest success should have positive conditional
correlation, leading relative performance evaluation to be optimal. Fleckinger (2012) develops this point further and
o↵ers another explanation based on e↵ort-controlled noise.
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up; but more to the point, many of the relevant environmental variables are not costlessly
observable to all parties to the contract. Thus, a single incentive structure must do in a variety
of circumstances. The lack of flexibility of the piece rate system is widely viewed to be its
critical shortcoming: the process of adapting the piece rate is costly and contentious.”

In contrast to Nalebu↵ and Stiglitz (1983), who study a model in which interdependent incentives
outperform independent incentives due to their screening ability,7 I explicitly account for the principal’s desire for flexibility by assuming that she uses a max-min criterion to evaluate contracts; a
max-min optimal contract performs well across all environments the principal deems feasible. That
joint performance evaluation emerges as optimal thus provides a formal justification for the assertion
that such schemes are more flexible than individual performance evaluation.
Fourth, this paper contributes to the literature on supermodular implementation (Chen (2002),
Mathevet (2010), Healy and Mathevet (2012)) by presenting an environment in which a supermodular mechanism (a mechanism inducing a supermodular game between agents) emerges as optimal
due to robustness considerations instead of restrictions on the set of feasible mechanisms. Equilibria of supermodular games possess desirable theoretical properties: they can be found by iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies and are the limit points of adaptive and sophisticated
learning dynamics (Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1991)). In addition, a collection of experimental papers have shown that laboratory subjects converge to equilibrium faster
in supermodular games than in other classes of games (see, for instance, Chen and Gazzale (2004),
Healy (2006), and Essen, Lazzati, and Walker (2012)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 illustrates the mechanism behind the main
result using a simple example; Section 1.3 presents the model; Section 1.4 states and proves Theorem
1.1; Section 2.6 discusses extensions; and Section 1.6 concludes.

1.2. Simple Example
In this section, I study a simple example illustrating the rent-extraction benefit of joint performance
evaluation relative to independent performance evaluation.
7 For related contributions, see Lazear and Rosen (1981), who consider the optimality of competitive incentives
versus piece rates in a setting with a common shock and risk-neutral agents, and Green and Stokey (1983), who
consider the case of risk-averse agents.

5

1.2.1. Set Up
Consider a scenario in which a risk-neutral manager compensates two identical, risk-neutral agents
who perform independent tasks and are protected by limited liability. Successful completion of a
task yields the manager a utility value of one and failure yields her a utility value of zero. The
manager knows that each agent can take an action, call it “work”, that results in the successful
completion of her task with probability one. However, the manager is concerned about another
action available to each agent, call it “shirk”, that results in the successful completion of her task
with probability p ⇤ 2 [0, 1), and failure with complementary probability. The manager knows that
work incurs a disutility cost of e↵ort of

1
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and shirk incurs zero disutility. However, she does not

know the value of p ⇤ .
The manager contemplates using two types of contracts, both of which respect the limited liability
constraint that ex-post wage payments must be non-negative.
1. Independent Performance Evaluation: Pay each agent w 2 ( 14 , 1) for success. Pay each
agent 0 for failure.
2. Joint Performance Evaluation: Pay each agent w for success when the other agent also
succeeds, and w

✏, with ✏ 2 (0, w ], when the other agent fails. Pay each agent 0 for failure.

Any such contract is calibrated to (w , work) in the following sense: If an agent succeeds at
her task, then her expected wage payment remains equal to w conditional on the other agent
working.
The manager evaluates any contract according to the same criterion. First, for each value of p ⇤ , she
computes her expected payo↵ in the worst Pareto Efficient Nash equilibrium (from her perspective)
in the game induced by the contract she o↵ers. Second, she computes the infimum value of her
expected payo↵ over all values of p ⇤ 2 [0, 1). The resulting payo↵ is called her worst-case payo↵.
Can joint performance evaluation yield the manager a higher worst-case payo↵ than independent
performance evaluation?
1.2.2. Independent Performance Evaluation
An independent performance evaluation contract with wage w , together with an actual value of p ⇤ ,
induces the game between the agents depicted in Figure 1.1.
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work
1
4

w

work

shirk
1
4

w

1
4

p⇤w , w

shirk

1
4

,w

, p⇤w

p⇤w , p⇤w

Figure 1.1: Game Induced by IPE w and p ⇤ .
A naive intuition is that the worst-case scenario for the principal occurs when p ⇤ = 0; if agents take
a shirking action with this success probability, then the principal obtains an expected payo↵ of zero.
But, this logic ignores incentives. In particular, each agent has a (weak) incentive to shirk if and
only if she obtains a higher expected utility from doing so, i.e.
p⇤w

So, whenever p ⇤ is strictly smaller than 1
the principal a payo↵ per agent of 1

1
() p ⇤
4

w

1
4w ,

1

1
.
4w

(work, work) is the unique Nash equilibrium, yielding

w.

Instead, the principal’s worst-case payo↵ from a contract w is attained when p ⇤ = 1

1
4w ,

just

high enough to make shirking attractive to each agent, as shown by Carroll (2015). In this case,
(shirk, shirk) is the manager’s least-preferred Pareto Efficient Nash equilibrium. In it, the principal
obtains a payo↵ per agent of
1
(1
)
4w
| {z }

(1
|

Expected Task Value

1
)w > 0.
4w
{z
}

Expected Wages

1.2.3. Joint Performance Evaluation
Can the manager obtain a higher worst-case payo↵ from a joint performance evaluation contract?
Consider the joint performance evaluation contract calibrated to (w , work) with wages (w , w

✏).

The game between the agents for a given value of p ⇤ is depicted in Figure 1.2.
The crucial property of calibration to (w , work) is that the incentive for each agent to shirk, given
that the other agent takes the targeted action work, is identical to the case in which each is o↵ered
an independent performance evaluation contract with wage w . Put di↵erently, as in the case of
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work
w

work

shirk

1
4

shirk
1
4

,w

p ⇤ w , p ⇤ w + (1

p ⇤ )(w

p ⇤ w + (1

p ⇤ (p ⇤ w + (1

1
4

✏)

p ⇤ )(w

p ⇤ )(w

p ⇤ (p ⇤ w + (1

Figure 1.2: Game Induced by JPE (w , w

1
4,

✏)

p⇤w

✏)),
p ⇤ )(w

✏))

✏) and p ⇤ .

independent performance evaluation, (work, work) is a Nash equilibrium whenever
p⇤  1

1
.
4w

Moreover, whenever (work, work) is a Nash equilibrium it Pareto dominates any other Nash equilibrium; one agent working generates a positive externality on the other since that agent is more likely
to receive w than w

✏. So, the principal obtains a payo↵ per agent of 1

Given any joint performance evaluation contract (w , w
instead obtained as p ⇤ approaches 1

1
4w

w , as before.

✏), the principal’s worst-case payo↵ is

from above. Along this sequence, (shirk, shirk) is the

unique Nash equilibrium. A simple calculation shows that the principal’s payo↵ from each agent in
the limit is strictly larger than her worst-case payo↵ under independent performance evaluation:
1
(1
)
4w
| {z }

Expected Task Value

because

(1
|

1
)(p ⇤ w + (1
4w
{z

p ⇤ )(w

Expected Wages

p ⇤ w + (1

p ⇤ )(w

✏)) > (1
}

1
)
4w

(1

1
)w
4w

✏) < w

whenever p ⇤ 2 [0, 1).
In a nutshell, calibration ensures that the worst-case expected task value is no lower than in the
worst-case scenario given the benchmark independent performance evaluation contract. But, the
principal is able to pay each agent less in expectation when both shirk; joint performance evaluation
means that one agent’s wages are responsive to the other agent’s shirking.
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1.3. Model
1.3.1. Environment
A risk-neutral principal writes a contract for two risk-neutral agents, indexed by i = 1, 2. Each
agent i chooses an unobservable, costly action, ai , from a common, finite set A ⇢ R+ ⇥ [0, 1]. Each
action ai is identified by its cost, c(ai ) 2 R+ , and the probability with which it results in success,
p(ai ) 2 [0, 1]. Let yi = 1 denote success and yi = 0 denote failure. There are neither informational
linkages across agents,
Pr (yi , yj |ai , aj ) = Pr (yi |ai , aj )Pr (yj |ai , aj ),
nor productive linkages across agents,

Pr (yi |ai , aj ) = Pr (yi |ai ) =

A contract is a quadruple of non-negative wages,

8
>
>
<p(a )
i

>
>
:1

p(ai )

if yi = 1

.

if yi = 0.

w := (w11 , w10 , w01 , w00 ) 2 R4+ ,
where the first index of each wage indicates an agent’s own success or failure and the second indicates
the success or failure of the other agent. I impose the assumption that contracts are symmetric
throughout, postponing a discussion of asymmetric contracts to Section 1.5.1.
It will be useful to classify the resulting contracts according to the typology of Che and Yoo (2001).
Definition 1.1 (Performance Evaluations). A contract w is
• an independent performance evaluation (IPE) if (w11 , w01 ) = (w10 , w00 );
• a relative performance evaluation (RPE) if (w11 , w01 ) < (w10 , w00 );
• and a joint performance evaluation (JPE) if (w11 , w01 ) > (w10 , w00 ),
where > and < indicate strict inequality in at least one component and weak in both.
While this typology is non-exhaustive (for instance, when w11 > w10 and w01 < w00 there is JPE “at
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the top” and RPE “at the bottom”), I will show later that it is without loss of generality to consider
contracts for which w01 = w00 = 0 (Lemma 1.4). Within this class of contracts, it is exhaustive. I
now distinguish between linear and nonlinear JPE.
Definition 1.2 (Linear JPE). A JPE is linear if

wyi yj = ↵(yi + yj ) for some ↵ 2 [0, 1]
and nonlinear otherwise.
1.3.2. Principal’s Problem
Agent i’s ex post payo↵ given a contract w , action profile (ai , aj ), and realization (yi , yj ) is

wyi yj

c(ai ),

while her expected payo↵ is

Ui (ai , aj ; w ) :=

X X

yi 2Y yj 2Y

Pr (yi , yj |ai , aj )wyi yj

c(ai ).

Let (w , A) denote the normal form game induced by the contract w and E(w , A) denote its (nonempty) set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. As non-IPE contracts tie the incentives of agents
together, agents may have an incentive to discuss their strategies with one another, even if they
cannot make binding commitments. This would deem equilibria that are strictly Pareto dominated
2 E(w , A) for which there exists another equilibrium

implausible, i.e. equilibria

0

2 E(w , A) that

makes each agent strictly better o↵. I thus require that agents play a (weakly) Pareto Efficient Nash
equilibrium. Denote the set of such equilibria by EP (w , A).
The principal’s ex post payo↵ given a contract w and realization (y1 , y2 ) is

y 1 + y2

wy1 y2

wy2 y1 ,

while her expected payo↵ is

V (w , A) :=

min

2EP (w ,A)

E [y1 + y2
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wy1 y2

wy2 y1 ].

In the spirit of a worst-case analysis, I do not allow the principal to select her preferred Pareto
Efficient Nash Equilibrium when there is multiplicity of equilibria, i.e. when EP (w , A) is not a
singleton.8
When the principal writes a contract for the agents, she has limited knowledge about the game the
agents play. In particular, she knows only a non-empty subset of actions available to them A0 ✓ A.
In the face of her uncertainty, the principal evaluates each contract on the basis of its performance
across all finite supersets of her knowledge contained in R+ ⇥ [0, 1]. The worst-case payo↵ she
receives from a contract w is thus given by

V (w ) := inf 0 V (w , A).
A◆A

The principal’s problem is to identify a contract w ⇤ for which
V (w ⇤ ) = sup V (w ).
w

Call such a contract a worst-case optimal contract.
To rule out trivial cases, I make the following assumptions about A0 .
Assumption 1.1. The known action set A0 has the following properties:
1. (Non-Triviality) There exists an action a0 2 A0 such that p(a0 )

c(a0 ) > 0.

2. (Known Productive Actions are Costly) If a0 2 A0 and p(a0 ) > 0, then c(a0 ) > 0.
The first assumption ensures that the principal can possibly obtain a strictly positive worst-case
payo↵ from contracting with the agents. The second ensures that the principal’s supremum payo↵
is never approached by a sequence of contracts converging to one always paying each agent zero.9
8 In the classical Bayesian contracting literature as well as in recent work on robust contracting (e.g., Carroll
(2015), Dai and Toikka (2018), and Walton and Carroll (2019)), the principal has the power to select her preferred
Nash equilibrium. The primary role of the assumption is technical convenience; it ensures the existence of a worst-case
optimal contract. I will not need such an assumption to obtain existence–ruling out Pareto-dominated equilibria is
enough.
9 The assumption that known productive actions are costly is stronger than necessary for my main result (for
instance, if there is a zero-cost productive action that the principal does not optimally “target”, then the result goes
through). Nonetheless, it has the advantage of being easy to interpret.
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1.3.3. Interpretation
The principal’s problem can be re-phrased as follows: If the principal must use the same contract,
i.e. mapping from successes and failures into wages, given any feasible set of actions the agents
might have available, which one does the best in the sense of yielding the highest payo↵ guarantee?
The solution to the problem is a positive description of how a principal might write a contract in
the face of structured uncertainty about the agents’ environment.

1.4. Worst-Case Optimal Contracts
1.4.1. Main Result
My main result shows that the rent-extraction benefit of JPE described in Section 1.2 is powerful
enough to ensure that there exists a contract of this form that is worst-case optimal. Put di↵erently,
in spite of the efficiency losses such contracts induce in any game the agents might be playing, no
other contract can do better. Moreover, I prove that any worst-case optimal contract must be a
JPE and that it must be nonlinear.
Theorem 1.1. Any worst-case optimal contract is a nonlinear JPE. There exists a worst-case
optimal contract.
The key intuition behind the result is that by judiciously calibrating a JPE to a benchmark IPE, any
(worst-case) efficiency losses such contracts generate can be made approximately the same as those of
the benchmark contract. Thus, the reduction in expected wage payments the principal obtains when
agents take less productive actions, due to the responsiveness property of JPE outlined in Section
1.2, causes JPE to outperform the benchmark contract. Of course, to show that only nonlinear
JPE can be worst-case optimal, I must also prove strict suboptimality of contracts other than IPE,
including those that exhibit RPE and those that reward agents with positive expected wages when
they fail.
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 1.1. I first review some preliminaries
from the theory of supermodular games, then present the arguments that rule out IPE and RPE
contracts as worst-case optimal.
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1.4.2. Preliminaries: Supermodular Games
Equip any action set A with the total order ⌫: ai ⌫ aj if either p(ai ) > p(aj ), or p(ai ) = p(aj ) and
c(ai )  c(aj ).10 In words, ai is higher than aj if ai results in success with a higher probability or if it
results in success with the same probability, but at a lower cost. Then, (A, ⌫) is a complete lattice;
all subsets of A have both a maximum and a minimum. A supermodular game may thus be defined
as follows.11
Definition 1.3 (Supermodular Game). The game (w , A) is supermodular if Ui exhibits increasing
di↵erences: ai0 ⌫ ai and aj0 ⌫ aj implies
Ui (ai0 , aj0 ; w )

Ui (ai , aj0 ; w )

Ui (ai0 , aj ; w )

Ui (ai , aj ; w ).

If, in addition, Ui (ai , aj ; w ) is strictly increasing in p(aj ) when p(ai ) > 0, then (w , A) is said to
exhibit strictly positive spillovers. The game (w , A) is submodular if Ui exhibits decreasing
di↵erences: ai0 ⌫ ai and aj0 ⌫ aj implies
Ui (ai0 , aj0 ; w )

Ui (ai , aj0 ; w )  Ui (ai0 , aj ; w )

Ui (ai , aj ; w ).

The important property of supermodular games that I exploit is that best-response dynamics converge to their maximal and minimal equilibria. Moreover, any supermodular game with strictly
positive spillovers has a unique Pareto Efficient Nash equilibrium. In particular, let amax and amin
denote the maximal and minimal elements of A, and BR : A ! A and BR : A ! A denote the
maximal and minimal best-response functions for the agents.12 Then, the following properties hold.
Lemma 1.1 (Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). Suppose ā (a) is the limit found by
iterating BR (BR) starting from amax (amin ). If (w , A) is supermodular, then it has a maximal Nash
equilibrium (ā, ā) and a minimal Nash equilibrium (a, a); any other equilibrium (ai , aj ) must satisfy
ā ⌫ ai ⌫ a and ā ⌫ aj ⌫ a. If, in addition, (w , A) exhibits strictly positive spillovers, then (ā, ā) is
10 It is easy to verify that this relation is antisymmetric (if a ⌫ a and a
aj , then ai = aj ), transitive (if ai ⌫ aj
i
j
i
and aj
ak , then ai ⌫ ak ), and complete (ai ⌫ aj or aj
ai ).
11 As all games considered in this paper are finite, I need not introduce any continuity requirements in the definition.
The definition of strictly positive spillovers is non-standard, but nevertheless useful. See Vives (1999) for a textbook
treatment of supermodular games and Vives (2005) for a survey.
12 Formally, if a = BR(a ), then a is a best-response to a and a ⌫ a0 for any other best-response a0 . Similarly,
i
j
i
j
i
i
i
if ai = BR(aj ), then ai is a best-response to aj and ai
ai0 for any other best-response ai0 . Both BR and BR are
well-defined by Corollary 4.1 of Topkis (1978).
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the unique Pareto Efficient Nash equilibrium.
A similar property holds for two-player submodular games. Define the mapping
f :A⇥A!A⇥A
BR

(ai , aj ) 7! (BR(aj ), BR(ai )).

Then, the following property holds.
Lemma 1.2 (Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). Suppose (ā, a) is the limit found by
f starting from the action profile (amax , amin ). If (w , A) is submodular, then both (ā, a)
iterating BR

and (a, ā) are Nash equilibria and any other Nash equilibrium action must be smaller than ā and
larger than a.
1.4.3. Proof of Main Result
Say that a contract w is eligible if V (w ) > 0.13 It is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to eligible contracts; Carroll (2015) already identifies that
⇤
VIPE

:=

sup

V (w ) = 2

w : w is an IPE

max

w 2[0,1],a0 2A0



(p(a0 )

c(a0 )
)(1
w

w) > 0

by an argument that generalizes the one sketched in Section 1.2.14 Hence, any contract w for which
V (w )  0 cannot be worst-case optimal.
The proof has five steps. First, I show that linear contracts are strictly suboptimal (Lemma 1.3)
and that any contract can be (weakly) improved by a contract w for which w01 = w00 = 0 or yields
⇤
a worst-case payo↵ smaller than VIPE
(Lemma 1.4). Second, I show that there does not exist an
⇤
RPE that yields the principal a strictly larger payo↵ than VIPE
(Lemma 1.5). Third, I compute

the principal’s worst-case payo↵ given any JPE (Lemma 1.6). Fourth, I show that there exists
⇤
a (calibrated) JPE that yields a strictly higher payo↵ than VIPE
(Lemma 1.7). Fifth, I establish

existence of a worst-case optimal JPE with w01 = w10 = 0 and re-examine the proof of Lemma 1.4
to show that no other class of contracts can be optimal.
13 This definition implies eligibility in the sense of Carroll (2015), who requires that, in addition, V (w ) yields a
higher worst-case payo↵ than the contract paying zero wages for all pairs (yi , yj ). By the assumption of costly known
productive actions, such a contract yields the principal a worst-case payo↵ of zero.
14 Due to adversarial equilibrium selection, V ⇤ may only be approached by a sequence of contracts, in contrast to
IPE
the setting of Carroll (2015).
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1.4.3.1 Suboptimality of Linear and Related Contracts
I provide a simple proof that any eligible linear contract is strictly suboptimal.
Lemma 1.3 (Linear Contracts are Suboptimal). For any eligible linear contract w , there exists a
nonlinear contract w 0 that yields the principal a strictly higher worst-case payo↵.

Proof. Let ↵ 2 [0, 1] parameterize the eligible linear contract w . If ↵ = 0, then the assumption
that known productive actions are costly ensures that w cannot guarantee the principal more than
zero in the game (w , A0 [ {a; }), where p(a; ) = c(a; ) = 0, because in this game each agent has
a strict incentive to choose a; . So, since w is eligible, it must be that ↵ > 0. Under w , w00 = 0,
0
0
w10 = w01 = ↵ > 0, and w11 = 2↵ > 0. Define a contract w 0 with w01
= 0 and w11
= ↵ that is

otherwise equal to w . Then, the incentives of the agents are unchanged; a constant shift in an agent’s
payo↵ given any action of the other does not a↵ect her optimal choice of action. Hence, for any
A ◆ A0 , an equilibrium under w is also an equilibrium under w 0 . By eligibility of w , however, some
agent must succeed at her task with strictly positive probability in any equilibrium

2 EP (w , A).

But, conditional on this event, the principal’s wage payments must decrease. Hence, her expected
wage payments strictly decrease in any equilibrium. It follows that V (w 0 ) > V (w ).

More generally, any eligible contract w with w00 > 0 or w01 > 0 can be improved upon by another
0
⇤
contract w 0 with w00
= w01 = 0 or, alternatively, cannot yield a payo↵ higher than VIPE
. The

following Lemma is proved in Appendix 1.7.1.
Lemma 1.4 (Positive Wages for Failure is Suboptimal). For any eligible contract w with w00 > 0 or
0
0
w01 > 0, there either exists a contract w 0 with w01
= w00
= 0 and V (w 0 )

⇤
V (w ), or VIPE

V (w ).

While the “shifting” argument used in the proof of Lemma 1.3 rules out many contracts, there are
two cases that require di↵erent arguments. When w11 > 0 and w00 > 0 (with w01 = w00 = 0),
I exploit supermodularity of the payo↵ function and a comparative statics result of Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) to argue that the probability of success given any equilibrium action decreases in
w00 . When w10 > 0 and w01 > 0 (with w11 = w00 = 0), I must elaborate upon the proof idea in
Lemma 1.5 to rule out asymmetric and mixed equilibria that might be beneficial for the principal.
I therefore encourage the interested reader to review it only upon reading the rest of Section 1.4.
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An immediate corollary of Lemma 1.4 is that to find a worst-case optimal contract it suffices to
consider nonlinear JPE satisfying w11 > w10 , IPE satisfying w11 = w10 , and RPE satisfying w11 <
w10 . When w11 > w10 (w11 < w10 ), so that w is a JPE (RPE), it is easy to show that Ui (ai , aj ; w )
exhibits increasing (decreasing) di↵erences: If ai0 ⌫ ai , and aj0 ⌫ aj , so that p(ai0 )
p(aj0 )

p(ai ) and

p(aj ), then
Ui (ai0 , aj0 ; w )

Ui (ai , aj0 ; w ) = (p(ai0 )
(p(ai0 )

⇥
p(ai )) p(aj0 )w11 + (1
p(ai )) [p(aj )w11 + (1

= Ui (ai0 , aj ; w )

p(aj0 ))w10

⇤

p(aj ))w10 ]

(c(ai0 )

c(ai ))

(c(ai0 )

c(ai ))

Ui (ai , aj ; w ).

A similar calculation establishes that when w11 < w10 payo↵ functions exhibit decreasing di↵erences.
Intuitively, the marginal benefit of taking a higher action for agent i is increasing (decreasing) in
the action of agent j in the case of JPE (RPE).
Moreover, if w is a JPE, any game (w , A) with A ◆ A0 exhibits strictly positive spillovers:
Ui (ai , aj ; w ) = p(ai ) [p(aj )w11 + (1

p(aj ))w10 ]

c(ai )

is strictly increasing in p(aj ) when p(ai ) > 0. I thus make the following observation.
Observation 1. If w is an RPE for which w00 = w01 = 0 and A ◆ A0 , then (w , A) is a submodular
game. If w is a JPE for which w00 = w01 = 0 and A ◆ A0 , then (w , A) is a supermodular game
exhibiting strictly positive spillovers.

1.4.3.2 RPE Cannot Outperform IPE
⇤
I now establish that no RPE can yield a higher payo↵ than VIPE
.

Lemma 1.5 (IPE Outperforms RPE). No RPE with w01 = w00 = 0 can yield the principal a higher
⇤
worst-case payo↵ than VIPE
.

The proof of the Lemma is in Appendix 1.7.2. I sketch the proof for the case in which there is a
single known action, i.e. A0 := {a0 }. Suppose each agent has available a single additional zero-cost
action a⇤ that results in success with probability p(a⇤ ) < p(a0 ). Then, a⇤ is a strict best response
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to a⇤ if and only if
p(a⇤ ) (p(a⇤ )w11 + (1
|
{z

p(a⇤ ))w10 ) > p(a0 ) (p(a⇤ )w11 + (1
} |
{z

Payo↵ a⇤ against a⇤

p(a⇤ ))w10 )

Payo↵ a0 against a⇤

p(a⇤ ) > p(a0 )

c0 ()
}

c(a0 )
.
p(a⇤ )w11 + (1 p(a⇤ ))w10

This condition also ensures that a⇤ is a strictly dominant strategy. Intuitively, if a⇤ is a strict best
response to a⇤ , which is less productive than a0 , then it must also be a strict best response to a0 since
the marginal benefit of shirking against a more productive action is higher (because w10 > w11 );
this property is a direct consequence of the submodularity of the game induced by RPE. Hence,
(a⇤ , a⇤ ) is the unique Nash equilibrium. The principal’s payo↵ as p ⇤ approaches the value at which
the incentive constraint binds is therefore

2 (p(a0 )
|

c(a0 )
) ⇥ [1
|
p(a⇤ )w11 + (1 p(a⇤ ))w10
{z
}
Probability Success

Letting ŵ := p(a⇤ )w11 + (1

2(p(a0 )

p(a⇤ ))(1

c(a0 )
)(1
ŵ

(p(a⇤ )w11 + (1
{z

p(a⇤ ))w10 )] .
}

Conditional Expected Surplus

⇤
w10 ), it is immediate that she can do no better than VIPE
:

ŵ )  2 max

w 2[0,1]



(p(a0 )

c(a0 )
)(1
w

⇤
w ) = VIPE
.

The proof for general known action sets builds upon this idea. In particular, I consider a worst-case
action set with a zero-cost action a⇤ that results in success with a high enough probability that
(a⇤ , a⇤ ) is a strict Nash equilibrium. I then argue that this equilibrium is unique and that, in it, the
⇤
principal obtains a payo↵ no higher than VIPE
.

1.4.3.3 JPE Worst-Case Payo↵s
Within the class of contracts setting w00 = w01 = 0, the only contracts left to consider are nonlinear
JPE for which w11 > w10 . Lemma 1.6 states the principal’s worst-case payo↵ guarantee from any
contract of this form. Its proof is in Appendix 1.7.3.15
15 The characterization holds for any JPE if I replace w
w01 and w10 with w10 w00 in Equation 1.1
11 with w11
and change p̄ [p̄(1 w11 ) + (1 p̄)(1 w10 )] to p̄ [p̄(1 w11 ) + (1 p̄)(1 w10 )] + (1 p̄) [p̄( w01 ) + (1 p̄)( w00 )]
.
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Lemma 1.6 (JPE Worst-Case Payo↵s). Suppose w is a JPE with w00 = w01 = 0 and, for each
a0 2 A0 , p̂(·|a0 ) : [0, t̂(a0 )] ! [0, p(a0 )] is the unique solution to the initial value problem
p̂ 0 (t) =f (p̂(t)) :=

1
with
p̂(t)w11 + (1 p̂(t))w10

(1.1)

p̂(0) =p(a0 ),
where [0, t̂(a0 )] ✓ [0, c(a0 )] is the largest interval on which p̂(t) > 0 for all t 2 [0, t̂(a0 )). Then,
V (w ) = 2 min{1

w11 , p̄ [p̄(1

w11 ) + (1

p̄)(1

w10 )]},

(1.2)

where
p̄ := max0 p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 ).
a0 2A

The principal’s worst-case payo↵, V (w ), is two times the minimum of two terms. The first term

1

w11

is the principal’s payo↵ from each agent when the worst-case action set induces a game between the
agents in which there is an equilibrium in which both succeed with probability one. The second
term
p̄ [p̄(1

w11 ) + (1

p̄)(1

w10 )]

is the principal’s payo↵ when the worst-case action set induces a game between the agents with a
“shirking equilibrium” in which each succeeds with a probability p̄ as low as possible. (Both are
required because, for high enough w11 , the principal may prefer the shirking equilibrium.) The
solution to each di↵erential equation, p̂(·|a0 ), characterizes best-response dynamics in the limit of
a sequence of discrete games in which a0 is the only known action; p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 ) is the limit of the
equilibrium probability of success in this sequence of games; and p̄ is the maximum of these limits.
I discuss the proof of Lemma 1.6 in two parts. First, I describe the sequence of games that leads to
the worst-case probability p̄. Second, I describe why p̄ is, in fact, a lower bound.
The Worst-Case Sequence of Games

For simplicity, suppose there is a single known action a0

with success probability p(a0 ) = 1 and cost c(a0 ) = 14 . The optimal IPE puts w ⇤ = w11 = w10 = 12 .
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Given w ⇤ , the worst-case success probability approaches

p(a0 )

c(a0 )
1
= .
⇤
w
2

Now, suppose I reduce w10 to zero (corresponding to setting ✏ =

1
2

in the example of Section 1.2),

but keep all other wages the same. This contract is calibrated to w ⇤ and the known action a0 :

p(a0 )w11 + (1

p(a0 ))w10 = w ⇤ .

So, according to the analysis of Section 1.2, there is ostensibly no efficiency loss generated by this
modification.
In particular, if I consider only the class of games with action sets of the form A1 := A0 [ {a11 }, for
some action a11 with success probability p(a11 ) < p(a0 ), then the worst-case for the principal occurs
as p(a11 ) approaches the value at which the best-response condition binds:
p(a11 ) [p(a0 )w11 + (1

p(a0 ))w10 ]

c(a11 ) = p(a0 ) [p(a0 )w11 + (1
c(a0 ) c(a11 )
p(a0 )w11 + (1 p(a0 ))w10

() p(a11 ) = p(a0 )

p(a0 ))w10 ]

c(a0 )

1
.
2

Figure 1.3 depicts the best-response response path starting from the known (maximal) action a0 . The
dashed line may be interpreted as an indi↵erence curve with slope m =

1/(p(a0 )w11 +(1 p(a0 ))w10 )

and intercept b = p(a0 ): each action on the line, a, is identified by its cost relative to c(a0 ),
x = c(a0 )

c(a), and its success probability, y = p(a). Since the slope of the indi↵erence curve is

negative, the maximal reduction in success probability occurs when the cost reduction is as large as
possible, i.e. when c(a11 ) = 0 so that x = 14 .
But what if there are two unknown actions? Consider the action set A2 := A0 [ {a12 , a22 }, where a12
has a positive cost of c(a12 ) =

c(a0 )
2

=

1
8

and c(a22 ) = 0. A simple calculation shows that for a12 to be

a strict best-response to a0 , it must be the case that
p(a12 ) [p(a0 )w11 + (1

p(a0 ))w10 ]

() p(a12 ) > p(a0 )

c(a12 ) > p(a0 ) [p(a0 )w11 + (1

p(a0 ))w10 ]

c(a0 ) c(a12 )
3
= .
p(a0 )w11 + (1 p(a0 ))w10
4
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Figure 1.3: A1 Best-Response Path.
Furthermore, for a22 to be a best-response to a12 , it must be the case that
p(a22 ) > p(a12 )
If p(a12 ) is close to

3
4

c(a12 ) c(a22 )
= p(a12 )
p(a12 )w11 + (1 p(a12 ))w10

and p(a22 ) is close to p(a12 )

1
.
4p(a12 )

1/(4p(a12 )), then, in addition, a12 is the unique best-

response to a0 and a22 is the unique best-response to a12 . Hence, best-response dynamics converge
to (a12 , a12 ). Since (w , A1 ) is supermodular (Observation 1), Lemma 1.1 thus implies that (a12 , a12 )
is the unique Nash (and therefore, Pareto Efficient Nash) equilibrium. In it, each agent’s success
probability can be made arbitrarily close to
3
4

1
5
1
3 = 12 < 2 .
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See Figure 1.4, which now depicts a second indi↵erence curve, with a steeper slope, corresponding
to weak best-responses to a12 .
I now generalize this construction to drive the equilibrium probabilities of success even lower. Let
An := A0 [ {a1n , ..., ann } be an action set with c(akn ) = (n

k) c(an0 ) , so that costs are evenly distributed

on a grid between zero and c(a0 ). For each k = 1, ..., n, choose p(ak ) so that ak is a best-response to
ak

1,

i.e. set
p(ak ) = p(ak

1)

p(ak

✏(n)
)w
+
(1 p(ak
1
11

20

1 ))w10

+ ⇢(n),

(E)
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Figure 1.4: A2 Best-Response Path.
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Figure 1.5: p(ann ) as n ! 1.
where ✏(n) :=

c(a0 )
n

and ⇢(n) > 0.16 For ⇢(n) small, ak is a maximal best-response to ak

1

for

all k. It follows that the unique Nash equilibrium of (w , An ) is (ann , ann ), found again by iterating
best-responses. Hence, the equilibrium probability of success for each agent is p(ann ).
What is the limit of p(ann ) as n ! 1? The key observation is that Equation E is an Euler approximation of Equation 1.1, where

c(a0 )
n

is the step size of the approximation and ⇢(n) is a “rounding

error”. Hence, as n grows large, if the rounding error ⇢(n) approaches zero at an appropriately fast
rate relative to ✏(n), agents’ best-response dynamics are well-described by the solution to Equation
16 To

see why this is an equivalent condition, multiply both sides of the equation by p(ak
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1 )w11 + (1

p(ak

1 ))w10 .
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Figure 1.6: Increasing w11 .
1.1, p̂(·|a0 ), under the interpretation that time t is “cost-reduction relative to a0 ”.17 In the example
considered here, the limit is

p̄ = p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 ) = p̂(c(a0 )|a0 ) = p̂(0.25|a0 ) = 0,

as depicted in Figure 1.5.
Why is p̄ a Lower Bound?

Since the law of motion in Equation 1.1 is controlled by the wages

the principal o↵ers, the principal can increase p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 ) above zero. For instance, Figure 1.6 shows
that if the principal increases w11 to 23 , while keeping w10 at 0, then she increases p̄ = p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 )
back to 12 , the worst-case probability of success given the optimal IPE. In this case, Lemma 1.6 then
dictates that there does not exist a game that drives the equilibrium probability of success below 12 .
I outline the proof that

1
2

is a lower bound. By Observation 1, for any action set A ◆ A0 = {a0 },

the game (w , A) is supermodular and exhibits strictly positive spillovers. Hence, by Lemma 1.1,
its unique Pareto Efficient Nash equilibrium can be found by iterating the maximal best-response
function BR starting from the maximal element of A, amax . There are two possible cases: (i) a0 = amax
17 See,

for instance, Theorem 6.3 of Atkinson (1989) and the proceeding discussion.
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and (ii) amax ⌫ a0 and a0 6⌫ amax . I argue that the equilibrium probability of success cannot be below
p̄ in either case.
Suppose first that a0 = amax . It suffices to show that any best-response path (a0 , ..., an ), beginning
at a0 and ending at an , satisfies p(an )

p̂(c(a0 )|a0 ) = p̄. If a1 = BR(a0 ), then it must be the case

that

c(a0 ) c(a1 )
p(a0 )w11 + (1 p(a0 ))w10

p(a1 ) > p(a0 )

✏p̂ 0 (✏|a0 )

= p̂(0|a0 )
p̂(✏|a0 ),
where ✏ := c(a0 )

c(a1 ) > 0 and the inequality follows from concavity of p̂(·|a0 ). By induction, it

can then be shown that
p(ak )

p̂(

k
X
`=1

where ✏k := c(ak ) c(ak

1)

> 0. As

Pn

`=1 ✏`

✏` |a0 )

for all k = 1, ..., n,

= c(a0 ), this means that p(an )

p̂(c(a0 )|a0 ) as desired.

Suppose, instead, that amax ⌫ a0 and a0 6⌫ amax . Then, p(amax ) = 1 and c(amax ) <
Any best-response path starting at amax and ending at an must have p(an )

1
4

= c(a0 ).

p̂(c(amax )|amax ) by the

argument just outlined. Plotting p̂(·|amax ) and p̂(·|a0 ) on a cost-adjusted axis, however, it is clear
that p̂(·|amax ) lies above p̂(·|a0 ) (see Figure 1.7).18 Hence, p(an )

p̂(c(amax )|amax )

p̂(c(a0 )|a0 ),

establishing the result.
The full proof of Lemma 1.6 extends the previous arguments to the case of an arbitrary known
action set A0 . This entails showing that the lowest probability of success, p̄, is the maximum of
p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 ) for all a0 2 A0 rather than, say, the minimum. It also involves ruling out best-response
paths originating from unknown actions that succeed with strictly higher probability than any known
action. To prove these claims, I show that any path of actions containing an action “beneath” a
di↵erential equation associated with a known action cannot be a best-response path.

1.4.3.4 Existence of a Calibrated JPE Outperforming IPE
While I demonstrated in the previous section that not every calibrated JPE outperforms a benchmark
(optimal) IPE, I prove that there must exist one that does. Thus, I obtain the following Lemma,
18 More formally, since both are solutions to the same initial value problem with distinct initial conditions, their
paths can never cross. Since there is a time period t at which p̂(c(a0 ) c(amax ) + t|amax ) is above p̂(t|a0 ), the result
follows.
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Figure 1.7: p̂(t|amax ) lies above p̂(t|a0 ).
proved in Appendix 1.7.4.
Lemma 1.7 (JPE Outperforms IPE). There exists a JPE with w00 = w10 = 0 yielding the principal
⇤
a strictly higher worst-case payo↵ than VIPE
.

I illustrate the argument using the running example with a single known action a0 that results in
success with probability p(a0 ) = 1 and has an e↵ort cost of c(a0 ) = 14 . As previously pointed out,
the optimal IPE given this action puts w ⇤ = w11 = w10 = 12 . Consider the calibrated JPE setting
w10 = w ⇤

✏=

1
2

✏ for small ✏ > 0 and setting

p(a0 )w11 + (1

p(a0 ))w10 = w ⇤ () w11 =

1
.
2

I show that this contract strictly increases the principal’s worst-case payo↵.
Elementary methods show that the solution to the di↵erential equation defining p̄ in Lemma 1.6 is

p̄(✏) :=

q

1 1
2(2

✏)
✏

( 12

✏)

.

A simple application of L’HÃ´pital’s rule confirms that as ✏ ! 0+ , so that the wage scheme I
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constructed approaches the optimal IPE, p̄(✏) approaches 12 , the worst-case equilibrium probability
of success given the optimal IPE. Di↵erentiating p̄(✏) and taking its limit as ✏ ! 0+ , I identify a
local calibration e↵ect on the worst-case probability of success:
lim+ p̄ 0 (✏) =

✏!0

1
.
4

I now compute the local e↵ect of calibration on the principal’s profit from each agent in the shirking
equilibrium.19 For any ✏ > 0, the principal’s payo↵ per agent in the shirking equilibrium is

⇡(✏) :=

p̄(✏)
|{z}

Expected Task Value

Using the chain rule and taking limits,
lim ⇡ 0 (✏) = lim p̄ 0 (✏) [1
✏!0+ |

✏!0+

0

= ( lim p̄ (✏))(1
✏!0+

=

(p̄(✏)w11 + (1
{z

Efficiency Loss
⇤

⇥ [1
|

p̄(✏))w10 )] .
}

Conditional Expected Surplus

d
p̄(✏))w10 )] + p̄(✏) [1
} | d✏

w ) + ( lim p̄(✏))w
✏!0+

(p̄(✏)w11 + (1
{z

⇤

(p̄(✏)w11 + (1
{z
Gain in Rents

p̄(✏))w10 )]
}

1
1
1
⇥ + > 0.
4
2
4

This establishes the desired result.

1.4.3.5 Existence, Uniqueness, and Optimal Wages
I summarize the preceding arguments. Lemma 1.4 establishes that, for the purposes of finding a
weakly optimal contract, it suffices to consider those setting w00 = w01 = 0. Any such contract
is either an RPE, JPE, or IPE. Lemma 1.5 establishes that no RPE with w00 = w01 = 0 can
⇤
outperform VIPE
, the supremum payo↵ attainable within the class of IPE. On the other hand,

Lemma 1.7 establishes that there does exist a JPE with w00 = w01 = 0 that yields the principal a
⇤
strictly higher payo↵ than VIPE
. Hence, if there exists a JPE with w00 = w01 = 0 that maximizes

Equation 1.2, the principal’s worst-case payo↵ given an arbitrary JPE, then it is a worst-case optimal
contract.
19 As the principal’s profit in the shirking equilibrium at the optimal IPE is strictly lower than in the equilibrium
in which both agents succeed probability one, it suffices to show that the principal benefits from such a decrease to
exhibit a strict increase in the principal’s payo↵.
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To establish existence of a worst-case optimal contract, I simply observe that the search for an
optimal JPE with w00 = w01 = 0 can be recast as a maximization problem of a continuous function
over a compact set. To establish that any worst-case optimal contract must be a nonlinear JPE with
w00 = w01 = 0, I need only strengthen the proof of Lemma 1.4 to show that any contract w with
either w00 > 0 or w01 > 0 is either weakly outperformed by an IPE or RPE, or strictly outperformed
by a JPE. I leave these last details to Appendix 1.7.5, thereby completing the proof of Theorem 1.1.
To conclude the analysis, notice that the optimal values of w11 and w10 can be found by solving the
following maximization problem:

max

w11 >w10 0

min{1

w11 , p̄ [p̄(1

w11 ) + (1

p̄)(1

w10 )]},

where p̄ is defined in the statement of Lemma 1.6. In the running example I have considered, the
optimal wages are w11 =

2
3

and w10 = w01 = w00 = 0; the principal increases w11 above the optimal

IPE wage, 12 , to mitigate the efficiency loss I illustrated when w11 =

1
2

and w10 = 0. As shown in

Figure 1.6, by doing so, she increases p̄ to 12 , the worst-case equilibrium probability of success given
the optimal IPE.20

1.5. Discussion
I briefly sketch how the model might be enriched, describe how the analysis changes, and draw
attention to some open questions.
1.5.1. Asymmetric Contracts
Symmetric contracts are attractive from a normative perspective: Any asymmetric contract is discriminatory in the sense of treating equals unequally. Hence, they may be ruled out by either legal
considerations or–if the principal randomizes–ex post fairness considerations. However, it is natural
to wonder whether the “anti”- Informativeness Principle finding of my paper holds when asymmetric
contracts are permitted. In particular, is it in general optimal to link the incentives of identical,
technologically independent agents? I provide an affirmative answer to this question.21
20 Incidentally, 1
w11 = p̄ [p̄(1 w11 ) + (1 p̄)(1 w10 )] at the optimal wage scheme, as well. I remark that this
is not a general property, nor it is a general property that the principal exactly o↵sets the efficiency loss generated
by JPE by increasing w11 . It is, however, a general property that at any worst-case optimal contract the principal’s
payo↵ in the equilibrium in which agents succeed with probability one is greater than in the shirking equilibrium.
21 In a Bayesian environment in which a principal demands e↵ort as a unique Nash equilibrium, Winter (2004)
shows that asymmetric contracts can be optimal even when agents are symmetric. As Winter (2004) points out,
however, if agents were restricted to play Pareto Efficient Nash equilibria, then any optimal contract is symmetric.
His argument therefore appears to have no relevance to the model I study.
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i
i
i
i
Formally, an asymmetric contract is a quadruple w i = (w11
, w10
, w01
, w00
) 2 R4+ for each agent

i = 1, 2, where the first index of each wage indicates agent i’s success or failure and the second
indicates agent j’s success or failure. An asymmetric contract is linear if there exist parameters
↵i 2 [0, 1] for each agent i = 1, 2 such that wyi i yj = ↵i (yi + yj ) (and nonlinear, otherwise). It is an
independent performance evaluation (IPE) if wyi 1 = wyi 0 for each agent i = 1, 2 and success
or failure y 2 {0, 1}. It is a dependent performance evaluation (DPE), otherwise. A nearly
immediate corollary of the proof of Theorem 1.1 is the following.
Corollary 1. If there exists an asymmetric contract that outperforms the optimal symmetric nonlinear JPE, then it must be nonlinear and it must be a DPE.
That any worst-case optimal asymmetric contract must be nonlinear is immediate from the argument
in Lemma 1.3. If, towards contradiction, some agent were compensated linearly, then, outside of
trivial cases, the principal can simply shift their wages down by a constant and strictly increase her
payo↵ given any action set available to the agents.
That any worst-case optimal asymmetric contract must be a DPE is immediate upon observing that,
within the class of all IPE, if there exists a worst-case optimal IPE, then there exists a worst-case
optimal symmetric IPE. Indeed, given the absence of productive or informational linkages between
agents, any optimal contract for agent i, w i , is also an optimal contract for agent j; if not, then the
contract o↵ered to agent i could not have been optimal in the first place. Since, by Lemma 1.7, there
exists a JPE that strictly outperforms the optimal symmetric IPE, this implies that there exists a
JPE that strictly outperforms any IPE–symmetric or asymmetric.
Though I have not found an asymmetric contract that outperforms the optimal symmetric nonlinear
JPE, proving that no such contract exists is non-trivial.22 I therefore leave as an unproven conjecture
that the optimal symmetric contract I have identified is also optimal when the principal is permitted
to use asymmetric contracts.
22 To understand the difficulties involved in constructing a proof, it is instructive to consider how such a result
is proved in standard Bayesian contracting models. In these models, if the principal considers implementing each
possible action profile and then chooses the implementation that maximizes her profits. For symmetric action profiles,
if there exists an incentive compatible asymmetric contract that minimizes expected wage payments and if agents are
symmetric, then a “flipped” contract in which the agents labels are exchanged is also incentive compatible and minimizes expected wage payments. As incentive constraints are linear in probabilities, it then follows that randomizing
over asymmetric contracts produces a symmetric contract that satisfies the incentive constraints and also minimizes
the principal’s expected payments. Hence, asymmetry does not pose a problem if the principal wants to implement
symmetric profiles. In the robust contracting setting, this argument does not work because the principal does not solve
her problem by fixing an action profile that she wants to implement and then maximizing over all implementations.
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1.5.2. Multiple Levels of Success and Multiple Agents
Now, suppose there are finitely many agents i = 1, 2, ..., n and individual output can take on any
value in a compact set Y ⇢ R+ with min(Y ) = 0. Each action is now described by an e↵ort cost
and probability distribution over Y . A linear contract in this model is a function
w : Y N ! R+
(y1 , ..., yn ) 7! ↵

n
X

yi ,

i=1

for some value ↵ 2 [0, 1]. Otherwise, it is nonlinear. The result that worst-case optimal compensation is nonlinear readily generalizes to this setting by again modifying the argument establishing
Lemma 1.3.
Corollary 2. If Y ⇢ R+ is a compact set with min(Y ) = 0 and there are n agents, then any
worst-case optimal contract must be nonlinear.
Showing that dependent performance evaluation is optimal in the case of multiple agents when
e↵ort is binary is immediate from the main analysis, which shows that the principal would stand to
benefit from using JPE with any two agents rather than o↵ering each the optimal IPE. However,
showing that JPE is optimal is more challenging because RPE no longer induces a supermodular
game between the agents (it no longer suffices to “reverse” the order given to one agent’s action
set when there are more than two of them). Hence, Lemma 1.5 must be extended. Proving that
optimal compensation involves dependent performance evaluation when there are multiple output
levels is non-trivial. The key challenge is to define an order ⌫ over the set of actions, each of which
now consists of an e↵ort cost and a probability distribution over outcomes Y , that generalizes the
one defined in Section 1.4.2.

1.6. Final Remarks
I study a moral hazard in teams model in which a principal compensates identical, independent
agents. In contrast to the classical model, however, I assume that the principal has non-quantifiable
uncertainty about the common actions available to the agents. The worst-case optimal contracts
that arise–nonlinear, joint performance evaluation contracts–contrast strikingly with what arises if
the principal has either unbounded, non-quantifiable uncertainty–in which case linear contracts are
worst-case optimal–or if she is fully Bayesian–in which case independent performance evaluation is
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optimal. I thereby provide a novel robustness foundation for nonlinear joint performance evaluation
contracts observed in practice, such as team bonuses and employee stock options in start-ups.
I conclude by commenting on a broader theme in the literature. Over the last decades, a growing
number of papers have investigated the “robustness” of classical game-theoretic predictions and
mechanisms to various relaxations of the agents’ environment. For instance, Bergemann and Morris
(2005) consider robust implementation across all type spaces; Chen, Di Tillio, Faingold, and Xiong
(2017) propose a metric on the Universal Type Space to capture the strategic impact of relaxing
higher-order beliefs in all possible games the agents might play; and, as discussed, Dai and Toikka
(2018) study moral hazard in teams in a robust contracting setting in which the principal deems all
possible unknown action profiles to be plausible.
While these papers make important methodological contributions, the uncertainty faced by the
designer (or modeler) in these settings appears to be too extreme for many applications. My paper
contributes to a small, but growing, research agenda exploring the robustness of predictions and
mechanisms in the “intermediate” cases between fully Bayesian and fully Knightian uncertainty.
For recent work in this spirit, see Antic (2015), who imposes bounds on the principal’s uncertainty
over unknown actions in a single-agent robust principal-agent model; Ollar and Penta (2019), who
consider robust implementation in the case in which it is common knowledge that agents’ types are
identically distributed; Gensbittel, Peski, and Renault (2020), who consider robustness to higherorder beliefs within the class of zero-sum games; and Malenko and Tsoy (2020), who study optimal
project financing when the financier has bounded, non-quantifiable uncertainty about a project’s
cash flows.

1.7. Appendix: Proofs
1.7.1. Proof of Lemma 1.4
Given an eligible contract w , agent i’s expected payo↵ is
Ui (ai , aj ; w ) = p(ai ) [p(aj )w11 + (1
+ (1

p(aj ))w10 ]

p(ai )) [p(aj )w01 + (1

= p(ai ) [p(aj )(w11

w01 ) + (1

+ [p(aj )w01 + (1
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p(aj ))w00 ]

p(aj ))w00 ]

c(ai )

p(aj ))(w10

w00 )]

c(ai ).

0
Hence, if w11 > w01 (w10 > w00 ), setting w11
= w11

0
0
w01 and w01
= 0 (w10
= w10

0
w00 and w00
= 0)

0
shifts each agent’s payo↵ by a constant. Similarly, if w11 < w01 (w10 < w00 ), setting w01
= w01
0
0
and w11
= 0 (w00
= w00

w11

0
w10 and w10
= 0) shifts each agent’s payo↵ by a constant. It follows that

any equilibrium under w is also an equilibrium under w 0 . Since the principal’s ex post payment
decreases, these adjustments must (weakly) increase her worst-case payo↵.
The argument in the previous paragraph immediately establishes that if w11 > 0 and w10 > 0,
0
0
then there exists an improved contract w 0 for which w00
= w01
= 0. There are three other cases

to consider: (i) w01 > 0 and w00 > 0 (with w11 = w10 = 0); (ii) w11 > 0 and w00 > 0 (with
w01 = w10 = 0); and (iii) w01 > 0 and w10 > 0 (with w11 = w00 = 0). I discuss each case in turn.

w01 > 0 and w00 > 0
If w01 > 0 and w00 > 0, then w cannot be eligible. To wit, consider the action set A := A0 [ {a; }
where p(a; ) = 0 = c(a; ). Then, a; is a strictly dominant strategy and so (a; , a; ) is the unique Nash
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the principal obtains a payo↵

2w00 < 0.

w11 > 0 and w00 > 0
I first argue that if w is eligible, then it must have w11

w00 . Suppose, towards contradiction, that

w00 > w11 . Consider the action set A := A0 [ {a; } where p(a; ) = 0 = c(a; ). Then, (a; , a; ) is the
only Pareto Efficient Nash Equilibrium because each agent obtains the maximum wage w00 at no
e↵ort cost and any other Nash Equilibrium results in this wage with a probability strictly less than
one. In the equilibrium (a; , a; ), however, the principal obtains a payo↵
If w11

2w00 < 0.

w00 > 0, then agent i’s payo↵ is

Ui (ai , aj ; w ) = p(ai )p(aj )w11 + (1

p(ai ))(1

p(aj ))w00

c(ai ),

and satisfies increasing di↵erences in (ai , aj ). Hence, any game this contract induces is supermodular.
Moreover, fixing aj , (ai , w00 ) satisfies decreasing di↵erences. Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) then implies that the maximal equilibrium of any game (w , A), A ◆ A0 , is decreasing in w00 .
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Now, suppose agent i produces succeeds with probability pi . The principal’s payo↵ given (pi , pj ) is

⇡(pi , pj ) := pi pj (2

2w11 ) + pi (1

pj ) + pj (1

pi ) + (1

pi )(1

pj )(0

2w00 ).

Profits are therefore increasing in pi if and only if,
@⇡
= pj (2
@pi

2w11 ) + (1

pj 

2pj ) + (1

pj )2w00

0 ()

1 + 2w00
.
2w11 + 2w00

If w11  12 , then the right-hand side expression is greater than one and profits are strictly increasing
in pi and pj on their whole domain (for any w00 ). The principal’s worst-case payo↵ thus strictly
increases when w00 decreases to zero. If 1 > w11 >
pi and pj when both are less than

1+2w00
2w11 +2w00

1
2,

then the principal’s payo↵ is increasing in

and decreasing above it. If A := A0 [ {a1 }, where

p(a1 ) = 1 > 0 = c(a1 ), however, then (a1 , a1 ) is the maximal equilibrium. Since the principal may
only obtain a strictly lower payo↵ than 2

2w11 if the maximal equilibrium of some game is in the

region in which profits are strictly increasing in both pi and pj , it is once again in the principal’s
interest to increase the maximal equilibrium by setting w00 = 0. Last, I need not consider the case
in which w11

1 since no such contract is eligible.

w01 > 0 and w10 > 0
Notice, if w01 > 0 and w10 > 0 and all other wages are zero, agent i’s payo↵ from an action profile
(ai , aj ) is
Ui (ai , aj ; w ) = p(ai )(1
= p(ai ) [w10

p(aj ))w10 + (1

p(ai ))p(aj )w01

c(ai )

p(aj )(w10 + w01 )] + p(aj )w01

c(ai ),

which satisfies decreasing di↵erences. I show that the principal’s payo↵ under such a contract cannot
⇤
exceed VIPE
.

Let a; be the action satisfying c(a; ) = p(a; ) = 0. Let a✏⇤ be an action for which c(a✏⇤ ) = 0 and for
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which p(a✏⇤ ) is a fixed point of

T✏ (p) :=

8
>
>
<

max
0

a2A [{a; }

>
>
:0

h

p(a)

w10

c(a)
p(w10 +w01 )

i

+✏

if w10

p(w10 + w01 ) > 0
,

otherwise

where ✏ > 0 is small. To see that T✏ has a fixed point, notice that, for any p 2 [0, 1], T✏ (p) is
larger than zero (because a; 2 A0 [ {a; }) and less than one if ✏ is small enough (because A0 does
not contain a zero-cost action that results in success with probability one by the assumption of
costly known productive actions). Hence, T✏ is a continuous function mapping [0, 1] into [0, 1]. By
Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, it thus has at least one fixed point.
By construction, (a✏⇤ , a✏⇤ ) is a Nash equilibrium of (w , A✏ ), where A✏ := A0 [{a✏⇤ , a; }. Now, consider a
sequence of strictly positive values ✏1 , ✏2 ,... that converges to zero and for which there is a convergent
sequence of fixed points p(a✏⇤1 ), p(a✏⇤2 ),... of the mappings T✏1 , T✏2 ,... . Since [0, 1] is a compact set,
such a convergent sequence must exist. Moreover, its limit is the distribution
p ⇤ :=

max
0

a2A [{a; }



p(a)

w10

c(a)
.
p ⇤ (w10 + w01 )

I show that the principal’s worst-case payo↵ in the limit can be no larger than what she obtains
from the optimal IPE. If p ⇤ equals zero, then the principal attains less than zero profits and so lower
profits than under the optimal IPE. Otherwise, let â0 denote a maximizer of p(a)
over A0 [ {a; }, let ↵
ˆ := (1

p ⇤ )w10 , and notice that the principal attains a payo↵ of

⇥
⇤
2 (p ⇤ )2 + p ⇤ (1 p ⇤ )(1 w01 w10 )

c(â0 )
= 2 p(â0 )
[1 (1 p ⇤ )(w10 + w01 )]
(1 p ⇤ )(w10 + w01 )

c(â0 )
 2 p(â0 )
[1 (1 p ⇤ )w10 ]
(1 p ⇤ )w10

c(â0 )
= 2 p(â0 )
[1 ↵
ˆ] .
↵
ˆ
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c(a)
w10 p ⇤ (w10 +w01 )

But,


2 p(â0 )

c(â0 )
(1
↵
ˆ

↵
ˆ)  2

max 0

↵2[0,1],a0 2A [{a; }

=2

max

↵2[0,1],a0 2A0





(1

(1

c(a0 )
)
↵
c(a0 )
)
↵

↵)(p(a0 )

↵)(p(a0 )

⇤
= VIPE
,
c(â0 )
↵
ˆ

where the inequality follows because p(â0 )

0 for all ↵
ˆ

0 and the equality follows because

setting ↵ = 1 yields the principal a payo↵ of zero given any action in A0 , the payo↵ attained from
choosing a; and any ↵ 2 [0, 1].
The previous argument establishes that if there exists a K such that, for all k

K , (a✏⇤k , a✏⇤k ) is the

⇤
unique Nash equilibrium of (w , A✏k ), then the principal’s worst-case payo↵ is no higher than VIPE
.

But, other pure and mixed strategy equilibria may exist, even as k grows large (so that ✏ grows
small). I now address this issue.
First, consider the case in which the limit of (a✏⇤k ) is a; and multiplicity arises. Then, there exists an
action a0 2 A0 that results in success with strictly positive probability and is a weak best response
to any action that succeeds with zero probability; if not, then, by Lemma 1.1, there would exist a K
such that for all k

K , (a✏⇤k , a✏⇤k ) is the maximal Nash equilibrium of (w , A✏k ) and hence the unique

Nash equilibrium. If this action is less than

w10
w10 +w01 ,

then the principal’s payo↵ in an equilibrium in

which it is played is less than zero:

p(a0 )(1

w10

If this action is strictly larger than
c(a00 ) = 0 and p(a00 ) = p(a0 )

c(a0 )
w10

w01 ) 

w10
w10 +w01 ,

w10
w10 + w01

w10 < 0.

then I can add to each A✏k the action a00 for which
c(a0 )
w10

if p(a0 )

w10
w10 +w01

>

and p(a00 ) =

w10
w10 +w01

+ ✏k otherwise. In

the first case, the principal attains a payo↵ of


p(a0 )

c(a0 )
(1
w10

w10

w01 )  2

max

↵2[0,1],a0

2A0

In the second case, there exists a K such that for all k



(1

↵)(p(a0 )

c(a0 )
⇤
) = VIPE
.
↵

K , the principal’s payo↵ in the equilibrium

(a00 , a✏⇤k ) is less than zero because the inequality in the previous displayed equation is strict. Finally,
no mixed equilibria can exist in any of the cases considered since a; is a strict best response to any
action larger than

w10
w10 +w01

(the marginal benefit of producing succeeding with higher probability is
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less than zero).
Second, consider the case in which the limit of (a✏⇤k ) is p ⇤ > 0. Any other pure or mixed Nash
equilibrium of (w , A✏k ) must involve one agent succeeding with probability p̂

w10
w10 +w01

> p ⇤ . If

not, then p(a✏⇤k ) would be a best-response to the distribution p̂ and, if p(a✏⇤k ) is played, then any
distribution p̂ could not be a best-response. The first statement follows because p(a✏⇤ ) has zero cost,
profits would still be increasing in the probability with which the agent succeeds, and there are
strictly decreasing di↵erences. The second follows because p(a✏⇤k ) is a strict best-response to p(a✏⇤k )
by construction. However, any equilibrium in which one agent generates a distribution p̂ must have
the other play either a; (if p(a0 ) >
two (again, only if p(a0 ) =

w10
w10 +w01 ),

w10
w10 +w01 );

a✏⇤k (only if p(a0 ) =

w10
w10 +w01 ),

or a mixture between the

known productive actions are costly and the marginal benefit

of succeeding with higher probability is less than zero (strictly so if p(a0 ) >

w10
w10 +w01 ).

It suffices to show that the principal’s payo↵ in the equilibrium in which one agent chooses a; is less
⇤
than VIPE
; none of the other equilibria can Pareto dominate it as the mixing player is indi↵erent

between a; and a✏⇤k and I have already argued that the symmetric equilibrium I constructed yields
⇤
the principal a worse payo↵ than VIPE
. To show this, it suffices to consider any action, a0 2 A0 ,

satisfying p(a0 )

w10
w10 +w01

in the support of the strategy succeeding with probability p̂. Mirroring

the argument in the previous case, I can then add to each A✏k the action a00 for which c(a00 ) = 0
and p(a00 ) = p(a0 )

c(a0 )
w10

+ ✏k if p(a0 )

c(a0 )
w10

w10
w10 +w01

>

and p(a00 ) =

w10
w10 +w01

+ ✏k otherwise. These

adjustments ensure that a00 is the unique best response to a; for every k and so, mirroring the steps
⇤
in the proof of the previous case, the principal attains a payo↵ no larger than VIPE
.

1.7.2. Proof of Lemma 1.5
Let a; be the action satisfying c(a; ) = p(a; ) = 0. Let a✏⇤ be an action for which c(a✏⇤ ) = 0 and for
which p(a✏⇤ ) is a fixed point of
T✏ (p) :=

max

a0 2A0 [{a; }



p(a0 )

c(a0 )
+ ✏,
pw11 + (1 p)w10

where ✏ > 0 is small.23 To see that T✏ has a fixed point, notice that, for any p 2 [0, 1], T✏ (p) is
larger than zero (because a; 2 A0 [ {a; }) and less than one if ✏ is small enough (because A0 does not
contain a zero-cost action that results in success with probability one). Hence, T✏ is a continuous
23 Interpret

c(a0 ) > 0.

c(a0 )
pw11 +(1 p)w10

as zero if the denominator is zero and c(a0 ) = 0 and
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1 if the denominator is zero and

function mapping [0, 1] into [0, 1]. By Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, it thus has at least one fixed
point.
Now, define an action space A✏ := A0 [ {a✏⇤ , a; }. If A0 contains an action producing yi = 1 with
probability one, consider the least costly among all of them, ā0 , and add to A✏ the action ā✏ , where
c(ā✏ ) = c(ā0 )

(✏) and p(ān ) = 1

(✏)
2

for (✏) :=

✏(p(a✏⇤ )w11 +(1 p(a✏⇤ ))w10
.
2

Then, ā✏ strictly dominates

ā0 (and so any other action producing yi = 1 with probability one is as well) and a✏⇤ is a strictly
better reply to a✏⇤ than ā✏ .
I show that (a✏⇤ , a✏⇤ ) is the unique Nash equilibrium of (w , A✏ ). Notice, by construction, (a✏⇤ , a✏⇤ ) is
a strict Nash equilibrium. Now, remove all actions producing yi = 1 with probability one since they
are strictly dominated by ā✏ . Upon removing these actions, a✏⇤ strictly dominates any action smaller
than it in the order ⌫. So, remove any actions in (w , A✏ ) below a✏⇤ and denote the resulting action
space by Â. Now, consider the profile (ā, a✏⇤ ), where ā is the largest element of Â. Since a✏⇤ is the
unique best response to a✏⇤ (because (a✏⇤ , a✏⇤ ) is a strict Nash equilibrium), the maximal best-response
to a✏⇤ is a✏⇤ . This also implies that a✏⇤ is the minimal best-response to ā; if not, there exists some
â0 2 Â such that â0

a✏⇤ and

Ui (â0 , a0 ; w )

Ui (a✏⇤ , a0 ; w )

Ui (â0 , ā; w )

Ui (a✏⇤ , ā; w ) > 0 for any a0 2 Â,

where the first inequality follows from the property of decreasing di↵erences and the second from a0
being the smallest best-response to ā. Hence, â0 strictly dominates a✏⇤ , contradicting the previous
f (a⇤ , a⇤ ) is the limit
observation that a✏⇤ is a best response to a✏⇤ . As (a✏⇤ , a✏⇤ ) is a fixed point of BR,
✏
✏

f from (ā, a⇤ ) or (a⇤ , ā) in (w , Â). By Lemma 1.2, it follows that (a⇤ , a⇤ ) is the
found by iterating BR
✏
✏
✏
✏
unique Nash equilibrium of (w , Â) and hence of (w , A✏ ).

Now, consider a sequence of strictly positive values ✏1 , ✏2 ,... that converges to zero and for which
there is a convergent sequence of fixed points p(a✏⇤1 ), p(a✏⇤2 ),... of the mappings T✏1 , T✏2 ,... . Since
[0, 1] is a compact set, such a convergent sequence must exist. Moreover, its limit is the distribution
p(a⇤ ) =

max
0

a0 2A [{a; }



p(a0 )

c(a0 )
.
p(a⇤ )w11 + (1 p(a⇤ ))w10

Let â0 2 A0 [ {a; } denote the maximizer on the right-hand side and define ↵
ˆ := p(a⇤ )w11 + (1
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p(a⇤ ))w10 . The principal’s payo↵ in the unique equilibrium (a✏⇤k , a✏⇤k ) of (w , A✏k ) as k grows large
becomes arbitrarily close to
2 [p(a⇤ )] [p(a⇤ )(1

2 p(â0 )

c(â0 )
(1
↵
ˆ

w11 ) + (1

↵
ˆ)  2

max 0

↵2[0,1],a0 2A [{a; }

where the inequality follows because p(â0 )

c(â0 )
↵
ˆ

of ↵ between zero and one to maximize (1

2

max 0

↵2[0,1],a0 2A [{a; }



(1

p(a⇤ ))(1


(1

0 for all ↵
ˆ

↵)(p(a0 )

↵)(p(a0 )

c(a0 )
) ,
↵

0 and so I need only consider values

c(a0 )
↵ )

for any a0 2 A0 [ {a; }. But,

c(a0 )
) = 2 max 0
↵
↵2[0,1],a0 2A

↵)(p(a0 )

w10 )] =



(1

↵)(p(a0 )

c(a0 )
⇤
) = VIPE
↵

because setting ↵ = 1 yields the principal a payo↵ of zero given any action in A0 , the same payo↵
attained from choosing a; and any ↵ 2 [0, 1].
1.7.3. Proof of Lemma 1.6

Comparative Statics in Principal’s Payo↵
Suppose agent i succeeds with probability pi . The principal’s payo↵ given (pi , pj ) is

⇡(pi , pj ) := pi pj (2

2w11 ) + [pi (1

pj ) + (1

pi )pj ] (1

w10 ).

The principal’s payo↵ is therefore increasing in pi if and only if
@⇡(p)
= pj (2
@pi

2w11 ) + (1

2pj )(1

w10 )

0 ()


1 1 w10
pj 
.
2 w11 w10
Monotonicity of ⇡(pi , pj ) on [0, 1] thus depends on w : (i) if w10
pi and pj ; (ii) if w10 < 1 and w11 

1+w10
2 ,

1, then ⇡ is decreasing on [0, 1] in

then ⇡(p) is increasing on [0, 1] in pi and pj ; and, (iii) if
h
i
1 w10
1
10
> 1+w
,
then
⇡(p)
is
increasing
in
p
if
p
2
[0,
i
j
2
2 w11 w10 ] and decreasing in pi if

w10 < 1 and w11
h
i
pj 2 [ 12 w111 ww1010 , 1].
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In case (i), ⇡ is minimized when pi = pj = 1, yielding the principal a payo↵ of

2

2w11 .

This payo↵ can be achieved exactly: Consider the action set A := A0 [ {â} ◆ A0 , where p(â) = 1
and c(â) = 0. Then, because w11 > w10

1, â is a strictly dominant strategy and so the unique

Nash equilibrium of (w , A) is (â, â).
In case (ii), ⇡ is minimized when the probability with which the maximal equilibrium action of
(w , A) succeeds with strictly positive probability, for any A ◆ A0 , is as small as possible (by
Observation 1 and Lemma 1.1 there always exists such an action). Letting p̄ denote the greatest
lower bound on such probabilities, the principal’s payo↵ is,
p̄ 2 (2

2w11 ) + p̄(1

p̄)(2

2w10 ).

In case (iii), the principal’s payo↵ is the minimum of the payo↵ in case (i) and case (ii),

V (w ) = min{2

2w11 , p̄ 2 (2

2w11 ) + p̄(1

p̄)(2

2w10 )}.

I identify p̄ to complete the proof of the Lemma.
Defining p̄

Consider an arbitrary action a 2 A with cost c(a) and probability p(a). Let p̂(·|a) be

a solution to the initial value problem
p̂ 0 (t|a) = f (p̂(t|a)) :=

1
with
p̂(t|a)w11 + (1 p̂(t|a))w10

p̂(0|a) = p(a)
on D = [0, t̂(a)] ⇥ [0, p(a)], where [0, t̂(a)] ✓ [0, c(a)] is the largest interval on which p̂(t|a) > 0 for
all t 2 [0, t̂(a)). Notice, p̂ 0 (t|a) exists on (0, t̂(a)), p̂ 0 (t|a) < 0, and p̂ 00 (t|a) < 0. So, p̂(·|a) is strictly
decreasing and strictly concave. Now, define

p̄ := max0 p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 ).
a0 2A
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p̄ is a lower bound

I show that p̄ is a lower bound on the probability of the maximal equilibrium

action of any game (w , A), where A ◆ A0 . I begin with the following claim.
Claim 1.1 (Lower Bound of a BR Path). Fix some game (w , A), where A ◆ A0 . Let (a1 , a2 , ..., an )
be the path starting from the maximal element of A, a1 , to the maximal equilibrium action, an ,
obtained by iterating BR. If a = a` for some ` = 1, ..., n, then

p(an )

p̂(t̂(a)|a).

Proof. Consider the truncated path starting at a = a` and ending at an . Notice that ak 2 BR(ak
for k = ` + 1, ..., n only if p(ak
p(ak ) [p(ak

1 )w11

+ (1

p(ak

1)

> p(ak ) and,

1 ))w10 ]

() p(ak ) > p(ak

Hence, ✏k := c(ak
c(an )

1)

c(ak ) > p(ak

1)

p(ak

1 ) [p(ak

1 )w11

+ (1

c(ak 1 ) c(ak )
+ (1 p(ak

1 )w11

p(ak

1 ))w10

1 ))w10 ]

c(ak

1)

.

c(ak ) > 0 for any k = ` + 1, ..., n. This implies that

0.

To show that p(an )

1)

Pn

k=`+1 ✏k

 c(a), since

p̂(t̂(a)|a), it suffices to consider the case in which f (t, p̂(t)|a) exists for all

t 2 [0, c(a)] (it must always be the case that p(an )
0). To show this, I need only show that
Pn
Pn
p(an ) p̂( k=`+1 ✏k |a) because p̂(·|a) is decreasing and so p̂(c(a)|a)  p̂( k=`+1 ✏k |a).
I prove the inequality by induction. For the base case, recall that p(a`+1 ) must satisfy the bestresponse condition
p(a`+1 )

p(a` )

✏1
p(a` )w11 + (1

p(a` ))w10

= p̂(0|a) + p̂ 0 (0|a)✏1
p̂(✏`+1 |a),
where the last inequality follows because p̂(·|a) is concave.
For the inductive step, suppose p̂(

Pm

k=`+1 ✏k |a)

 p(am ) for m = `+1, ..., K . I show that p̂(
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PK

k=`+1 ✏k +

✏K +1 |a)  p(aK +1 ). Once again, aK +1 is a best-response to aK only if,
p(aK +1 )

p(aK )
p̂(

K
X

k=`+1

p̂(

K
X

k=`+1

✏K +1
p(aK )w11 + (1 p(aK ))w10
✏k |a) + p̂ 0 (

K
X

k=`+1

✏k |a)✏K +1

✏k + ✏K +1 |a),

where the second inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and the last follows because p̂(·|a)
is concave.
Consider any finite set A ◆ A0 . Let c̃ be the maximal cost of any action in A and p̃ be the maximal
probability. For any action a 2 A, let p̃(·|a) be the solution to the initial value problem,
p̃ 0 (t|a) = f (p̃(t|a)) =
p̃(c̄

1
p̃(t|a)w11 + (1 p̃(t|a))w10

c(a)|a) = p(a),

on D = [0, t̃(a)] ⇥ [0, p̃], where [0, t̃(a)] ✓ [0, c̃] is the largest interval on which p̂(t|a) > 0 for all
t 2 [0, t̂(a)). Notice that p̃(c̄

c(a)+t|a) = p̂(t|a) for any t 2 [0, t̂(a)], p̃ 0 (·|a) < 0 for all t 2 [0, t̃(a)),

and p̃ 00 (·|a) < 0 for all t 2 [0, t̃(a)). Moreover, the following “no crossing” property holds; its proof
is immediate upon observing that the solution to the initial value problem is unique on any interval
[0, t̄] for t̄ < c̃, since f 0 (p̂(t|a)) is bounded and exists.24
Claim 1.2 (No Crossing). If p̃(t|a) > p̃(t|a0 ) for some t 2 [0, t̃(a)] \ [0, t̃(a0 )], then p̃(t 0 |a)
for any other t 0 2 [0, t̃(a)] \ [0, t̃(a0 )] and so p̂(t̂(a)|a)

p̃(t 0 |a0 )

p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 ).

Suppose, towards contradiction, that there was a game with a maximal equilibrium action distribution p satisfying p < p̄. Then, there must exist a finite path of actions in A, (a1 , ..., an ), for which (i)
a1 is the maximal element of A and p(an ) = p, (ii) p(a1 ) > ... > p(an ), and (iii) ak 2 BR(ak

1)

(so

that c(a1 ) > ... > c(an )) for k = 2, ..., n. It suffices to consider the case in which p̄ > 0, so that for
any ā0 2 argmax p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 ), p̃ 0 (·|ā0 ) is defined on [0, c̃]. Otherwise, it could never be that p < p̄.
a0

Now, let ak be the first action in the path (a1 , ..., an ) at which c(ak ) < c(ā0 ). Such an action must
24 See,

for instance, Theorem 2.2 of Coddington and Levinson (1955).
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exist. If not, then c(an )

c(ā0 ). So, if p = p(an ) < p̄ < p(ā0 ), then (an , an ) could not be a Nash

equilibrium; ā0 would be a strict best-response to an .
Consider the case in which k = 1, so that c(a1 ) < c(ā0 ). Then,

p̃(c̄

c(a1 )|a1 ) = p(a1 )

p(ā0 ) = p̃(c̄

c(ā0 )|ā0 ) > p̃(c̄

c(a1 )|ā0 ),

where the first inequality follows because a1 is maximal in A and the second because p̃(·|ā0 ) is strictly
decreasing. But then, p̂(t̂(a1 )|a1 )

p̂(t̂(ā0 )|ā0 ) by Claim 1.2. Hence, by Claim 1.1,

p = p(an )

p̂(t̂(a1 )|a1 )

p̂(t̂(ā0 )|ā0 ) = p̄.

Consider the case in which k > 1. Then, there exist two actions ak
c(ā0 ) > c(ak ). Notice, p(ak

1)

element and, if k > 2, then ak

p(ā0 ); if not and k = 2, then ak
1

1

1

and ak for which c(ak

1)

could not have been a maximal

could not have been a best response to ak

2

because ā0 would have

yielded a strictly higher payo↵. Notice also that it must be the case that

p(ak ) < p̃(c̄

c(ak )|ā0 )  p̃(c̄

c(ak )|ā0 )  p(ak ) = p̃(c̄

If the first inequality did not hold, then p̃(c̄
Claim 1.2 implies that p̂(t̂(ak )|ak )
p̂(t̂(ak )|ak )

c(ā0 )|ā0 ) = p(ā0 ).

c(ak )|ak ), in which case

p̂(t̂(ā0 )|ā0 ). Hence, by Claim 1.1, it must be that p = p(an )

p̂(t̂(ā0 )|ā0 ) = p̄. The second inequality follows because p̃(·|ā0 ) is decreasing.

I show that ā0 is a weakly better response to ak

1

than ak , contradicting the claim that ak 2 BR(ak

1)

(since ā0 > ak ). This is equivalent to showing that,
p(ā0 ) [p(ak

1 )w11

+ (1

()

p(ak


p(ā0 )
c(ā0 )

1 ))w10 ]

c(ā0 )

p(ak )

c(ak )

p(ak ) [p(ak



p(ak

1 )w11

1 )w11

1
+ (1

+ (1

p(ak

p(ak

1 ))w10

1 ))w10 ]

c(ak ),

.

Notice that,


p(ā0 )
c(ā0 )

p(ak )
p̃(c̄ c(ā0 )|ā0 )

c(ak )
(c̄ c(ā0 ))

p̃(c̄ c(ak )|ā0 )
 p̃ 0 (c̄
(c̄ c(ak ))

where the first inequality follows because p(ak ) < p̃(c̄
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c(ak )|ā0 ),

c(ak )|ā0 ) and the second inequality follows

because p̃(·|ā0 ) is concave. Further,


p(ak

1
1 )w11 + (1

p(ak



1 ))w10

where the first inequality follows from p(ak
p̃ 0 (c̄

1
p(ā0 )w11 + (1

1)

= p̃ 0 (c̄

p(ā0 ))w10

p(ā0 ). But, since c(ā0 )

c(ak )|ā0 )  p̃ 0 (c̄

c(ā0 )|ā0 ),

c(ak ),

c(ā0 )|ā0 ),

again by concavity of p̃(·|ā0 ).
p̄ is the greatest lower bound

I need only exhibit a sequence of action spaces (An ) for which

An ◆ A0 , ān is the maximal Nash equilibrium action of (w , An ), and,
p(ān ) ! p̄

as n ! 1.

Let c̃ be the maximal cost of any action in A0 and p̃ be the maximal probability. Then, define p̃(·|a)
as before. Finally, let ā0 2 arg max p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 ) be chosen so that t̃(ā0 )
a0

t̃(a0 ) for all a0 2 A0 .25

Suppose first that f (t, p̃(t|ā0 )) exists for all t 2 [0, c̃] so that p̃ 0 (·|a) and p̃ 00 (·|a) are bounded:
|p̃ 0 (t|a)|  |

p 0 (t|a)(w11 w10 )
| := 1 > 0,
(p̂(t̂|a)w11 + (1 p̂(t̂|a))w10 )2

and,
|p̂ 00 (t|a)|  |1

(w11 w10 )
| := 2 > 0.
(p̂(t̂|a)w11 + (1 p̂(t̂|a))w10 )2

Now, consider a sequence of action spaces (An ), with An := {a1n , a2n , ..., ann } [ A0 . Set a1n = p̃(t|ā0 ),
where t 2 [0, c̃] is such that p̃(t|ā0 ) = 1, and ān := ann for each n. Set c(akn
for k = 2, .., n, ⇢(n) :=

1
c̃
n2 w11 +1 ,

1)

c(akn ) =

c̃
n

:= ✏(n)

and

p(akn ) = p(akn

1)

p(akn

✏(n)
)w
+
(1 p(akn
11
1

1 ))w10

+ ⇢(n)

(E)

25 Intuitively, p̃(t̂(a )|a ) may equal zero for many a 2 A0 . The selection of ā ensures that p̃(·|ā ) hits zero at the
0
0
0
0
0
largest time and therefore, invoking Claim 1.2, is always above the di↵erential equations associated with other known
actions.
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for k = 2, ..., n. Notice,
1
n p(akn

c(a)
p(akn
1 )w11 + (1

1 ))w10

+

1 c(a)
< 0,
n2 w11 + 1

for k = 2, ..., n so that a1n > a2n > ... > ann . Equation E approximates p̃(t|ā0 ) on [t, c̄] ⇥ [0, p̄] using
Euler’s method with rounding error term ⇢(n). By the rounding error analysis of Atkinson (1989)
(see Theorem 6.3 and Equation 6.2.3), since p̃ 0 (·|a) is bounded by 1 > 0, and p̃ 00 (·|a) is bounded by
2 > 0, it must be the case that

|p(ān )
Since ✏(n) ! 0 as n ! 1 and

p̃(c̄|ā0 )| 
⇢(n)
✏(n)

=



1
1
n w11 +1

e c(a)1
1

1



✏(n)
⇢(n)
2 +
.
2
✏(n)

! 0 as n ! 1, the right-hand side approaches zero.

Hence, p(ān ) becomes arbitrarily close to p̃(c̃|ā0 ) = p̄ as n ! 1.
I need only argue that (ann , ann ) is the maximal Nash equilibrium of (w , An ). For any a0 2 A0 ,
p̂(t̂(ā0 )|ā0 )

p̂(t̂(a0 )|a0 ). Claim 1.2 thus ensures that p̃(t|ā0 )

p̃(t|a0 ) for any t 2 [t, c̃] for which

both p̃(t|ā0 ) and p̃(t|a0 ) are defined. Hence, a1n = ā0 is the maximal element of An ; if there is
another action in A0 that succeeds with probability one, it must have a higher cost. Finally, as
Euler’s method approximates p̃(·|ā0 ) from above and there does not exist an element a0 2 A0 for
which p̃(t|a0 ) > p̃(t|ā0 ) for any t 2 [t, c̄], akn 2 BR(akn

1)

for each n and k = 2, ...n. This implies that

ann is the maximal Nash equilibrium action of (w , An ).
In the case in which f (t, p̃(t)|ā0 ) does not exist for all t 2 [0, c̄], there exists some t̄ 2 [0, c̄] at which
p̂(t̄|ā0 ) = 0, where p̃(t̄|ā0 ) is the solution to the di↵erential equation on [0, t̄] ⇥ [0, p(a)]. For any
interval [0, t̂] such that t̂ < t̄, I can mirror the argument in the case in which f (t, p̃(t)|ā0 ) is welldefined for all t 2 [0, c̄] by setting c(akn

1)

c(akn ) =

t̂
n

:= ✏(n) for all k = 1, .., n and ⇢(n) :=

1
t̂
n2 w11 +1

to show that p(ann ) approaches p̃(t̂|ā0 ) as n goes to infinity. But t̂ can be chosen arbitrarily close to
t̄, in which case p̃(t̂|ā0 ) becomes arbitrarily close to p̃(t̄|ā0 ) = 0. Hence, for any ✏ > 0, there exists
a sequence of games with a maximal equilibrium action distribution p(ann ) converging to a point in
[0, ✏) as n approaches infinity. This establishes that p̄ = 0 is the greatest lower bound.
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1.7.4. Proof of Lemma 1.7
Let
(w ⇤ , a0⇤ ) 2

arg max (1
w 2[0,1],a0 2A0

c(a0 )
),
w

w )(p(a0 )

p ⇤ := p(a0⇤ ), and c ⇤ := c(a0⇤ ). By the assumption of non-triviality, p ⇤ > c ⇤ since choosing any action
in A0 that does not satisfy this property results in at most zero profit. By the assumption that
q ⇤
productive known actions are costly, c ⇤ > 0 and so w ⇤ = pc ⇤ 2 (0, 1). Moreover,
⇤
VIPE
= (1

w ⇤ )(p ⇤

Now, consider the JPE setting w10 = w ⇤

c⇤
)<1
w⇤

w ⇤.

✏, for ✏ > 0 small, and

p ⇤ w11 + (1

p ⇤ )w10 = w ⇤ .

⇤
⇤
= (1 w ⇤ )(p ⇤
I show that the principal obtains a strictly higher profit than VIPE
. Since VIPE

1

c⇤
w⇤ )

<

w ⇤ , I need only show that the principal obtains a higher payo↵ in the worst-case shirking

equilibrium.
Elementary methods show that the solution to the di↵erential equation in Lemma 1.6 associated
with a0⇤ evaluated at c ⇤ is:
p̄(✏) : =
=

p
(p ⇤ w11 + (1
q
(w ⇤ )2

⇤

2 pc ⇤ ✏

p ⇤ )w10 )2 2c ⇤ (w11
w11 w10
(w ⇤

w10 )

w10

✏)
.

✏/p ⇤

Moreover, it is easy to show that
lim+ p̄(✏) = p ⇤

✏!0

c⇤
,
w⇤

and
lim+ p̄ 0 (✏) =

✏!0

1 ⇤ ⇤
p w .
2

Notice, if both agents choose an action that results in success with probability p(✏), the principal’s
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payo↵ from each agent in the shirking equilibrium is

⇡(✏) := p̄(✏) [1

(p̄(✏)w11 + (1

p̄(✏))w10 )]

and
lim+ ⇡(✏) = (p ⇤

✏!0

c⇤
)(1
w⇤

w ⇤ ),

the least upper bound payo↵ the principal obtains from each agent within the class of IPE. Since p̄
(as defined in Lemma 1.6) is weakly larger than p̄(✏) for every ✏ > 0 and profits are strictly increasing
in the probability with each worker succeeds when ✏ > 0 is small, I need only show that ⇡(✏) increases
in ✏ at zero to demonstrate the existence of an improvement in the principal’s payo↵.26
It suffices to show that
@+ ⇡(0) > 0,
where @+ is the right derivative of ⇡(✏) at 0. For ✏ > 0, the derivative of ⇡ is well-defined and equals
⇡ 0 (✏) = p̄ 0 (✏)(1

(p̄(✏)w11 + (1

p̄(✏))w10 ))

p̄(✏)

d
[p̄(✏)w11 + (1
d✏
|
{z
=p

p̄(✏))w10 ] .
}

c⇤
p ⇤ (c ⇤ 2c ⇤ ✏)

Hence,
@+ ⇡(0) = lim+ ⇡ 0 (✏) = ( lim+ p̄ 0 (✏))(1
✏!0

✏!0

w ⇤ ) + ( lim+ p̄(✏))w ⇤
✏!0

1 ⇤ ⇤
=(
p w )(1 w ⇤ ) + (p ⇤
2
1
= (p ⇤ w ⇤ c ⇤ ).
2

c⇤ ⇤
)w
w⇤

So,
@+ ⇡(0) > 0 () p ⇤ w ⇤ > c ⇤ ,
which holds because w ⇤ > 0 and p ⇤ > c ⇤ , establishing the desired result.
26 Simply

observe that, for ✏ > 0 small,
@
[p(1
@p

w ⇤ ) + p(1

p)✏] = (1

since w ⇤ < 1.
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w ⇤ ) + (1

2p)✏ > 0,

1.7.5. Proofs for Section 1.4.3.5

Existence
A worst-case optimal JPE with w10 = w00 = 0 is one that solves following maximization problem:
max min{1

w11 ,w10

w11 , p̄ [p̄(1

w11 ) + (1

p̄)(1

w10 )]}

subject to
p̄ = max0 p̂(t̂(a0 ; w11 , w10 )|a0 ; w11 , w10 ),
a0 2A

w11 > w10

0.

where p̂(t̂(a0 ; w11 , w10 )|a0 ; w11 , w10 ) is defined in the statement of Lemma 1.6 (I now make explicit
the terms that depend on the wage scheme).
I argue that the solution set of the latter problem coincides with that of the following:
max min{1

w11 ,w10

w11 , p̄ [p̄(1

w11 ) + (1

p̄)(1

w10 )]}

subject to
p̄ = max0 p̂(t̂(a0 ; w11 , w10 )|a0 ; w11 , w10 )
a0 2A

1

w11

w10

0.

I may bound w11 above by 1 without altering the solution set because any larger wage cannot be
eligible (it yields the principal a profit of at most zero by the first argument of the objective function).
I may relax the strict inequality between w11 and w10 to be a weak relationship without altering
the solution set since I have already shown that for any wage scheme setting w11 = w10 there exist
wages w11 > w10 that yield the principal strictly higher profits.
As D := {(w11 , w10 ) : 0  w10  w11  1} is a closed and bounded subset of R2 , it is compact.
Moreover, the function
f :D!R
(w11 , w10 ) 7! min{1

w11 , p̄ [p̄(1
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w11 ) + (1

p̄)(1

w10 )]},

with,
p̄ = max0 p̂(t̂(a0 ; w11 , w10 )|a0 ; w11 , w10 )
a0 2A

is continuous.27 Hence, the Weierstrass Theorem (Theorem 3.1 of Sundaram (1996)) ensures the
existence of a solution.

Uniqueness
The proof of Lemma 1.4 shows that any contract that is not a JPE and does not set w11 > 0,
w00 > 0, and w10 = w01 = 0 is weakly improved upon by an IPE or RPE. Lemma 1.5 and Lemma
1.7 then establish that such contracts are strictly suboptimal. So, all that is left to show is that (i)
any JPE with either w00 > 0 or w01 > 0 is strictly suboptimal and (ii) any contract setting w11 > 0
and w00 > 0 (with w10 = w01 = 0) is strictly suboptimal.
For case (i), notice that the characterization of the principal’s worst-case payo↵ given a JPE identified
in Lemma 1.6 holds when replacing w11 with w11

w01 and w10 with w10

w00 in Equation 1.1 and

setting

V (w ) = 2 min{1

If 1

w11 , p̄ [p̄(1

w11 ) + (1

p̄)(1

w10 )] + (1

p̄) [p̄( w01 ) + (1

p̄)( w00 )]}.

w11 is strictly smaller than the principal’s payo↵ in the shirking equilibrium, then the contract

could not have been optimal; the principal could reduce w11 by a small amount and strictly increase
her payo↵s (because p̄ is continuous in w11 ). If the principal’s payo↵ in the shirking equilibrium is
larger than 1

0
0
w11 , then setting w01
= 0, w11
= w11

0
0
w01 , w00
= 0, and w10
= w10

w00 leaves p̄

unchanged, thereby strictly increasing the principal’s profits in the shirking equilibrium in all cases
in which p̄ > 0. If w11 is a↵ected by this adjustment, then this ensures that the principal’s payo↵
0
strictly increases. If not, then decreasing w11
by a small amount strictly increases the principal’s

payo↵ in the case that 1

w11 is strictly smaller than that in the shirking equilibrium.

For case (ii), the characterization of the principal’s worst-case payo↵ given a JPE identified in Lemma
27 This follows from continuity of p̂(t̂(a ; w , w )|a ; w , w ) (see Theorem 4.1 of Coddington and Levinson
0
11
10
0
11
10
(1955)), which in turn implies that p̄ is continuous (since the maximum of continuous functions is continuous),
which in turn implies that p̄ [p̄(1 w11 ) + (1 p̄)(1 w10 )] is continuous. As 1 w11 is continuous and the minimum
of two continuous functions is continuous, the result follows.
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1.6 holds when replacing the law of motion in Equation 1.1 with
p̂ 0 (t) = f (p̂(t)) :=

p̂(t)w11

1
(1 p̂(t))w00

and setting
V (w ) = 2 min{1

w11 , p̄ 2 (1

w11 ) + (1

p̄)2 ( w00 )}.

The proof of Lemma 1.4 establishes that setting w00 = 0 yields a weak improvement for the principal.
It also establishes that this improvement is strict if, given this adjustment, the principal’s payo↵
(from each agent) in the shirking equilibrium is smaller than 1

w11 . So, I need only consider the

case in which 1 w11 is strictly smaller than the principal’s payo↵ in the shirking equilibrium. In this
case, the resulting contract is strictly suboptimal; the principal could reduce w11 by a small amount
and strictly increase her payo↵ (because p̄ is continuous in w11 ). Hence, the original contract with
w00 > 0 is strictly suboptimal as well.
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CHAPTER 2 : Optimal Team Formation under Asymmetric Information
Ashwin Kambhampati and Carlos Segura-Rodriguez

2.1. Introduction
Teamwork has increasingly become “a way of life” in many firms (Lazear and Shaw, 2007). For
instance, at Google, “the team is the molecular unit where real production happens, where innovative ideas are conceived and tested, and where employees experience most of their work.”1 Yet,
forming teams composed of complementary and productive workers is complicated. First, workers
often possess private information about their characteristics, such as their ability or willingness to
work collaboratively. Second, individual e↵ort is difficult to identify from team output. A profitmaximizing manager must therefore design contracts that simultaneously screen for unobservable
characteristics and provide incentives for e↵ort in teams.
What is the optimal assignment of workers to teams? How should a manager remunerate her workers?
With few exceptions, the economic theory of teams has answered each question separately. To wit, a
large literature in matching, pioneered by Becker (1973), studies the optimal composition of teams,
abstracting from incentives. At the same time, a large literature in contract theory, pioneered by
Holmström (1982), studies the provision of incentives within a single team, fixing its composition.2
By conducting a unified analysis of optimal team composition and incentives, we uncover a novel
economic distortion: Even when matching likes with likes– positive assortative matching (PAM)– is
productively efficient, creating the right incentives for workers to truthfully reveal their characteristics and exert e↵ort can make implementing PAM prohibitively costly, leading a profit-maximizing
manager to match non-assortatively. We identify when and why productive distortions occur, and
argue that non-assortative matching within a firm need not indicate a lack of productive complementarity. Moreover, we identify when a profit-maximizing manager would prefer to allow workers to
sort themselves in order to save on incentive costs. Together, our results rationalize recent empirical
evidence of non-assortative matching inside of firms (Adhvaryu, Bassi, Nyshadham, and Tamayo
(2019)).
1 https://rework.withgoogle.com/guides/understanding-team-effectiveness/steps/introduction/
2 Less related is the work of Marschak and Radner (1972), which investigates the behavior of a fixed team of agents
whom share a common prior and objective function, but possess di↵erent information when taking actions. Within
this framework, Prat (2002) studies the optimal composition of teams.
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We posit a simple model to illustrate the key mechanism. A single risk-neutral manager assigns riskneutral workers, each protected by limited liability, to teams of two. She then compensates workers
upon observing the output that each team produces. Each worker has a private type, high or low,
and can exert costly hidden e↵ort. E↵ort by both teammates is necessary to produce high output
with positive probability; high workers (“highs”) are more productive than low workers (“lows”);
and there are complementarities between types–the productivity gain from working with a high is
strictly increasing in own type (the production technology is supermodular ).3
We characterize optimal wages in terms of the assortativity of the matching the manager implements
and the production function. A matching exhibits positive assortativity if highs are more likely than
lows to match highs. The production technology is log submodular if the proportionate gain from
matching a high is decreasing in own type. Theorem 2.2 states that highs and lows must both receive
strictly positive information rent if, and only if, the implemented matching exhibits strict positive
(negative) assortativity and the production technology is strictly log submodular (supermodular).
The result is a consequence of two di↵erent incentive problems. The first is standard. In order to
incentivize a low to exert e↵ort, she must pay him a high enough wage for producing high output
relative to what she pays him for producing low output. But, highs are more likely than lows to
produce high output. Providing e↵ort incentives for lows thereby increases the payo↵ to highs from
misreporting their type. To dissuade such deviations, the manager must always pay highs a strictly
positive information rent.
The second is non-standard–we call it the problem of disassortative incentives. When lows are held
to their reservation value (so that they receive zero information rent), the payo↵ a high receives after
deviating is determined by the proportionate gain he gets from being a high, rather than a low, in his
assigned team. But if the production technology is strictly log submodular, then this gain is strictly
higher when he is assigned to work with a low instead of a high. Counterintuitively, deviation payo↵s
are therefore increasing in the assortativity of the implemented matching. Increasing wages for highs
to satisfy the downward incentive constraint, however, makes upward deviations by lows profitable.
Satisfying both incentive constraints thus requires paying lows a strictly positive information rent.
Disassortative incentives give rise to a novel rent-efficiency tradeo↵: If the production technology is
3 Interestingly, all distortions we identify hold only when production is supermodular. In particular, if production
is strictly submodular, Theorem 2.3 directly implies that there is no incentive-efficiency tradeo↵.

49

strictly log submodular, optimal wage payments strictly increase in the assortativity of the matching
the manager implements. Theorem 2.3, our main result, shows that PAM is suboptimal if and only
if e↵ort costs lie above a positive threshold. Moreover, as talent becomes scarce or abundant (the
proportion of highs in the population approaches zero or one), this threshold approaches zero, so
that PAM is suboptimal for all cost parameters. In the former case, random matching (RM) is
optimal while in the latter negative assortative matching (NAM) is optimal.4
To conclude our analysis, we consider the implications of our result for the internal organization
of the firm. We ask the following question: If a manager could commit to not asking workers to
report their types, so that she would instead have to delegate the problem of sorting to her workers,
would she do so? On one hand, such an arrangement entails a loss of control : She can no longer
tailor wages to reported characteristics. But on the other, the manager can exploit her workers’
local information about each other’s characteristics. We formalize this tradeo↵ by considering an
environment in which there is no reporting stage, but in which workers are endowed with knowledge
of one another’s types. Using this knowledge, workers then form self-enforcing teams. Theorem 2.4,
our final result, shows that if the firm is large enough, talent is scarce, and e↵ort is not too costly,
then delegation is optimal. We thus provide a theoretical rationale for the increasing prominence of
self-organized teams within firms (see Kambhampati, Segura-Rodriguez, and Shao (2018) and the
references therein).
New empirical evidence supports our theoretical results. Using three years of daily data on workerlevel productivity and team composition in a large Indian garment manufacturer, Adhvaryu et al.
(2019) find evidence for NAM despite production complementarities between workers.5 They hypothesize that NAM arises due to large negative consequences of failing to meet deadlines to complete
and deliver an order, i.e. frayed buyer-supplier relations. Our results show that NAM can be rationalized even in the absence of such considerations, as long as complementarities are sufficiently
low. Quantifying the relative importance of each channel is therefore a promising avenue for future
4 The intuition for the optimality of RM is subtle, but follows directly from our discussion of Theorem 2.2: If the
production technology is strictly log submodular, then as the implemented matching goes from exhibiting positive
assortativity to exhibiting negative assortativity, the manager goes from paying information rents to both highs and
lows, to paying rents to highs alone. Hence, the manager saves less on incentive costs when distorting the matching
past the point at which the matching is random, i.e. incentive costs have a kink. If the cost of e↵ort is not too high,
in which case NAM is optimal, and not too low, in which case PAM is optimal, then it turns out that RM is optimal.
5 Aggregate output would increase by an estimated 1%- 4% if the firm switched to PAM. We note that Theorem
2.4 implies that whenever NAM is optimal under centralized matching delegation is suboptimal.

50

empirical research.6
2.1.1. Literature
We summarize the closest related theoretical literature. Franco, Mitchell, and Vereshchagina (2011)
and Kaya and Vereshchagina (2014) consider settings in which a profit-maximizing manager assigns workers to teams subject to moral hazard. Our model enriches these frameworks to include
adverse selection. Damiano and Li (2007) and Johnson (2013) find conditions for PAM to be profitmaximizing in environments in which individuals have private information, but match payo↵s are
specified exogenously.7 Our model enriches these frameworks to include moral hazard within teams.
To distinguish our contribution from these papers, we assume a production specification ensuring
that neither moral hazard nor adverse selection alone generates a distortion of PAM.8 Indeed, all of
our results are driven by the interaction between the two.
More broadly, building on Becker (1973)’s marriage model, a number of papers have investigated
the role of imperfectly transferable utility and costly search in distorting the stability of PAM.9
Though we share a similar motivation as these papers, our analysis is quite di↵erent due to our
focus on profit-maximization under asymmetric information rather than stability under complete
information. Nevertheless, the sufficient condition for PAM we identify, log supermodularity, is
identical to the one found by Smith (2006), who studies the problem of random search for marriage
partners in an environment with nontransferable utility. In Smith (2006)’s theory, the role of this
condition is to ensure that the opportunity cost of time is small enough relative to the reward of
finding a higher quality match. In our theory, the condition ensures that the gain a high worker
obtains from misreporting his type is decreasing in the assortativity of the matching the manager
6 Understanding whether productivity losses are driven by supply chain constraints, as hypothesized by Adhvaryu
et al. (2019), or by the degree of technological complementarity in the firm, as our theory suggests, is of considerable
importance for development policy. In particular, Adhvaryu et al. (2019) suggest that reducing the market power of
large multinational buyers might result in lower inequality between firms in developing and developed countries. In
contrast, our theory suggests a “tipping point” explanation, unrelated to market power, wherein the endogenously
chosen productivity of a firm is discontinuous in the degree of technological complementarity.
7 The problem of a profit-maximizing platform also bears resemblance to the one faced by the manager in our
study. See, for instance, Gomes and Pavan (2016) and the references therein.
8 Precisely, our specification, which nests Kremer (1993)’s O-Ring model as a special case, implies that type and
e↵ort are complements. As shown by Franco et al. (2011) and Kaya and Vereshchagina (2014), this leads to PAM
absent adverse selection.
9 For instance, Legros and Newman (2007) find conditions for PAM in general environments with imperfectly
transferable utility; Serfes (2005) and Serfes (2007) find conditions for PAM when principals match agents (see also
Wright (2004)); Shimer and Smith (2000) find conditions for PAM when individuals engage in random search; and
Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) find conditions for PAM when individuals engage in directed search. An interesting,
recent application of the framework of Legros and Newman (2007) is Chiappori and Reny (2016), who find NAM is
optimal when individuals are heterogeneous in risk aversion and match to share risk. See also Anderson and Smith
(2010), who find NAM to be optimal in a dynamic sorting environment in which workers have a high discount factor
and possess a public reputation, and Chade and Eeckhout (2018), who find a natural informational environment in
which the match surplus generated by a team is submodular in characteristics, so that NAM is optimal.
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implements.
Our modeling of the moral hazard in teams problem follows the literature in which limited liability
constraints are the source of contracting friction (in addition to Franco et al. (2011) and Kaya
and Vereshchagina (2014), see, among many other papers, Sappington (1983), Sappington (1984),
Innes (1990), and Che and Yoo (2001)). This ensures that, despite our assumption of risk neutrality,
“efficiency wages” must be paid to incentivize e↵ort. Outside of this literature, McAfee and McMillan
(1991) consider the interaction of adverse selection and moral hazard within a fixed team in the
absence of limited liability constraints. They establish conditions under which incentives are linear
in team output, even when individual performance measures are available.
Finally, our modeling of the tradeo↵ between centralized assignment and delegated matching is
inspired by the literature on delegation, i.e. Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dessein (2002), wherein
the benefit of delegation is that workers can utilize superior information to make decisions and the
cost is a loss of control. In contrast to these theories, however, the loss of control issue in our
model is not related to the misalignment of incentives between workers and the manager. Indeed,
under strictly increasing di↵erences, endogenous sorting leads to PAM, the productively-efficient
matching.10 Instead, the loss of control is related to the manager’s decision to commit to not
eliciting reports about workers’ types; since wages cannot depend on reports, the manager’s ability
to extract rents is limited.

2.2. Model
We describe the environment, timing, information, and contracts in the case in which matching is
centralized, leaving the description of the delegation alternative to Section 2.5.
2.2.1. Environment
There is a single profit-maximizing manager, described using female pronouns, and a finite, even
number of workers, each described using male pronouns. Workers are indexed by the set N :=
{1, ..., N} and there at least four workers, N

4 and N even. Output is produced in teams of two.

Within a team, each worker either exerts e↵ort, e = 1, or does not, e = 0, so that the set of e↵ort
levels is E := {0, 1}. The disutility of e↵ort for every worker is c > 0. Each team produces high
output, y = 1, or low output, y = 0, so that the set of output levels is Y := {0, 1}. The manager
is the residual claimant of all output produced by the workers, which may be sold in a competitive
10 Kambhampati et al. (2018) studies delegated matching in an informational environment in which endogenous
sorting is not productively efficient.
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market at the normalized price of one per unit. Workers are protected by limited liability and may
only receive non-negative wages. Each has an outside option normalized to zero. All parties are risk
neutral.
Each worker has a type: high (H), with probability 0 < p < 1, or low (L), with probability 1

p.

Worker i’s type is denoted by ti 2 T := {H, L} and is statistically independent of the types of all
other workers. The types of workers in a team a↵ect the probability with which the team produces
high output: If any worker in a team does not exert e↵ort, his team produces high output with
probability zero. But if both workers in a team exert e↵ort, the interior probability with which the
team produces high output, y = 1, is a symmetric function of its workers’ types, q : T 2 ! (0, 1).
Let qL := q(L, L), qM := q(L, H) = q(H, L), and qH := q(H, H) denote the probabilities with which
a team composed of two lows, one low and one high, and two highs produces high output. Then,
q := (qH , qM , qL ) parameterizes the production function.
We make three standard assumptions. First, teams with higher types are, on average, more productive
qH > qM > qL .
Second, the production technology is strictly supermodular11

qH

qM > qM

qL .

Third, c is small enough relative to qL that, in the absence of private information, it is optimal to
induce e↵ort by all workers in all teams,
qL > 2c.

Example 1 (Kremer (1993)’s O-Ring Model). Suppose workers in a team must complete two independent tasks to produce high output, the interior probability with which a high (low) completes
his task upon exerting e↵ort is pH (pL ), and highs are more likely than lows to complete their task,
pH > pL . Then, qH := pH ⇤ pH , qM := pH ⇤ pL , and qL := pL ⇤ pL . Simple algebra shows that
qH > qM > qL and qH

qM > qM

qL .

11 Equip the product set T ⇥ T with the partial order ⌫ satisfying (H, H) ⌫ (H, L) ⌫ (L, L) and (H, H) ⌫ (L, H) ⌫
(L, L). Then (T ⇥ T , ⌫) is a complete lattice with (H, L) _ (L, H) = (H, H) and (H, L) ^ (L, H) = (L, L) implying that
q is a supermodular function.
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2.2.2. Timing, Information, and Contracts
The timing is as follows:12
1. The manager proposes a contract.
2. Each worker accepts or rejects the proposed contract.
3. Each worker reports his type to the manager.
4. The manager assigns workers to teams.
5. Each worker learns the type of his assigned teammate.
6. Workers exert e↵ort.
7. The manager observes output and compensates each worker.
A full assignment of workers to teams is a one-to-one function ⌫ : N ! N satisfying (i) ⌫(⌫(i)) = i
and (ii) ⌫(i) 6= i, with the interpretation that ⌫(i) is worker i’s teammate. Condition (i) implies that
each worker is his teammate’s teammate. Condition (ii) implies that each worker has a teammate.
Letting P denote the set of full assignments, we define a matching to be a function associating
each vector of reported types with a probability distribution over P,
µ : TN !

(P).

A wage scheme is a tuple of functions (wi )i2N := w , one for each worker i, where worker i’s wage
function maps each full assignment, reported type profile, and output vector to a non-negative wage
for that worker,
wi : P ⇥ T N ⇥ Y N/2 ! R+ .13
A contract is a matching and a wage scheme.
A comment about the timing is in order. In step 3, the manager elicits all information held among
her workers. But, in step 5, due to their close interaction, each worker learns the type of his assigned
12 We need not specify behavior by the manager or the workers in the cases in which some workers reject the
contract. The manager could always replicate the performance of such a contract by paying the rejecting workers an
unconditional wage of zero and having them participate.
13 The co-domain of w is restricted to the positive reals because workers are protected by limited liability.
i
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teammate. Yet, there is no subsequent reporting stage. Contracts are therefore incomplete; mechanisms in which teammates report each other’s type are ruled out by assumption.14 We believe this is
a plausible assumption in environments in which the manager is worried about collusion among her
workers or if reporting workers fear retaliation by their co-workers for making undesirable reports.15
Moreover, maintaining this assumption throughout the paper allows us to make a meaningful comparison between centralized matching and delegated matching. Indeed, any comparison between the
two in which delegated matching strictly outperforms centralized matching requires the introduction
of contractual incompleteness. Otherwise, by the Revelation Principle, delegated matching would
appear as a mechanism in the present environment, so that delegation could never result in strictly
higher profits.16

2.3. The Manager’s Problem
To ease the exposition, we restrict attention to contracts that induce e↵ort by all workers in all teams.
We discuss relaxing this restriction in Section 2.6 (a formal analysis can be found in Appendix 2.9).
2.3.1. Full-Information Benchmark
We first consider the full-information benchmark in which both e↵ort and type are contractible.
Given any matching, the manager optimally compensates each worker for the cost of e↵ort: each
worker receives a wage equal to that cost, c, if they exert e↵ort, and zero otherwise. As is wellknown, since expected output satisfies strictly increasing di↵erences, the manager then maximizes
(minimizes) profits by matching highs with highs (lows) whenever possible. We define the notions
of positive and negative assortative matching in our environment before stating this result.
Definition 2.1. A matching µ : T N !

(P) is a positive assortative matching (PAM) if,

for any type profile t 2 T N and any assignment ⌫ 2 supp µ(t) ✓ P, it is never the case that there
are two workers i and j 6= ⌫(i) for which ti 6= t⌫(i) and tj 6= t⌫(j) . A matching µ : T N !

(P) is

a negative assortative matching (NAM) if, for any type profile t 2 T N and any assignment
⌫ 2 supp µ(t) ✓ P, it is never the case that there are two workers i and j 6= ⌫(i) for which ti = t⌫(i)
and tj = t⌫(j) .
14 As is well-known, under weak Nash implementation, the manager could obtain full-information profits by punishing workers with zero wages when their reports about the profile of types in their team disagree and compensating
them for e↵ort when they agree.
15 In Section 2.6, we suggest an approach to endogenize such concerns.
16 See Poitevin (2000) and Mookherjee (2006) for illuminating discussions. In Section 2.5.3, we exhibit a matching
and wage scheme that can be implemented under delegated matching, but not centralized matching, and explain the
fundamental di↵erence between the two environments.
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Theorem 2.1 (Becker (1973)). In the full-information problem, PAM (NAM) maximizes (minimizes) expected profits.
It is also straightforward to show that the manager attains identical expected profits if type is
contractable and e↵ort is not, or vice-versa. If e↵ort is contractable, but not type, then, as in
the full-information case, each worker is compensated for her e↵ort cost and attains zero utility in
any team to which she is assigned, independently of her report. Since each worker receives zero
utility in any team to which she is assigned, she thus has an incentive to report her type truthfully,
so that the manager can implement positive assortative matching. If, on the other hand, type is
contractable, but not e↵ort, then the manager may match highs whenever possible, i.e. implement
positive assortative matching. Within each team, since type is observable, the manager can pay
each worker the minimal amount required for each worker to exert e↵ort (this, of course, depends
on the type of her teammate). As workers are risk neutral, the expected payment to each worker
is thus equal to the cost of e↵ort, so that total expected payments are the same as in the fullinformation case. Hence, it is the interaction of adverse selection and moral hazard that makes the
asymmetric-information problem interesting. We proceed to analyze this case.
2.3.2. Asymmetric-Information Problem
To define the constraints the manager faces in implementing a matching under asymmetric information, we need some notation. Given a matching µ and truthful reporting by all workers, the interim
probability with which worker i matches a high if his type is t 2 T is ptµ (i);17 the event that he
(t,t 0 )

is assigned to a teammate of type t 0 2 T is Fi

; and the expected wage he receives given his

teammate’s type, and when his team produces output y and all workers exert e↵ort, is
0

wtt (y , i) := E [wi (⌫, t, y(i,⌫(i) , y

(t,t 0 )
].
(i,⌫(i)) )|Fi

Worker i’s expected utility from honesty (reporting her type truthfully) and obedience (always
exerting e↵ort), is therefore,

ūt (i) :=

"

ptµ (i)
1

ptµ (i)

17 Formally,

ptµ (i) :=

#T "
X

q(t, H)wtH (1, i) + (1

q(t, H))wtH (0, i)

q(t, L)wtL (1, i) + (1

q(t, L))wtH (0, i)

t i 2T N 1

Pr (t

i)

X

µ(t, t

⌫2P

where µ(t)(⌫) is the probability of ⌫ 2 P according to µ(t) 2
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i )(⌫)

c
c

#

.

⇤ 1{t⌫(i) = H},

(P) and 1{·} is the indicator function.

We now describe the incentive constraints. First, each worker must have a weak incentive to exert
e↵ort, given that his teammate exerts e↵ort, in any team to which he is assigned. The obedience
constraint for a worker i 2 N of type t 2 T , given that his teammate has type t 0 2 T , is therefore
0

q(t, t 0 )wtt (1, i)

(1

0

q(t, t 0 ))wtt (0, i)

c

0

0

wtt (0, i).

(Ott (i))

Second, workers must be incentivized to report their types truthfully: each worker’s expected payo↵
under honesty and obedience must exceed the expected payo↵ he receives from misreporting his
type and making an optimal e↵ort decision in each team to which he is assigned. The incentive
compatibility constraint for worker i 2 N of type t 2 T is therefore,
ūt (i)

"

pt̂µ (i)
1

pt̂µ (i)

#T "

max{q(t, H)wt̂H (1, i) + (1

q(t, H))wt̂H (0, i)

max{q(t, L)wt̂L (1, i) + (1

q(t, L))wt̂L (0, i)

#
c, wt̂H (0, i)}

c, wt̂L (0, i)}

,

(ICt (i))

where t̂ 6= t. Finally, knowing his own type, each worker must be willing to accept the contract
proposed by the manager. Equivalently, the utility from honesty and obedience must exceed her
outside option of zero. The interim individual rationality constraint for worker i of type t 2 T
is therefore
ūt (i)

0.

(IRt (i))

We say that a contract (µ, w ) is incentive feasible if all obedience constraints, all incentive compatibility constraints, and all participation constraints are satisfied. The manager’s problem is
to chose a contract that maximizes profits–expected output net expected wage payments– subject
to the constraint that the contract is incentive feasible.
2.3.3. Redundant Constraints
Before proceeding to the analysis of the optimal contract, we make two observations that reduce the
number of constraints. First, the interim individual rationality constraint for each worker is satisfied
as long as his obedience constraints are satisfied; any non-negative wages satisfying obedience yield
him non-negative expected utility in any team to which he is assigned.
Observation 2. If OtH (i) and OtL (i) are satisfied, then IRt (i) is satisfied.
Second, if the obedience constraints for lows are satisfied, highs have a strict incentive to exert e↵ort
after misreporting their type, no matter the type of their assigned teammate.
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Observation 3. If OLH (i) and OLL (i) are satisfied, then ICH (i) is satisfied as long as,

ūH (i)

"

pLµ (i)
1

pLµ (i)

#T "

qH wLH (1, i) + (1

qH )wLH (0, i)

c

qM wLL (1, i) + (1

qM )wLL (0, i)

c

#

.

In light of Obervation 2 and 3, we henceforth omit participation constraints and “double deviation”
constraints by highs when writing the manager’s problem.

2.4. The Optimal Contract
We solve the manager’s problem in three steps. First, we establish that it is without loss of generality
to restrict attention to a simple, and tractable, class of matchings and wage schemes. Second, given
an arbitrary matching in this class, we identify all optimal wage schemes. Third, given these wage
schemes, we identify all profit-maximizing matchings. Our main results, Theorem 2.2 and Theorem
2.3, fully characterize the optimal wage schemes and matchings.
2.4.1. Simplifying the Contract Space
The manager’s problem is complex: she faces many constraints and the contract space is large. We
greatly simplify her problem by establishing that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to equal treatment matchings, and independent and anonymous wage schemes.
Definition 2.2. The matching µ is an equal treatment matching if, for any two workers of the
same type, the interim probability with which each is assigned to work with a high is the same,
ptµ (i) = ptµ (j) for all i, j 2 N and t 2 T .

Definition 2.3. The wage scheme w is independent if the wage of any worker depends only on
his own type, the type of his assigned teammate, and the output his team produces,
0
wi (⌫, ti , t i , y) = wi (⌫ 0 , ti , t0 i , y’) when t⌫(i) = t⌫0 0 (i) and y(i,⌫(i)) = y(i,⌫
0 (i)) .

Definition 2.4. The wage scheme w is anonymous if expected wages do not depend on a worker’s
identity,
0

0

wtt (y , i) = wtt (y , j) for all i, j 2 N , t, t 0 2 T , and y 2 Y .
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Lemma 2.1. For any incentive feasible contract (µ, w ), there exists another incentive feasible contract, (µ̂, ŵ ), that attains at least the same expected profits, where µ̂ is an equal treatment matching
and ŵ is an independent and anonymous wage scheme.
The restriction to independent wage schemes is without loss of generality because each worker’s
type and e↵ort decision do not a↵ect the probabilities with which teams other than his own produce high output.18 Restriction to anonymous wage schemes is without loss of generality because
workers are ex-ante identical and the e↵ort equilibrium the manager implements within teams is
symmetric.19 Finally, restriction to equal treatment matchings is without loss of generality because,
for any non-equal treatment matching, the manager attains identical profits using an equal treatment matching that uniformly randomizes over labelings of workers and then applies the original
non-equal treatment matching and wages.
Lemma 2.1 simplifies the manager’s problem in two ways. First, any anonymous and independent
wage scheme may be summarized by eight wages
0

(wtt (y ))t,t 0 2T ,y 2Y 2 R8+ ,
0

where wtt (y ) denotes the wage given to any worker whose type is t, teammate’s type is t 0 , and
whose team produces output y . Second, any equal treatment matching may be summarized by a
single parameter pHµ , the interim probability with which a worker matches a high upon reporting his
type as high.20 Let M denote the set of all equal treatment matchings. It will be useful to partition
M into equivalence classes wherein two matchings, µ and µ0 , are in the same equivalence class if
0

pHµ = pHµ . Three equivalence classes will be of interest in what follows.
Definition 2.5 (Assortative Equal Treatment Matchings). An equal treatment matching µ is a
18 The result is a straightforward application of the Informativeness Principle (Holmström (1979) and Shavell
(1979)).
19 In contrast to the setting of Winter (2004), who shows that non-anonymous schemes may be useful when the
manager wants to implement a unique Nash Equilibrium, we require only that e↵ort by two workers in a team is a Nash
Equilibrium. Indeed, given the production technology and the assumption of limited liability, requiring uniqueness of
the high e↵ort equilibrium is impossible: low e↵ort by any worker in a team dooms a project to failure, and e↵ort is
costly, so that there is always a Nash Equilibrium in which both workers do not exert e↵ort.
20 Let p µ denote the interim probability with which a worker matches a high upon reporting her type as low. In
L
every matching, the number of highs matched to lows must equal the number of lows matched to highs. Hence, the
ex-ante probability with which a worker is a high and matches a low must equal the ex-ante probability with which
µ
µ
µ
a worker is a low and matches a high, i.e. p(1 pH
) = (1 p)pLµ . Therefore, pLµ = 1 p p (1 pH
) is determined by pH
.
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positive assortative matching (PAM) if
pHµ = max pHµ̃ ,
µ̃2M

a negative assortative matching (NAM) if,
pHµ = min pHµ̃ ,
µ̃2M

and a random matching (RM) if,
pHµ = p.

It is easy to show that any PAM (NAM) is a positive (negative) assortative matching in the sense
of Definition 2.1.
2.4.2. The Minimization Problem
Given Lemma 2.1, the manager’s minimization problem is to choose an anonymous, independent
0

wage scheme, described by the tuple (wtt (y ))t,t 0 2T ,y 2Y 2 R8+ , to minimize expected wage payments
subject to the incentive constraints,

[ICH ] ūH

[ICL ] ūL

"

pLµ

#T "

qH wLH (1) + (1

qH )wLH (0)

c

#

pLµ
qM wLL (1) + (1 qM )wLL (0) c
" µ #T "
pH
max{qM wHH (1) + (1 qM )wHH (0)
1

1

pHµ

max{qL wHL (1) + (1

qL )wHL (0)

[OHH ] qH wHH (1) + (1

qH )wHH (0)

c

wHH (0)

[OHL ] qM wHL (1) + (1

qM )wHL (0)

c

wHL (0)

[OLH ] qM wLH (1) + (1

qM )wLH (0)

c

wLH (0)

[OLL ] qL wLL (1) + (1

qL )wLL (0)

c

#
c, wHH (0)}

c, wHL (0)}

wLL (0).

The first issue the manager must resolve is standard. In order to incentivize a low to exert e↵ort,
she must pay him a high enough wage for producing high output relative to what she pays him for
producing low output. But, fixing teammate type, highs are more likely than lows to produce high
output. Hence, highs must always be paid a strictly positive information rent in order to prevent
them from misreporting their type. We show that, in any optimal wage scheme, the incentive
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compatibility constraint for highs and the obedience constraints for lows bind, and that highs always
receive zero wages when they produce low output.
Lemma 2.2. In any optimal wage scheme, wHH (0) = 0, wHL (0) = 0 and ICH , OLH , and OLL bind.
The second issue the manager must resolve is novel to our environment. In addition to the downward
incentive compatibility constraint, ICH , the upward incentive compatibility constraint, ICL , may
also bind. In particular, ICL binds when the implemented matching exhibits positive (negative)
assortativity and the production technology is strictly log submodular (supermodular).
Definition 2.6. µ exhibits positive assortativity if pHµ > p and negative assortativity if pHµ <
p.21
Definition 2.7. The production technology is log supermodular if
if

qH
qM



qM
qL

qH
qM

qM
qL

and log submodular

.

Example 2 (Kremer (1993)’s O-Ring Model Continued). In the O-Ring model, output probabilities
are multiplicative: qH := pH ⇤ pH , qM := pH ⇤ pL , and qL := pL ⇤ pL , where 0 < pL < pH < 1. Hence,
the production technology is both log supermodular and log submodular:
qH
pH ⇤ pH
pH
pH ⇤ pL
qM
=
=
=
=
.
qM
pH ⇤ pL
pL
pL ⇤ pL
qL
The O-Ring model is therefore a “knife-edge” case.
In these cases, the manager optimally o↵ers two wage schemes: one targeted to lows in which low
output is sometimes rewarded with positive wages, and one targeted to highs in which low output
is never rewarded with positive wages.
Theorem 2.2 (Optimal Wages).
• If µ exhibits positive (negative) assortativity and the production technology is strictly log submodular (supermodular), then either wLH (0) > 0 or wLL (0) > 0 and both types of workers receive
a strictly positive information rent: ūL > 0 and ūH > 0.
• If µ exhibits positive (negative) assortativity and the production technology is log supermodular

21 By the observation made in Footnote 20, positive assortativity is equivalent to p µ > p µ and negative assortativity
H
L
µ
is equivalent to pH
< pLµ .
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(submodular), then wLH (0) = wLL (0) = 0 and only highs receive a strictly positive information
rent: ūL = 0 and ūH > 0.
The result is driven by a feasibility issue that arises when the manager attempts to hold lows to
their reservation utility. If µ exhibits positive (negative) assortativity and the production technology
is log supermodular (submodular), it is incentive feasible, and also optimal, to do so. But if µ
exhibits positive (negative) assortativity and the production technology is strictly log submodular
(supermodular), there do not exist wages holding lows to their reservation utility that satisfy both ICL
and ICH . The intuition for the result is as given in the introduction: under strict log submodularity,
highs strictly prefer to match a low after misreporting their type and this is more likely under a
matching exhibiting positive assortativity. Dissuading such deviations requires increasing wages to
highs when they report their type truthfully. But increasing these wages makes it profitable for lows
to masquerade as highs. Consequently, the upward incentive compatibility constraint binds at the
optimal wage scheme and lows must be paid a strictly positive information rent. We outline this
issue, leaving the full proof of Theorem 2.2, along with closed-form expressions of the optimal wages,
to the Appendix.

2.4.2.1 The Problem of Disassortative Incentives
By Lemma 2.2, we know that in any optimal wage scheme both obedience constraints for lows, OLH
and OLL , bind:
qM wLH (1) + (1

qM )wLH (0)

c = wLH (0),

and,
qL wLL (1) + (1

qL )wLL (0)

c = wLL (0).

Hence, the utility lows receive at the optimal wage scheme is entirely determined by the wages they
receive upon producing low output,

ūL =

"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T "

qM wLH (1) + (1

qM )wLH (0)

qL wLL (1) + (1

qL )wLL (0)

c
c

#

=

"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T "

wLH (0)
wLL (0)

#

.

A natural approach to solving the manager’s problem, then, is to minimize wage payments to lows,
i.e. set wLH (0) = wLL (0) = 0, so that lows do not obtain rent in excess of their reservation utility,
ūL = 0. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that it is optimal to do so when µ exhibits positive
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(a) Strictly Log Supermodular(qH =

9
)
16

(b) Knife-Edge Case (qH =

(c) Strictly Log Submodular (qH =

Figure 2.1: Positive Assortative Matching: N = 4, qM =

8
)
16

7
)
16

4
16

, qL =

2
16 ,

p = 12 , ūL = 0.

(negative) assortativity and the production technology is log supermodular (submodular).
What goes wrong in the other cases? By Lemma 2.2, wHH (0) = wHL (0) = 0 in any optimal wage
scheme. Hence, when ūL = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint for lows simplifies to,

ūL = 0

We see that if wHH (1) >

c
qM

"

(wHL (1) >

pHµ

#T "

#
c, 0}

max{qM wHH (1)

.

(ICL )

1

pHµ

c
qL ),

then regardless of the value of wHL (1) (wHH (1)), a low could

max{qL wHL (1)

c, 0}

misreport his type and obtain strictly positive utility by exerting e↵ort only when matched with a
high (low).
It turns out, however, that there do not exist wages wHH (1) 

c
qM

and wHL (1) 

c
qL

that also satisfy

the incentive compatibility constraint for highs, ICH , if µ exhibits positive (negative) assortativity
and the production technology is strictly log submodular (supermodular). In other words, in these
cases, it is impossible to satisfy both ICL and ICH while keeping lows to their reservation utility. To
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see why, notice that the payo↵ to highs from truth-telling is given by,

ūH =

"

pHµ
1

pHµ

#T "

qH wHH (1)

c

qM wHL (1)

c

#

,

while the payo↵ to deviating is given by,
"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T "

qH wLH (1) + (1

qH )wLL (0)

c

qM wLL (1) + (1

qM )wLL (0)

c

#

=

"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T "

qH
qM
qM
qL

c

c

c

c

#

,

where the equality follows by setting wLH (0) = wLL (0) = 0 and noticing that wLH (1) =
wLL (1) =

c
qL

c
qM

and

by the binding obedience constraints, OLH and OLL . Eliminating e↵ort costs from both

sides of the equation, we obtain a simple expression for ICH ,
"

pHµ
1

pHµ

#T "

qH wHH (1)
qM wHL (1)

#

"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T "

qH
qM
qM
qL

c
c

#

.

(ICH )

Inspecting ICH , we notice that if µ exhibits positive assortativity, so that pHµ > p, and hence pHµ > pLµ ,
then a high is more likely to match a low after misreporting his type than after reporting truthfully.
But the production technology is strictly log submodular, so that

qH
qM

<

qM
qL

, then a high strictly

prefers to match a low after misreporting. So, in order to prevent the high from deviating, the
manager must give him a high enough wage, wHH (1), when he reports truthfully, matches a high,
and produces high output. Unfortunately for the manager, if wHL (1) 
wHH (1) >

c
qM

c
qM

, then it must be that

in order to satisfy ICH . Hence, any wage scheme satisfying ICH violates ICL . See Figure

2.1 for an illustration.22
When it is infeasible to hold lows to their reservation utility, both incentive compatibility constraints
bind at the optimal wage scheme, and both types receive information rents. Indeed, giving higher
wages to highs to prevent downward deviations entails giving higher wages to lows to prevent upward
deviations, and vice-versa. Luckily, the manager can resolve this cyclicality by giving lows “lowpowered” incentives, simultaneously increasing their wages upon producing low and high output, and
highs “high-powered” incentives, only increasing their wages upon producing high output. These
schemes come at a cost, however, and may induce the manager to distort the matching in order to
22 A

similar issue occurs when the technology is strictly log supermodular and µ exhibits negative assortativity.
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save on expected wage payments. We turn to this issue next.
2.4.3. The Maximization Problem
Maximizing (minimizing) the assortativity of the implemented matching, pHµ , clearly maximizes
(minimizes) expected output; indeed, any such matching is a positive (negative) assortative matching. Absent incentive costs, PAM is therefore optimal, as pointed out in Section 2.3.1. It turns out,
however, that when the production technology is strictly log submodular, optimal expected wage
payments under asymmetric information are strictly increasing in pHµ . A non-trivial rent-efficiency
tradeo↵ arises. Theorem 2.3, our main result, fully characterizes the optimal matchings in terms of
the parameters of the model.
Theorem 2.3 (Optimal Matching). If the production technology is log supermodular, then PAM is
the unique optimal matching. If the production technology is strictly log submodular, however, there
exist two cuto↵ values on the cost of e↵ort, 0 < c < c̄, such that,
1. PAM is the unique optimal matching if and only if c < c;
2. RM is the unique optimal matching if and only if c < c < c̄; and,
3. NAM is the unique optimal matching if and only if c > c̄.
Further, under strict log submodularity, RM becomes optimal for all e↵ort costs as highs vanish from
the population, i.e. as p approaches zero, c approaches zero and c̄ approaches infinity, and NAM
becomes optimal for all e↵ort costs as lows vanish from the population, i.e. as p approaches one, c̄
approaches zero.
A number of aspects of Theorem 2.3 are worthy of attention. First, log supermodularity is a sufficient
condition for PAM, coinciding with the condition for PAM found by Smith (2006). Second, under
strictly log submodularity, PAM is suboptimal in a variety of circumstances–both when the e↵ort
cost is sufficiently high and when the prior probability of highs is close enough to zero or one.
Third, despite the complex matchings the manager has available to her, the optimal matchings are
simple. To implement PAM (NAM), the manager need only match highs with highs (lows), uniformly
randomizing which worker is matched with a low (high) in the case of an odd number of highs. To
implement RM, the manager need only commit to a full assignment and disregard any reports she
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Figure 2.2: Optimal Matchings: qH =

7
16 ,

qM =

4
16 ,

qL =

2
16 .

receives.23 Fourth, the optimal matchings we identify are unique up to their assortativity properties,
outside the special cases in which c = c̄ and c = c. Fifth, our proof provides a full quantitative
characterization of the optimal matchings, with exact values of the cuto↵s c and c̄ as determined
by the prior p and the production parameters q.24 See Figure 2.2 for an illustration.

2.4.3.1 Intuition
We discuss the driving forces behind each result. From Theorem 2.2, we know that, under log
supermodularity, any matching exhibiting positive assortativity minimizes expected wage payments
to lows– lows are held to their reservation utility. It turns out that, in addition, expected wage
payments to highs are minimized under PAM. Indeed, after misreporting his type, a high is more
likely to match a low, obtaining a utility gain proportional to
supermodularity,

qM
qL



qH
qM .

qM
qL

instead of

qH
qM

. And, under log

Hence, to deter downward deviations, expected wage payments to

highs must decrease as the implemented matching becomes more assortative. It follows that the
output-efficient matching, PAM, is optimal.
From Theorem 2.2, we also know, however, that in the case of strict log submodularity, if the
manager implements PAM, then lows must obtain wage payments in excess of those at which they
23 Any matching which does not depend on reports, i.e. any constant function µ : T N !
(P), is a random
matching according to our definition. However, there are non-constant random matchings.
24 The formulas are determined by the likelihood ratio of lows to highs, 1 p , complementarity in the production
p
qH
function in terms of levels, qH + qL 2qM , and in terms of ratios, qqM
. The exact expression is given in the proof
qM
L
of the Theorem in the Appendix.
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attain their reservation utility. Applying the opposite logic of what we described previously, as the
implemented matching becomes more assortative, wage payments to highs must increase to deter
downward deviations. It follows that total expected wage payments are increasing in assortativity.
Hence, if the reduction in incentive costs accrued from implementing an inefficient matching is
sufficient to compensate the manager for the loss in expected output, she optimally distorts PAM.
This happens precisely when c > c.
When the manager distorts PAM, why does she sometimes choose RM and other times NAM? As the
assortativity of the implemented matching decreases, the slope of optimal expected wage payments
decreases precisely at the point at which the implemented matching becomes random, pHµ = p. This
happens because, below this point, the manager no longer saves money by reducing wage payments
to lows; indeed, lows are held to their reservation utility at the optimal wage scheme for any matching
exhibiting negative assortativity. It follows that any reduction in incentive costs when reducing pHµ
in the region [0, p] owes to decreasing expected wage payments to highs only. Hence, there exists an
interval of e↵ort costs, (c, c̄), at which it is only optimal to distort the matching until the point at
which pHµ = p, so that only RM is optimal. If, however, c > c̄, then the gain of reducing payments to
highs by reducing the assortativity of the matching becomes so large that it is optimal to implement
NAM. Figure 2.3 depicts expected profits as a function of pHµ in all three cases.
We now explain why PAM becomes suboptimal for all e↵ort costs as the probability of highs becomes
extreme. As p approaches one or zero, it is clear that the di↵erence in expected output between
PAM and RM (or any other matching) disappears linearly. But it is less clear that the di↵erence in
expected wage payments under PAM and RM disappears sublinearly. This happens for the following
reason. In order to implement PAM, the manager must give strictly positive utility to lows to deter
upward deviations. This implies that she must also give highs an additional utility payment to
deter downward deviations, relative to what she gives them when implementing RM. Hence, as
p approaches one (zero), so that lows (highs) vanish in the population, the mere existence of lows
(highs) means that the manager must pay highs (lows) an additional utility payment along the entire
sequence. Expected wage payments, therefore, vanish at a slower rate than the actual population of
lows (highs).
A final result remains to be explained: why does NAM come to dominate RM as p approaches one,
but not as p approaches zero? Under both NAM and RM, wage payments to lows are minimized.
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NAM and RM di↵er, however, in terms of expected wage payments to highs–the less assortative the
matching, the lower these payments. When p is small, so that highs are rare, the di↵erence between
RM and NAM in terms of wage payments to highs is outweighed by the productivity gain of RM
relative to NAM. But as p grows large, so that highs are common, productivity gains matter more
than wage payments.

2.5. Delegated Matching
As we have seen, it may be costly to implement the efficient matching in a centralized workplace in
which a manager asks each worker to report his type, and uses these reports to assign workers to
teams. But what if, instead, the manager did not ask for reports, and simply allowed workers to
sort themselves?
A familiar tradeo↵ arises. On one hand, such an arrangement entails a loss of control for the
manager: She can no longer tailor wages to reports. But on the other hand, the manager can exploit
local information: It is reasonable to think that workers possess superior information about one
another’s characteristics and that they might use this information to sort efficiently.
We formalize this tradeo↵ by considering an environment in which there is no reporting stage, but
in which, during the process of finding a teammate, workers commonly learn the true type profile.
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Using this knowledge, workers then form self-enforcing teams.
2.5.1. Timing, Information, and Contracts
The environment is the same as in Section 2.2.1. In contrast, the timing is as follows:
1. The manager proposes a delegation contract.
2. Each worker accepts or rejects the proposed contract.
3. Workers commonly learn each other’s types.
4. Workers form teams.
5. Workers exert e↵ort.
6. The manager observes output and compensates each worker.
A delegation contract is a wage scheme w := (wi )i2N in which each wage function wi depends
only on a worker’s identity, the realized assignment, and observed output, i.e. for all i,
wi : P ⇥ Y N/2 ! R+ .
As before, we focus on contracts that induce e↵ort by every worker in every team, leaving a discussion
of this restriction to Section 2.6.
2.5.2. Manager’s Problem
Though not formally part of a contract, we may think of the manager as choosing a matching
function, µ : T N !

(P), in addition to a wage scheme w . In contrast to the centralization

environment, however, to implement a matching µ, we require that any assignment realized with
positive probability under µ must be self-enforcing given w in the sense that it is in the core. We
call any matching satisfying this property stable.
Definition 2.8. Given a wage scheme w , an assignment ⌫ 2 P is in the core if, for any worker
i 2 N and any worker that is not i’s teammate, j 6= ⌫(i),
1. i and ⌫(i) exerting e↵ort is a Nash Equilibrium; and
2. i and j cannot form a deviating team and select a Nash Equilibrium making each strictly better
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o↵.
A matching µ is stable with respect to w if for any realized type profile t 2 T N and any assignment
⌫ 2 supp µ(t), ⌫ is in the core given w .
The manager’s delegation problem is to choose a matching and a wage scheme, (µ, w ), to
maximize profits, subject to the constraint that µ is stable given w .
2.5.3. An Implementation Unattainable Under Centralized Matching
Before proceeding to identify the optimal delegation contract, we point out that some combinations
of matchings and wage schemes that can be implemented under delegation cannot be implemented
under centralized matching.25 For instance, suppose the manager pays each worker a wage of

c
qL

if his team produces high output and 0 if his team produces zero output. Then, PAM is stable
respect to this wage scheme. To see this, note that exerting e↵ort is an equilibrium even in teams
composed of two lows; in such a team, the payo↵ from exerting e↵ort when one’s teammate does is
qL qcL

c = 0, the payo↵ of not exerting e↵ort. In addition, there are no strictly profitable deviating

teams; two distinct highs are never matched with a low under PAM. Finally, a low can never form
a strictly profitable team with a high, as any such high would be made weakly worse o↵.
Notice, however, that PAM cannot be implemented using this wage scheme under centralized matching. If the manager were to ask workers to report their type in order to implement PAM, lows would
never have an incentive to report their type truthfully. Indeed, as wages do not depend on type
and exerting e↵ort is an equilibrium in any team, every worker strictly prefers to match a high.
Hence, under PAM, lows have a strict incentive to masquerade as highs. The fundamental di↵erence
between delegated matching and centralized assignment is thus that, under delegated matching, the
manager commits not to ask workers report their type and instead empowers workers to use the
information they have about one another to sort themselves into teams.
2.5.4. Optimal Delegation Contract
We now show that the contract described in Section 2.5.3 is actually optimal. As before, say that a
delegation contract is anonymous if it does not depend on the worker’s identity and independent
if the worker’s wage depends only on output produced in her own team. An anonymous, independent
wage scheme may therefore be represented by a pair (w (1), w (0)) 2 R2+ , specifying a non-negative
25 The opposite holds as well; Lemma 2.3, below, shows that under delegated matching anonymous and independent
wage schemes can only implement PAM.
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wage following each output level. It turns out that the only stable matchings the manager can
implement with respect to an anonymous and independent wage scheme are PAM.
Lemma 2.3. If w is an anonymous and independent wage scheme, then µ is stable with respect to
w only if µ is a PAM.

Proof. Suppose that w is an anonymous and independent wage scheme and that µ is not a PAM.
Then, there exists some type profile t 2 T N , assignment ⌫ 2 supp µ(t), and workers i and j 6= ⌫(i)
such that ti 6= t⌫(i) and tj 6= t⌫(j) . Without loss of generality, suppose that ti = tj = H, so that
t⌫(i) = t⌫(j) = L.
To show that µ is not stable with respect to w , we show that ⌫ is not in the core. Towards
contradiction, suppose that ⌫ is in the core. Then, in each team formed under ⌫, it must be that
e↵ort by both workers in teams (i, ⌫(i)) and (j, ⌫(j)) is a Nash Equilibrium. This is the case if and
only if,
qM w (1) + (1

qM )w (0)

c

w (0) () w (1)

w (0)

c
> 0.
qM

But, since qH > qM , this implies that,

qH w (1) + (1

qH )w (0)

c > qM w (1) + (1

qM )w (0)

c.

It follows that i and j obtain a strictly higher payo↵ by forming a deviating team and exerting e↵ort.
Hence, ⌫ cannot be in the core, our desired contradiction.

But PAM is efficient! Hence, the anonymous and independent wage scheme that minimizes expected
wage payments yields the manager at least the same profits as any other delegation contract.
Lemma 2.4. (w (1), w (0)) = ( qcL , 0) is an optimal delegation contract.
Proof. As observed previously, PAM is stable with respect to ( qcL , 0). Moreover, due to limited
liability, wages must always exceed zero after the production of low output. Hence, to ensure
that e↵ort is optimal when all workers are lows, a realization that occurs with positive probability,
expected wages following high output must be at least

c
qL .

The result then follows because PAM is

output-efficient and wage payments are minimized following the production of low and high output.
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Figure 2.4: Optimality of Delegation (“D”): N ! 1, qH =

7
16 ,

qM =

4
16

, qL =

2
16 .

Two comments about the optimal contract are in order. First, since wages depend only on the
output produced in a worker’s own team, each worker prefers to match a high. Due to common
knowledge of types, a high is only willing to match a low if he has no better option, i.e. all other
highs are matched with highs already. But these forces lead to PAM, the efficient matching. This is
the local information benefit of delegation. Second, as wages cannot be tailored to reported types,
both highs and lows receive strictly positive expected utility at the optimal contract; lows receive
strictly positive expected utility in the case in which they match a high, and highs receive strictly
positive expected utility no matter their teammate. This is the loss of control cost of delegation.
Delegation is optimal if and only if the local information benefit outweighs the loss of control cost.
2.5.5. Optimality of Delegation
Theorem 2.4, our final result, identifies sufficient conditions under which delegation outperforms
centralized assignment. In its statement, and in the subsequent discussion, we abuse notation and
let PAM, RM, and NAM denote the scenarios in which the manager chooses centralized assignment
and implements each of these matchings at minimal expected cost.
Theorem 2.4 (Optimality of Delegation). If the production technology is log supermodular, then
delegation is strictly suboptimal. If the production technology is strictly log submodular, however,
then in the limit as the number of workers grows large, there exists an e↵ort cost c̃ 2 (0, 1) and a
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(a) D1 : Delegation Optimal when RM Op- (b) D2 : Delegation Optimal when PAM Optimal.
timal.

Figure 2.5: Decomposition of Optimal Delegation Region.
prior p̃ 2 (0, 1) such that delegation is optimal if and only if c  c̃ and p  p̃.
See Figure 2.4 for an illustration and the proof of Theorem 2.4 for exact expressions of c̃ and p̃.
To understand the role of the conditions that production is strictly submodular and N is large, it is
instructive to recall the logic behind Theorem 2.3. Under strict log submodularity, a rent-efficiency
tradeo↵ arises because a high worker, counterintuitively, would rather match a low than a high after
misreporting his type. But as the number of workers in the firm increases, the probability with which
a worker is assigned to work with a teammate with the same reported type approaches one. Hence,
the probability with which a deviating high matches a low after misreporting his type approaches
one. The two conditions together ensure that incentive costs under PAM exceed those under the
optimal delegation contract; the first ensures that there is a rent-efficiency tradeo↵, while the second
ensures that this tradeo↵ is large enough. Notice that if the joint distribution over type profiles was
such that there were always an even number of highs, then no condition on N would be required.
One additional condition, that the probability of highs, p, is small enough, is required to ensure that
delegation outperforms PAM. This ensures that the loss of control under delegation is sufficiently
small. In particular, as the probability of highs becomes small, under delegation, the rent paid to
workers on average shrinks to zero because a low obtains zero expected utility when matched with
another low. However, under centralized assignment, the mere existence of highs makes incentivizing
truth-telling by lows costly. Hence, when p is small enough, delegation results in smaller expected
wage payments than PAM. See Figure 2.5b for a depiction of the region in which PAM is optimal
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under centralization, but delegation outperforms PAM.
The final condition, that the cost of e↵ort c is small enough, is the most interesting. Under centralized
assignment, when talent is scarce and the cost of e↵ort is high enough, RM dominates PAM; the
manager prefers to introduce productive inefficiency to reduce wages. We show, however, that there
is a region in which RM is optimal under centralization, but delegation is optimal overall (see Figure
2.5a). This result owes to the local information benefit of delegation. Rather than commit to a
distorted matching and elicit reports, the manager would rather allow workers to sort themselves
because workers, utilizing common knowledge of each other’s types, will sort efficiently. In other
words, if a manager contemplates distorting the efficient matching in order to pay lower wages,
there may be another option: write a “pay-for-performance” contract that does not depend on
non-verifiable reports, and simply allow workers to sort themselves.
We conclude our analysis of delegation by remarking that the tradeo↵ between centralized matching
and delegation is interesting only in the case in which production is supermodular. If the production
technology were to be submodular, then our analysis of the cost-minimizing wage scheme given NAM
indicates that expected wage payments are strictly lower than under delegated matching. Moreover,
endogenous sorting leads to PAM, which is inefficient given a submodular production technology.
Hence, centralized matching dominates delegation both in terms of extracting rent and productive
efficiency.

2.6. Discussion
Our analysis identifies a new channel by which asymmetric information, in the form of hidden e↵ort
and private information, distorts PAM. For strictly log submodular production technologies, more
productive workers benefit more from matching less productive workers after misreporting their type,
leading to the problem of disassortative incentives (Theorem 2.2). Disassortative incentives give rise
to a novel rent-efficiency tradeo↵: if the cost of e↵ort is sufficiently high, then either RM or NAM is
optimal. Furthermore, RM becomes optimal for all e↵ort costs as talent becomes scarce and NAM
becomes optimal for all e↵ort costs as talent becomes abundant (Theorem 2.3). We investigate the
implications of these results for the optimal management of teams inside the firm, and find conditions
under which delegating the sorting problem to workers outperforms centralized assignment (Theorem
2.4). Together, our results rationalize recent evidence of non-assortative matching inside of firms.
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We conclude by discussing the role of three assumptions maintained in our analysis. First, we have
assumed that workers are protected by limited liability, i.e. wages are constrained to be non-negative.
In Appendix 2.8, we analyze the case in which there are no such constraints. We show that PAM is
the unique optimal matching whenever the cost of e↵ort c < c̄, the threshold identified in Theorem
2.3 below which either PAM or RM is optimal. If, on the other hand, c > c̄, then NAM is the unique
optimal matching. This result arises because only ICH binds at the optimal wage scheme, even if µ
exhibits positive (negative) assortativity and the production technology is strictly log submodular
(supermodular); the manager can separate highs and lows by paying highs a negative “base wage”
and increasing their payment upon producing high output, while keeping wLL (0) = wLH (0) = 0. It
follows that there is no longer the kink in expected wage payments when transitioning from matchings
exhibiting positive assortativity to those exhibiting negative assortativity. In summary, the unique
optimality of RM in the main text is driven by limited liability constraints. In their absence, PAM
is optimal for a larger set of parameters.
Second, we have assumed, but not verified, that the manager finds it optimal to implement e↵ort by
all workers. When talent is scarce, so that the prior probability of highs is small, implementing e↵ort
by all workers is clearly optimal. Hence, the distortion of PAM we identify is robust to alternative
e↵ort implementations. When talent is abundant, however, it is not immediate that inducing e↵ort
by all workers is optimal. Hence, it is no longer clear that distorting PAM is optimal. In Appendix
2.9, in the case in which talent is abundant and the firm is large, we provide conditions on the
production function, stronger than those of strict log submodularity, under which NAM and e↵ort
by all workers outperforms PAM and any e↵ort implementation. It follows that distorting PAM is
globally optimal in these cases.
Third, we do not investigate mechanisms that provide information to the manager after teams have
been formed. While relaxing this assumption is theoretically interesting, we believe this restriction
plausible in environments in which peer evaluation is ine↵ective at generating reliable reports. As
previously mentioned, two explanations for why this may be the case are that peer reports may be
subject to collusion and reporting parties may fear retaliation by their co-workers (see Che and Yoo
(2001), who make a similar non-contractability assumption, for a discussion of the former point and
Chassang and Zehnder (2019) for recent work related to the latter point). An interesting, though
challenging, direction for future research would be to study whether the distortion we identify holds
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in a dynamic contracting environment in which information about one’s teammate arrives over time
and the manager demands contracts to be robust to collusion and/or that individual reports cannot
be identified by the manager’s chosen matching.

2.7. Appendix: Proofs
2.7.1. Proof of Lemma 2.1
Take an arbitrary incentive feasible contract (µ, w ). Form a partition of workers ⇧ := {⇡1 , ..., ⇡K },
with |⇡i | = Ni > 0, in which workers in the same partition element ⇡i face the same interim
probabilities, (pH⇡i , pL⇡i ), under µ. Now, define a set of workers I := {◆1 , ◆2 , ..., ◆K } such that ◆k 2 ⇡k
and expected wage payments to ◆k are minimized across all workers in ⇡k .
To construct an independent wage scheme, for each partition element ⇡k and every worker i 2 ⇡k , if
i’s type is t, his teammate’s type is t 0 , and his team produces output y , then set his wage equal to the
expected wage given to ◆k when ◆k ’s type is t, his teammate’s type is t 0 , and his team produces output
y . By construction, this scheme satisfies all incentive constraints given µ and weakly decreases the
0

manager’s expected wage payments. Abusing notation, let it be denoted by (wtt (y , ◆))t,t 0 2T ,y 2Y ,◆2I .
Now, before applying the matching µ, uniformly randomize over the set of all permutations of the
PK
N workers. In the resulting matching µ̂, each worker has interim probabilities pHµ̂ = i=1 NNi pH⇡i and
PK
pLµ̂ = i=1 NNi pL⇡i so that µ̂ satisfies equal treatment. Take the corresponding expectation over wages,

i.e. if a worker’s type is t, his teammate’s type is t 0 and his team produces output y , then set his
wage equal to
0

ŵtt (y ) =

X Ni
◆2I

N

0

wtt (y , ◆).

Call the resulting wage scheme ŵ . By construction, (µ̂, ŵ ) is incentive feasible, expected output
under µ̂ is identical to expected output under µ, and expected wage payments under w are at least
as large as under ŵ . Hence, (µ̂, ŵ ) attains at least the same profits as (µ, w ).26
2.7.2. Proof of Lemma 2.2
We first show that wHH (0) = wHL (0) = 0 in any optimal anonymous, independent wage scheme
0

w := (wtt (y )). There are two cases to consider. First, consider the case in which ūL = 0 at the
optimal wage scheme. In this case, if either wHH (0) > 0 or wHL (0) > 0, ICL would be violated; lows
could misreport their type, never exert e↵ort, and attain strictly positive expected utility. Second,
26 We thank Juuso Toikka for suggesting this short proof. A longer proof establishing that equal treatment matchings
strictly outperform all non-equal treatment matchings when RM is optimal is available upon request.
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consider the case in which ūL > 0 at the optimal wage scheme. In this case, at least one of the
following conditions must be satisfied: (i) wLH (1)

wLH (0) >

c
qM

, (ii) wLL (1)

wLL (0) >

c
qL ,

(iii)

wLL (0) > 0, or (iv) wLH (0) > 0. We claim that if either wHH (0) > 0 or wHL (0) > 0, then we can
0

construct an alternative wage scheme ŵ := (ŵtt (y )) which yields the manager strictly higher profits,
contradicting the supposed optimality of w . Suppose wHH (0) > 0. Then, we can construct ŵ as
follows. Modify w so that ŵHH (0) = 0 and ŵHH (1) = wHH (1) +

(1 qH ) H
qH wH (0).

Then, ūH is unchanged,

all incentive constraints for highs are satisfied, and the value of the right-hand side of ICL strictly
decreases. Hence, there exists an ✏ > 0 by which we may reduce some wage payment to lows and
satisfy all obedience and incentive constraints: in case (i), set ŵLH (1) = wLH (1)
ŵLL (1) = wLL (1)

✏; in case (iii), set ŵLL (0) = wLL (0)

✏; in case (ii), set

✏; and in case (iv ), set ŵLH (0) = wLH (0)

✏. It

follows that ŵ strictly increases the manager’s profits and so it must be the case that wHH (0) = 0 in
any optimal wage scheme. A similar argument shows that wHL (0) > 0 as well.
To show that ICH must bind in any optimal wage scheme, we first show that either OHL or OHH must
be slack. Since wHH (0) = wHL (0) = 0 in any optimal wage scheme, if both OHL and OHH bind, then
ūH = 0. On the other hand, the payo↵ to deviating is
"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T "

qH wLH (1) + (1

qH )wLH (0)

c

qM wLL (1) + (1

qM )wLL (0)

c

#

"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T "

( qqMH

1)c + wLH (0)

( qqML

1)c + wLL (0)

#

,

where the inequality follows because OLH and OLL must be satisfied in any incentive feasible wage
scheme. But since

qH
qM

1 > 0 and

qM
qL

1 > 0, the right-hand side of the inequality must be strictly

positive. As optimal wage schemes must be feasible, it follows that either OHH or OHL must be slack.
Now, towards contradiction, suppose that ICH is slack at the optimal wage scheme w . Since either
OHH or OHL must be slack, we may then reduce wHH (1) or wLH (1) by a small amount (depending on
whether OHH or OHL is slack) and still satisfy all incentive constraints for highs. This modification
does not a↵ect OLH and OLL and weakly decreases the right-hand side of ICL . Hence, all incentive
constraints for lows remain satisfied as well. As the manager’s profits must strictly increase in this
modified incentive feasible contract, w could not have been optimal, our desired contradiction.
Finally, we show that OLH and OLL must bind. Towards contradiction, suppose that OLH does not
bind at an optimal contract w . Consider a modified contract ŵ , where, for a small ✏ > 0, ŵLH (0) =
wLH (0) + ✏. Then, we may set ŵLH (1) = wLH (1)

(1 qM )
qM ✏,
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so that ūL is unchanged. Notice that if ✏ is

small enough, however, OLH remains slack. Further, the right-hand side of ICH strictly decreases:
qH ŵLH (1) + (1

qH )ŵLH (0) = qH wLH (1) + (1

qH )ŵLH (0)

< qH wLH (1) + (1

qH )wLH (0).

qH

qM
qM

✏

Since either OHH or OHL is slack in any optimal contract, as shown previously, we may then reduce
wHH (1) or wHL (1) by a small amount and strictly increase the manager’s profits while satisfying all
incentive constraints, contradicting the supposed optimality of w . A similar argument shows that
OLL binds as well.
2.7.3. Proof of Theorem 2.2

Simplifying the Manager’s Minimization Problem
µ
µ
We first simplify the manager’s objective function. Let p(H,H)
= ppHµ N2 , p(L,L)
= (1
µ
p(H,L)
= ((1

p)pLµ + p(1

p)pLµ N2 , and

pHµ )) N2 denote the expected number of teams composed of two highs, a

high and a low, and two lows. In any matching, it must be the case that the ex-ante probability a
worker is a low and matches a high equals the ex-ante probability a worker is a high and matches a
µ
low, i.e. (1 p)pLµ = p(1 pHµ ). Hence, p(H,L)
= ((1 p)pLµ + p(1 pHµ )) N2 = p(1 pHµ )N = (1 p)pLµ N.

The manager’s expected wage payments are therefore given by
⇥
µ
C (µ) = p(H,H)
qH (2wHH (1)) + (1
|
⇥

µ
p(L,L)
qL (2wLL (1)) + (1
|

=N(pūH + (1

⇤
⇥
µ
qH )(2wHH (0)) + p(H,L)
qM wHL (1) + (1
{z

Expected Wage Payments to Highs

⇤
⇥
µ
qL )(2wLL (0)) + p(H,L)
qM wLH (1) + (1
{z

Expected Wage Payments to Lows

p)ūL + c).

⇤
qM )wHL (0) +
}

⇤
qM )wLH (0)
}

As N and c are positive, it suffices to consider choosing wages to minimize the expected information
rent paid per worker,
(µ) := pūH + (1

p)ūL .

We now utilize Lemma 2.2 to re-write the constraints of the manager’s problem in terms of wage
payments to highs, wHH (1) and wHL (1), and the utility payment to lows ūL . By Lemma 2.2, wHH (0) =
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wHL (0) = 0 in any optimal wage scheme. Hence, ICH simplifies to
"

pHµ
1

pHµ

#T "

qH wHH (1)

c

qM wHL (1)

c

#

"

pLµ
pLµ

1

#T "

qH wLH (1) + (1

qH )wLH (0)

c

qM wLL (1) + (1

qM )wLL (0)

c

#

.

Further, by Lemma 2.2, we know that obedience constraints OLH and OLL bind in any optimal wage
scheme. These constraints may be written as di↵erence equations wLH (1)
wLL (0) =

c
qL .

c
qM

wLH (0) =

and wLL (1)

Substituting them into ICH , we obtain
"

pHµ
1

pHµ

#T "

qH wHH (1)

c

qM wHL (1)

c

#

"
|

pLµ
pLµ

1

#T "
{z

wLH (0)
wLL (0)

=ūL

#

+

}

"

pLµ
pLµ

1

#T "

qH
qM
qM
qL

c

c

c

c

#

.

The simplified manager’s problem, written in terms of ūL , wHH (1), and wHL (1) is therefore

min

(ūL ,wHH (1),wHL (1))2R3+

p

"

pHµ
1

pHµ

#T "

subject to
"
[ICH ]

[ICL ] ūL

1

qH wHH (1)

c

qM wHL (1)

c

pHµ
pHµ
"

#T "
pHµ

1

pHµ

#

qH wHH (1)

+ (1

c

p)ūL

#

"

pLµ

ūL +
qM wHL (1) c
1 pLµ
#T "
#
max{qM wHH (1) c, 0}
max{qL wHL (1)

[OBHH ] qH wHH (1)

c

0

[OBHL ] qM wHL (1)

c

0.

#T "

qH
qM
qM
qL

c

c

c

c

#

c, 0)}

Case 1: µ exhibits positive (negative) assortativity and the production technology is log
supermodular (submodular).
The derivation in Section 2.4.2.1 establishes that, when wLL (0) = wLH (0) = 0, wLL (1) =
wLH (1) =

c
qM ,

c
qL

and

so that ūL = 0, there exist wages wHH (1) and wHL (1) at which both ICH and ICL are

satisfied. By Lemma 2.2, ICH must bind at any optimal wage scheme. Observing that the slope of
the manager’s isocost curve and that of ICH coincide, the manager is indi↵erent between any wages
on the ICH line. The optimal wages for highs are therefore wHH (0) = wHL (0) = 0 and any wHH (1)
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0

and wHL (1)

0 satisfying

ūH =

"

pHµ
pHµ

1

#T "

qH wHH (1)

c

qM wHL (1)

c

#

=

"

pLµ
pLµ

1

#T "

qH
qM
qM
qL

c

c

c

c

#

> 0.

Case 2: µ exhibits positive (negative) assortativity and the production technology is strictly
log submodular (supermodular).
The derivation in Section 2.4.2.1 establishes that, in this case, there is no wage scheme satisfying
ICH and ICL that has ūL = 0. By the binding constraints OLH and OLL , this immediately implies that
either wLL (0) > 0 or wLH (0) > 0.
To find the optimal wages, we simplify the manager’s problem further by eliminating ūL , so that she
need only choose wHH (1) and wHL (1). To do this, observe that, since ICH binds in any optimal wage
scheme,
ūL =

"

pHµ
pHµ

1

#T "

qH wHH (1)

c

qM wHL (1)

c

#

"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T "

qH
qM
qM
qL

c

c

c

c

#

(ICH0 )

.

Substituting this expression into ICL , and into the objective function, we obtain the minimization
problem,
min

H (1),w L (1))2R2
(wH
+
H

"

pHµ
1

pHµ

#T "

qH wHH (1)

c

qM wHL (1)

c

#

(1

p)

"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T " q

H

qM
qM
qL

subject to
" µ #T "
# " µ #T " q
H
c
pH
qH wHH (1) c
pL
qM
[ICL ]
µ
µ
qM
L
1 pH
qM wH (1) c
1 pL
c
qL
" µ #T "
#
pH
max{qM wHH (1) c, 0}
1

pHµ

max{qL wHL (1)

[OBHH ] qH wHH (1)

c

0

[OBHL ] qM wHL (1)

c

0.

c

c

c

c

c
c

#

#

c, 0}

We now show that we can eliminate the “max” operators on the right-hand side of ICL .
Claim 2.1. In any optimal wage scheme, wHH (1)

c
qM

Proof. Suppose, towards contradiction, that wHL (1) <
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and wHL (1)
c
qL

c
qL .

in some optimal wage scheme. Then, to

satisfy ICL , it must be the case that wHH (1) >
"

pHµ
1

pHµ

#T "

(qH

c
qM

. ICL thus simplifies to

qM )wHH (1)

qM wHL (1)

c

#

"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T "

qH
qM c
qM
qL c

c
c

#

.

Now, decrease wHH (1) and increase wHL (1) until the left-hand side attains its original value. Inspecting
the manager’s objective function, this strictly decreases expected wage payments, contradicting the
c
qM .

supposed optimality of the original wage scheme. A similar proof shows that wHH (1)

Eliminating the constant from the manager’s objective function and the max operators from ICL , we
obtain the following problem:

min

(wHH (1),wHL (1))2R2+

"

pHµ
1

pHµ

#T "

qH wHH (1)

c

qM wHL (1)

c

subject to
" µ #T "
pH
(qH
[ICL ]
µ
1 pH
(qM

#

qM )wHH (1)
qL )wHL (1)

[OBHH ] qH wHH (1)

c

0

[OBHL ] qM wHL (1)

c

0.

#

"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#T "

qH
qM
qM
qL

c

c

c

c

#

Notice, the left-hand side of ICL is increasing in wHH (1) and wHL (1) and the constraint is not satisfied
when OBHH and OBHL bind. Hence, to minimize wage payments, the manager chooses wHH (1) and
wHL (1) so that the constraint holds with equality, i.e. ICL binds.
We now identify the optimal values of wHH (1) and wHL (1) to pin down all optimal wages. Notice, the
slope of the manager’s isocost line when written with wHH (1) on the left-hand side is
pHµ qM
,
pHµ qH

1

while the slope of the worker’s incentive constraint (which holds with equality at the optimal wage
scheme) when written with wHH (1) on the left-hand side is
1

pHµ qM
qH

pHµ
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qL
.
qM

When the slope of the isocost line is more negative than that of the worker’s incentive constraint,
then setting wHL (1) =
1

c
qL

and using ICL to determine wHH (1) is optimal. This happens if and only if

pHµ qM

pHµ qH

1

pHµ qM
pHµ qH

qL
qM
()
qM
qH

qM
qH

qL
qH
()
qM
qM

qM
.
qL

Put di↵erently, if µ exhibits negative assortativity and the technology is log supermodular, then
wHL (1) =

c
qL

is optimal. Using the binding constraint ICL , the optimal value of wHH (1) is given by

wHH (1)

=

1

pHµ qM
pHµ qH

" µ #T "
qH
pL
qL c
1
qM c
+ µ
qM
qM qL
pH (qH qM ) 1 pLµ
qL c

c
c

#

.

Similarly, if µ exhibits positive assortativity and the technology is log submodular, then wHH (1) =

c
qM

is optimal. Using the binding constraint ICL , the optimal value of wHL (1) is given by

wHL (1)

pHµ qH
1 pHµ qM

=

qM c
+
qL qM
(1

1
pHµ )(qM

"

qL ) 1

pLµ
pLµ

#T "

qH
qM
qM
qL

c

c

c

c

#

.

Once the manager has found the optimal wages (wHH (1), wHL (1)), she pins down the optimal value of
ūL⇤ at any optimal contract using the binding constraint ICH0 . As the manager’s expected payments
are proportional to ūL , any wages for lows such that OLH and OLL bind and ūL = ūL⇤ are optimal.
2.7.4. Proof of Theorem 2.3
Total expected output is given by
µ
µ
µ
O(µ) =p(H,H)
qH + p(H,L)
qM + p(L,L)
qL

=

N
[ppHµ qH + (p(1
2

pHµ ) + (1

p)pLµ )qM + (1

p)(1

pLµ )qL ] ,

µ
µ
µ
where p(H,H)
= ppHµ N2 , p(L,L)
= (1 p)pLµ N2 , and p(H,L)
= ((1 p)pLµ +p(1 pHµ )) N2 denote the expected

number of teams composed of two highs, a high and a low, and two lows. From the proof of Theorem
2.2, we saw that the manager’s total expected wage payments are given by

C (µ) = N(pūH + (1

p)ūL + c).

Let C ⇤ (µ) denote its value at an optimal wage scheme given µ, and ūH⇤ and ūL⇤ the corresponding
information rents paid to each worker. Then, the manager’s profit maximizing problem is to choose
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an equal treatment matching µ to maximize,

O(µ)

C ⇤ (µ) =

N
[ppHµ qH + (p(1
2
N(pūH⇤ + (1

pHµ ) + (1

p)pLµ )qM + (1

p)(1

pLµ )qL ]

p)ūL⇤ + c).

As N is positive and Nc does not depend on µ, it is therefore equivalent to choose an equal treatment
matching µ to maximize
⇤

o(µ)

(µ),
⇤

where o(µ) := O(µ)/N is the expected output produced per worker and

(µ) := pūH⇤ + (1

is the optimal expected information rent paid per worker. We now show that both o(µ) and

p)ūL⇤
⇤

(µ)

depend only on µ through pHµ and provide comparative statics for each in terms of this parameter.
Claim 2.2. o(µ) depends on µ only through pHµ , and is linear and strictly increasing in pHµ .
Proof. Observe that
1
o(µ) = [ppHµ qH + (p(1 pHµ ) + (1 p)pLµ )qM + (1
2
p
1 2p
=pHµ (qH + qL 2qM ) + pqM +
qL ,
2
2

p)(1

(2.1)

where the inequality follows by imposing the requirement that p(1
pLµ =

p
1 p (1

pHµ ) = (1

⇤

2qM > 0. Hence, o(µ) is strictly increasing in pHµ .

(µ) depends on µ only through pHµ , and is piecewise linear, continuous and convex

in pHµ . If the production technology is strictly log supermodular (submodular), then
decreasing (increasing) in
slope of

⇤

p)pLµ so that

pHµ ). Clearly, the expression is linear in pHµ . As expected output satisfies strictly

increasing di↵erences, qH + qL

Claim 2.3.

pLµ )qL ]

pHµ .

8
⇣
p2
qM
(µ) < c 1 p ⇣ qL
=
: c p 2 qM
@pHµ
1 p
qL
⇤

(µ) is strictly

If the production technology is strictly log supermodular, then the

(µ) is equal to
@

⇤

qH
qM
qH
qM

⌘
⌘

+
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2
qM
qH qL
c
1 p qM (qM qL )

if pHµ < p
if pHµ > p,

⇤

and if the production technology is strictly log submodular, then the slope of
@

8
⇣
p2
qM
(µ) < c 1 p ⇣ qL
=
2
qM
: c p
@pHµ
1 p
qL

qH
qM
qH
qM

⇤

⌘
⌘

(µ) is equal to

if pHµ < p
+

2
qM

qH qL
c
1 p qL (qH qM )

if pHµ > p,

Finally, if the production technology is both log submodular and log supermodular, then

⇤

(µ) is

constant in pHµ .
Proof. If pHµ > p (pHµ < p) and the production technology is log supermodular (submodular), then
ūL⇤ = 0 and
ūH⇤
where ↵1 :=

p qH
1 p qM

c+

=

"

pLµ
pLµ

1

1 2p qM
1 p qL

#T "

qH
qM
qM
qL

c

c

c

c

#

= pHµ

✓

cp
1

p

qM
qL

qH
qM

◆

+ ↵1 ,

c is a constant that does not depend on µ and pLµ =

c

(2.2)
p
1 p (1

pHµ )

is applied to obtain the second equality. Consequently,
⇤

(µ) =

pūH⇤

p)ūL⇤

+ (1

=

pHµ

cp 2
1 p

✓

qM
qL

qH
qM

◆

+ p↵1 ,

(2.3)

which depends on µ only through pHµ . If the production technology is both log submodular and
log supermodular, then
(submodularity),

⇤

qH
qM

=

qM
qL

so that

⇤

(µ) is constant in pHµ . Under strict log supermodularity

(µ) is linear and strictly decreasing (increasing) in pHµ on (p, 1) ((0, p)), with
@

✓

⇤

(µ)
p2
=
c
@pHµ
1 p

qM
qL

qH
qM

◆

.

For the other cases, as seen in the proof of Theorem 2.2,

ūH⇤

and,
ūL⇤

=

"

pHµ
1

pHµ

=

"

#T "

pHµ
1

pHµ

#T "

qH wHH (1)

c

qM wHL (1)

c

qH wHH (1)

c

qM wHL (1)

c
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#

"

pLµ
1

pLµ

#

,

#T "

qH
qM c
qM
qL c

c
c

#

,

where wHH (1) and wHL (1) are optimal wages. Hence,
⇤

(µ) = pūH⇤ + (1
" µ #T
pH
=
1 pHµ

p)ūL⇤
"
#
qH wHH (1)
qM wHL (1)

+ pHµ cp

✓

qH
qM

qM
qL

◆

+ ↵2 ,

where the second equality follows from the second equality in Equation 2.2 and

↵2 :=

(1

p)↵1

c=p

✓

qM
qL

qH
qM

◆

c +p

✓

◆
1 c

qM
qL

qM
c
qL

is a constant that does not depend on µ.
If the production technology is strictly log supermodular and pHµ < p, then wHH (1) =
pHµ qH wHH (1) = pHµ c

c
qM

, so that

qH
.
qM

Further,
wHL (1)

=

pHµ qH
1 pHµ qM

(1

pHµ )qM wHL (1) =pHµ c

qM c
+
qL qM
(1

so that,



p
1

1
µ
pH )(qM

qL )

2
qM
qH qL
p qL (qM qL )

✓

pHµ

qH
qM

cp
1

p

✓

qM
qL

qH
qM

◆

◆

+ ↵1 ,

qM
qM
+ ↵1
.
qL
qM qL

Consequently,
⇤

(µ)

=pHµ c



p2
1

p

✓

qM
qL

qH
qM

◆

+

1
1

2
qM
qH qL
+ ↵3 ,
p qM (qM qL )

where
↵3 : = ↵2 + ↵1

qM
qM qL

is a constant that does not depend on µ. Once again, the resulting expression depends on µ only
through pHµ . Further, if pHµ = p, we obtain the expression
⇤

(µ) =cp



p2
1

p

✓

qM
qL
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qH
qM

◆

+ p↵1 ,

so that

⇤

(µ) is continuous on [0, 1] when the production technology satisfies strict log supermodu-

larity. Finally,

⇤

(µ) is linear and strictly decreasing in (0, p), with slope equal to
@

 2 ✓
(µ)
p
qM
=
c
µ
@pH
1 p qL
⇤

where the inequality follows because

qH
qM

qH
qM

qM
qL

>

◆

1

+

1

2
qM
qH qL
< 0,
p qM (qM qL )

2
implies qM
< qH qL .

We now consider the case in which the production technology is strictly log submodular and pHµ > p.
Then, wHL (1) =

c
qL ,

so that
pHµ )qM wHL (1) = (1

(1
Hence,
⇤

 ✓
qH
(µ) = pHµ wHH (1) + pHµ c p
qM

with

◆

qM
qL

◆

qL c
1
+ µ
qM qL
pH (qH qM )

✓

qM
qL

qM
.
qL

qM
+ (1
qL

qH
qM

qM
↵4 := ↵2 + c
=p
qL

✓

pHµ )c

c +p

✓

pHµ )qM wHL (1) + ↵4 ,
◆

qM
qL

1 c.

Further,
1

wHH (1) =

pHµ qM
pHµ qH

pHµ

cp
1

p

✓

qH
qM

qM
qL

◆

◆
+ ↵1 ,

so that,
pHµ qH wHH (1)

=pHµ c



p
1

2
qM
)
qH (qM
+
qM ) qL (qH

qH (qH qL
p qL qM (qH

qL )
qH
+ ↵1
qM )
qH qM

c

qH (qM
qL (qH

qL )
.
qM )

Consequently,
⇤

(µ)

=pHµ c



p2
1

p

✓

qM
qL

qH
qM

◆

+

1
1

2
qM
qH qL
+ ↵5
p qL (qH qM )

where
↵5 : = ↵4 + ↵1

qH
qH

qM

c

qH (qM
qL (qH

qL )
,
qM )

is a constant that does not depend on µ. Further, if pHµ = p, then
⇤

(µ) =cp



p2
1

p

✓

qM
qL
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qH
qM

◆

+ p↵1 ,

(2.4)

so that

⇤

(µ) is continues when the production function is strictly log submodular. Finally,

⇤

(µ)

is linear and strictly increasing in (p, 1), with slope equal to
@

 2 ✓
(µ)
p
qM
=
c
µ
@pH
1 p qL
⇤

where the inequality follows because

qM
qL

qH
qM

qH
qM

>

◆

1

+

1

2
implies qM

2
qM
qH qL
> 0,
p qL (qH qM )

qH qL > 0.

We put together the two claims to prove the Theorem. If the production technology is log supermodular, then

⇤

(µ) is decreasing, at least weakly, in pHµ . As o(µ) is strictly increasing in pHµ , it is

optimal to maximize pHµ , i.e. PAM is optimal.
If the production technology is strictly log submodular, however, Claim 2.3 implies that
strictly increasing in
o(µ)

⇤

pHµ

⇤

(µ) is

and piecewise linear convex with a kink at p. And since o(µ) is linear,

(µ) is piecewise linear concave with a kink at p. Therefore, PAM is the unique optimal

matching if and only if o(µ)

(µ) is strictly increasing in pHµ on (p, 1), NAM is the unique optimal

matching if and only if o(µ)

(µ) is strictly decreasing in pHµ on (0, p), and RM is the unique optimal

matching if and only if o(µ)

(µ) is strictly increasing in pHµ on (0, p) and strictly decreasing in pHµ

on (p, 1). As profits are di↵erentiable on (p, 1), profits are strictly increasing in pHµ on (p, 1) if and
only if
@
[o(µ)
@pHµ

p
(µ)] = (qH + qL
2

or when
1
0 < c < c :=
2

2qM )

✓

1

p
p

c

◆



0
@

1
1

qH + qL
( qqML

✓

2
qM
qH qL
p2
+
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As profits are di↵erentiable on (0, p), profits are strictly decreasing in pHµ on (0, p) if and only if
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qM

◆

< 0,

Hence, PAM is the unique optimal matching if c < c, NAM is the unique optimal matching if c > c̄,
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and RM is the unique optimal matching if c < c < c̄.
2.7.5. Proof of Theorem 2.4
Define pHPAM := max pHµ and pHNAM := min pHµ , where M is the set of all equal treatment matchings.
µ2M

µ2M

By Lemma 2.4, it is optimal to pay each worker

c
qL

if their team produces high output and 0 if their

team produces low output and implement PAM. For analytical convenience, we write the expected
information rent paid per worker under delegation in terms of pLPAM instead of pHPAM , using the
observation that 1

D

pHPAM =

1 p PAM
,
p pL



qH
qM
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1 .
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p
qL
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1

Using Equation 2.4 in the proof of Theorem 2.2, we also write the expected information rent paid
per worker under PAM in terms of pLPAM instead of pHPAM ,
PAM

:=c



pLPAM
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Expected wage payments under PAM are larger than under delegation if and only if
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Note that, for any p > 0, as N ! 1, pLPAM ! 0. The condition therefore simplifies to
0<p<

2
qM
(qH

qH qL
:= p̃ < 1,
qM ) 2

where the inequality follows from the assumption of strict supermodularity. For any ✏ > 0, we can
therefore find a Ñ such that, for any N > Ñ, if p < p̃

✏, then expected wage payments under

PAM exceed those under delegation. As both delegation and PAM implement the same matching,
delegation therefore yields higher profits than PAM.
Now, we compare delegation to an arbitrary non-assortative matching with interim probability
pHµ 2 [pHNAM , p]. By Equation 2.1 in the proof of Theorem 2.2, the loss in allocative efficiency arising
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from implementing such a matching is
p
pHµ ) (qH + qL
2

(pHPAM

2qM ) > 0.

And using Equation 2.3, the di↵erence in expected rent payments is

cp
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pHµ ) < 1. Hence, delegation yields higher profits if and only if
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for all pHµ 2 [pHNAM , p]. The derivative of the right-hand side expression with respect to pHµ is
proportional to a negative term
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Hence, it is minimized when pHµ = p. Consequently, delegation outperforms both NAM and RM if
and only if

0
1@
⇣
0<c 
qM
2
qL

(p PAM p)(qH + qL 2qM )
⌘ H ⇣
⌘
⇣
qM
1
p qqMH
+ pHPAM qH +qqLL
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2qM

1
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2.8. Appendix: Unlimited Liability
By the argument given in Lemma 2.1, the manager’s minimization problem is to choose an anony0

mous, independent wage scheme, described by the tuple (wtt (y ))t,t 0 2T ,y 2Y 2 R8 , to minimize ex-
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pected wage payments subject to the incentive constraints,

[ICH ] ūH

[ICL ] ūL

"

pLµ

#T "

qH wLH (1) + (1

qH )wLH (0)

#

pLµ
qM wLL (1) + (1 qM )wLL (0) c
" µ #T "
pH
max{qM wHH (1) + (1 qM )wHH (0)
1

1

pHµ

max{qL wHL (1) + (1

qL )wHL (0)

[OHH ] qH wHH (1) + (1

qH )wHH (0)

c

wHH (0)

[OHL ] qM wHL (1) + (1

qM )wHL (0)

c

wHL (0)

[OLH ] qM wLH (1) + (1

qM )wLH (0)

c

wLH (0)

[OLL ] qL wLL (1) + (1
[IRL ] ūL

c

qL )wLL (0)

#
c, wHH (0)}

c, wHL (0)}

wLL (0)

c

0.

Notice, in contrast to the model considered in the main text, we no longer restrict wages to be nonnegative and participation constraints are no longer implied by the obedience constraints. However,
we drop IRH as before since it is implied by ICH , OLH , and OLL .
Once again, minimizing expected wage payments is equivalent to minimizing the expected information rent paid per worker
(µ) := pūH + (1
Any wage scheme satisfying IRL must have ūL
must have
ūH



c pLµ

p)ūL .

0. Any wage scheme satisfying OLL , OLH , and ICH

qH
+ (1
qM

pLµ )

qM
qL

1 .

Hence, any wage scheme for which expected information rent paid per worker equals

qH
(µ) := p ⇤ c pLµ
+ (1
qM

pLµ )

qM
qL

1

must be optimal.
An immediate implication of the preceding observation is that if µ exhibits positive (negative)
assortativity and the production technology is log supermodular (submodular), then the optimal
wages identified in the main text under limited liability remain optimal under unlimited liability
(those identified in Case 1 in the proof of Theorem 2.2). Outside of these cases, consider setting
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wLH (0) = wLL (0) = 0, wLH (1) =

c
qM

c
qL

, and wLL (1) =

so that ūL = 0. Let wH0 := wHH (0) = wHL (0)

denote a “base wage” (potentially negative) paid to highs upon announcing their type as a high.
Let bHH := wHH (1)

wHH (0) and bHL := wHL (1)

wHL (0) denote “bonuses” paid to highs when producing

high output when matched with a high and a low. Now, set

wH0

=

"

pHµ
1

pHµ

#"
max{qM bHH

c, 0}

max{qL bHL

c, 0}

so that ICL is satisfied for any bHH or bHL . In addition, set bHL =
equality, i.e.
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and bHH so that ICH holds with

pLµ )

qM
qL

1 .

qM > 0 and pHµ 2 (0, 1) for any matching. Hence, the

Notice, such a bHH always exists since qH

constructed wage scheme satisfies all incentive constraints and achieves an expected information rent
per worker equal to (µ). Hence, it must be optimal.
Since expected output per worker is given by
p
o(µ) := pHµ (qH + qL
2

2qM ) + pqM +

1

2p
2

qL ,

as shown in the proof of Theorem 2.3, we have
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where we use the relationship pLµ =
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pHµ ). Hence, PAM is the unique optimal matching if the

p
1 p (1

production technology is log supermodular (since the derivative above is strictly positive) or if the
production technology is log submodular and
1
c < c̄ =
2

✓

1

p
p

◆

qH + qL

If, on the other hand,
c > c̄,
then NAM is the unique optimal matching.
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qM
qL

2qM
qH
qM

!
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2.9. Appendix: Global Distortion of PAM
Throughout our analysis, we have assumed that the manager restricts attention to contracts that
induce e↵ort by all workers in all teams. Under strict log submodularity, we found conditions under
which PAM is distorted given this restriction. We now find conditions under which distorting PAM
is optimal even when consider the possibility of not implementing e↵ort in some teams. We focus
on the case in which the probability of highs is large and the firm is large.27
1
2,

Proposition 2.1. Suppose N is large, p

2qM is close to qH + qL , and 2qM > qH . Then,

there exists ĉ > c̄ such that if c 2 (c̄, ĉ), then implementing NAM and e↵ort by all workers in all
teams yields strictly higher profits than implementing PAM and any e↵ort implementation. Hence,
distorting PAM is globally optimal.
1
2,

Proof. As N ! 1, pHPAM ! 1 and, if p

pHNAM !

2p 1 28
p .

Hence, under PAM, the expected

number of teams with one high and one low converges to zero in the large N limit and we need
only consider three possibilities: (i) implementing e↵ort only in teams composed of two lows; (ii)
implementing e↵ort only in teams composed of two lows and teams composed of two highs; and (iii)
implementing e↵ort only in teams composed of two highs. But, implementing e↵ort only in teams
composed of two lows is infeasible since highs would have an incentive to misreport their type,
and implementing e↵ort only in teams composed of two lows and teams composed of two highs is
equivalent to implementing PAM and e↵ort by all workers in all teams in the limit. Hence, if c > c̄,
so that implementing NAM and e↵ort by all workers in all teams outperforms implementing PAM
and e↵ort by all workers in all teams, then it suffices to compare implementing NAM and e↵ort by
all workers to implementing PAM and high e↵ort only in teams composed of two highs to establish
a global distortion of PAM.
For any equal treatment matching, the optimal anonymous, independent wage scheme implementing
27 The large firm case is of special interest since the output distortion introduced by implementing NAM rather
PAM is increasing in N and p NAM is decreasing in N. A derivation of this result is
than PAM is increasing in N: pH
H
available upon request.
28 The expressions for p PAM and p NAM are given by:
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A derivation of the large N limit result is available upon request.
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e↵ort by two highs in a team is wHH (1) =

c
qH

and all other wages equal to zero. Profit comparisons may

be made by comparing expected output produced per worker net expected wage paid per worker.
In the case of implementing PAM and e↵ort by two highs, this simplifies to

p
1
2,
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so that pHNAM =
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in the large firm limit, the corresponding expression when imple-

menting NAM and e↵ort in all teams is
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Hence, NAM and e↵ort in all teams yields higher profits than PAM and e↵ort only in teams composed
of two highs if

p qH 2 2c <
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Notice that when 2qM > qH , the right-hand side is positive. Further, the left-hand side is positive
for any p. It follows that NAM and e↵ort in all teams yields higher profits than PAM and high
e↵ort in teams composed of two highs if
1 p
2 (2qM
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qL
qM ,
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p

20

which holds when 2qM ⇡ qH + qL

CHAPTER 3 : Matching to Produce Information: A Model of Self-Organized
Research Teams
Ashwin Kambhampati, Carlos Segura-Rodriguez, and Peng Shao

3.1. Introduction
Self-organized teams are playing an increasingly important role in economic activity. From 1987
to 1996, the fraction of Fortune 1000 firms with workers in self-managed work teams rose from
27 percent to 78 percent (Lawler, Mohrman, and Benson (2001) and Lazear and Shaw (2007)).
More recently, a 2016 survey of more than 7,000 executives in over 130 countries indicates that
organizations are increasingly operating as a network of teams in which workers engage in selfdirected research (Deloitte, 2016). These human resources trends are particularly important in
organizations such as Universities (Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi (2007)) and large technology companies,
like Google and Amazon, that rely on flexible internal labor markets in order to take advantage
of informational complementarities among workers with diverse backgrounds. Yet while the freeridership problem within teams has garnered considerable theoretical attention (see, for instance,
Holmström (1982), Legros and Matthews (1993), and Winter (2004)), less has been devoted to the
study of how moral hazard within teams a↵ects sorting. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no existing
work studies this interaction in the context of the production of information.
While decentralization of information production is ubiquitous, two case studies illustrate the importance of moral hazard in teams and sorting. In 1987, the Danish hearing-aid manufacturer Oticon
restructured its research department, replacing vertical, hierarchical production with horizontal,
project-based team production. Oticon hoped the flat management structure would enable the firm
to take advantage of existing information dispersed among its workers (Kao, 1996). But, eliminating
hierarchies gave rise to new problems. First, some teams were far better than others “in terms of
how well the team members worked together and what the outcome of team e↵ort was” (Larsen,
2002). Second, competition meant that “anybody [at a project] could leave at will, if noticing a
superior opportunity in the internal job market” (Foss, 2003).
In 2012, the multibillion-dollar video-game developer Valve publicly released a New Employer Handbook describing the company’s non-hierarchical organizational structure. Valve’s co-founder adopted
this approach in the hope of spurring the company’s research and innovation (Keighley, 2020). But,
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once again, decentralization led to new problems. First, talented workers refused to leave prestigious
projects, and it became hard for other projects to recruit them. Second, the flat management model
gave workers latitude to “minimize their work” because of the lack of “checks and balances” (Grey,
2013).1
We posit a model of moral hazard and sorting in the context of information production to better
understand these problems. In the setting we study, workers form teams (match) in order to forecast
the value of a Gaussian state. Each worker then acquires any number of costly Gaussian signals
about it.
We show that the types of inefficiencies observed in organizations which decentralize information
production arise naturally in this model. In particular, moral hazard within teams a↵ects the efficiency of sorting across teams in two ways. First, productive teams composed of workers producing
complementary information may form at the expense of excluded workers who must form relatively
unproductive teams composed of workers producing substitutable information. Second, productive
teams composed of workers producing complementary information may not form even when efficient;
a worker in such a team may prefer to join a less productive team if, in this deviating team, she can
exert sufficiently less e↵ort.
To derive these results, we proceed as follows. First, we characterize the (Pareto-Efficient Nash)
equilibrium correspondence of the signal-acquisition game played within teams. Our characterization
consists of cuto↵ values on the (state-conditional) pairwise correlation between workers’ signals. Intuitively, more positively correlated signals contain more redundant information. Thus, the marginal
value of producing a signal when one’s teammate has already produced one is decreasing in correlation. It follows that, if the cost of producing a signal is small enough, there is a cuto↵ above which
there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium, and another cuto↵ below which there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. More subtly, when signals are not too revealing, there is a third, intermediate
cuto↵ above which all equilibria are asymmetric and below which there is at least one symmetric
equilibrium (Proposition 3.1).
1 While prominent examples, Oticon and Valve are not the only companies to have experimented with decentralized
research teams and had problems. For instance, in 2014, GitHub introduced a middle-management level to supervise
its previously unsupervised allocation system of workers to teams (Rusli, 2014) and, in 2016, Medium abandoned its
use of holocracy, a system “designed to move companies away from rigid corporate structures and toward decentralized
management and dynamic composition” (Doyle, 2016).
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Given this characterization, we turn to sorting. Defining, and proving the existence of, a notion
of equilibrium in our environment is non-trivial: workers face a one-sided matching problem in
which an equilibrium correspondence determines their matching payo↵s. Nonetheless, while a stable
matching may not exist as in the Roommate Problem of Gale and Shapley (1962)), we show that by
fixing non-cooperative equilibria played within each feasible team, we can always find a self-enforcing
matching (Proposition 3.2). We call a collection of such equilibria and a self-enforcing matching a
Coalitional Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (CSPE).
We then study the welfare efficiency of equilibrium sorting. For a fixed strategy profile in which each
worker produces at least one signal, minimizing pairwise correlation maximizes team productivity.
Hence, one might guess that forming teams composed of workers with the lowest feasible pairwise
correlations is efficient. But this need not be the case; matching such workers might cause excluded
workers to form highly unproductive teams composed of workers with high pairwise correlations.
We call this phenomena Stratification Inefficiency.
Sometimes, however, a team composed of workers with a low pairwise correlation need not form
even when it is efficient. A worker in such a team may prefer to match with another worker with
whom she has a higher pairwise correlation if in that team she can produce relatively fewer signals
than her partner in equilibrium. Moral hazard thus generates an additional sorting inefficiency,
which we call Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficiency. Hence, while Stratification Inefficient CSPE feature
too much inequality in productivity across teams, Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficient CSPE feature too
much inequality of e↵ort within teams.
We conclude by showing that each inefficiency occurs in an open set of correlation parameters
(Proposition 3.3). Our formal definitions and proofs reveal two important insights relevant to our
motivating applications. First, whenever a CSPE is Stratification Inefficient, there is no other
efficient CSPE (Observation 4). Hence, Stratification Inefficiency is a robust phenomenon that can
only be eliminated by actively assigning workers to teams, in which case self-enforced teams are not
an optimal organizational structure. Second, in many cases, when there is an Asymmetric E↵ort
Inefficient CSPE, there is multiplicity and an efficient CSPE exists as well. That an efficient CSPE
exists suggests a simple resolution to incentive problems: make particular workers more responsible
for team output (Observation 5). Then, opportunities to free ride can be eliminated and so the
efficient outcome can be obtained as an equilibrium.
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Literature
Team Theory. The seminal work of Marschak and Radner (1972) investigates the behavior of a team
of agents whom share a common prior and objective function, but possess di↵erent information when
taking actions. As in this work, we assume that workers in a team have no conflict of interest: they
all want to choose an action closest to the realized state. However, in our setting, e↵ort is costly
and these costs have implications for the composition of teams that form in equilibrium.
Like us, Chade and Eeckhout (2018) study teams in a matching setting. They study the optimal
assignment of workers to teams in a canonical Gaussian environment with two important features:
(i) each worker produces exactly one signal within a team and (ii) utility is transferable. In our
environment, in contrast to (i), workers can acquire any number of signals and, in contrast to (ii),
utility is non-transferable. We are thus able to study the impact of moral hazard on sorting, a “relevant open problem with several economic applications” (Chade and Eeckhout, 2018). Our analysis,
consequently, focuses on the efficiency of equilibrium teams as opposed to their assortativity, as is
the focus of Chade and Eeckhout (2018).2
An additional di↵erence between our setup and that of Chade and Eeckhout (2018) is that they assume that signals between workers possess a common correlation parameter, but di↵er in variance,
whereas we assume the opposite. We make this assumption to capture research settings in which
workers are identical in their level of “expertise”, but may come from di↵erent backgrounds. Our
work, therefore, contributes to the literature on diversity in teams, i.e. Prat (2002), Hong and Page
(2001), and Hong and Page (2004).3 In particular, Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficient CSPE are characterized by excessive homogeneity, i.e. high correlation, within teams. Our results thus illustrate a
new channel through which moral hazard can cause homogenous teams to form even when they are
suboptimal.
Matching with Nontransferable Utility. Legros and Newman (2007) consider general two-sided matching environments in which, for each matched pair, there is an exogenously specified utility possibility
2 As the latter question is of independent interest, however, in Online Appendix 3.7 we discuss how endogenous
e↵ort might a↵ect the equilibrium assortativity of teams. Fixing the signal structure of Chade and Eeckhout (2018),
we show that, once e↵ort choice is endogenous, optimal matching must simultaneously diversify, while incentivizing
e↵ort.
3 Prat (2002) finds conditions under which a team should be comprised of homogenous information structures when
these information structures are priced according to market forces. Hong and Page (2004) and Hong and Page (2001)
consider the performance of heterogeneous non-Bayesian problem solvers. In contrast, we consider the endogenous
formation of teams by Bayesian workers within a firm with a fixed information structure.
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frontier.4 As matching is two-sided, a stable matching–the core of an assignment game–exists, as
established by Kaneko (1982). As we consider a one-sided matching problem, however, the core
may be empty; in the absence of restrictions on the expected utility possibilities frontier within each
team, cycles can arise (see Online Appendix 3.8 for an example). Hence, we define a new, weaker
solution concept, Coalitional Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (CSPE). In a CSPE, the non-cooperative
equilibria played within teams–even those not formed in equilibrium– are fixed. Our existence proof
thus demonstrates how after-match equilibrium selection can be used to prevent o↵-path deviations
that undermine stability.5
Sorting and Bilateral Moral Hazard. Our paper joins a small literature that considers matching
settings in which the utility possibility frontier of each matched pair is a↵ected by the presence
of bilateral moral hazard.6 Kaya and Vereshchagina (2015) study one-sided matching between
partners who, after matching, play a repeated game with imperfect monitoring (due to moral hazard)
and transfers. While moral hazard limits the achievable joint surplus attainable by a matched
pair, transfers ensure that the Pareto-frontier is linear, i.e. payo↵s are transferable. Hence, stable
matchings exist and (constrained) efficiency is ensured by standard arguments, in contrast to our
setting.7
Vereshchagina (2019) studies two-sided matching between financially-constrained entrepreneurs in
the presence of bilateral moral hazard and incomplete contracts; entrepreneurs can only sign contracts under which the realized revenue is split between the partners according to an equity-sharing
rule.8 Non-transferability of output gives rise to inefficient positive sorting through the following
channel: wealthy entrepreneurs, whom contribute more resources to joint production, are willing to
form partnerships with poor entrepreneurs only if they receive a high equity share. But, joint surplus
4 A well-known application of this framework is to risk-sharing within households. Legros and Newman (2007)
and Chiappori and Reny (2016) show that if couples share risk efficiently, then all stable matchings are negative
assortative. Gierlinger and Laczó (2018) show that if the assumption of perfect risk-sharing is relaxed, then positive
assortative matching can occur. Schulhofer-Wohl (2006) finds necessary and sufficient conditions for preferences under
which risk-sharing problems admit a transferable utility representation.
5 In Section 3.2.3, we compare our definition and that of the core in detail. It is worth noting that our constructive
proof bears resemblance to that of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988), who prove that the core is non-empty in a market
for partners whom divide output equally.
6 Wright (2004), Serfes (2005), Serfes (2007), and Sperisen and Wiseman (2016) study the assortativity of stable
matchings in the presence of one-sided moral hazard, i.e. principals matching agents.
7 Kaya and Vereshchagina (2014) study a discrete version of their model in which workers form partnerships that
may involve “money burning” to provide incentives. They then ask whether workers would prefer to work for an
entrepreneur, i.e. hire a budget-breaker, as in Franco et al. (2011) to avoid this problem. Chakraborty and Citanna
(2005) consider a model similar to that of Kaya and Vereshchagina (2015) in which partners play asymmetric roles.
8 Two-sidedness again ensures that a stable matching exists, in the sense of Legros and Newman (2007), unlike in
our setting.
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maximizing equity shares may be constant across all partnerships. Hence, wealthy entrepreneurs
prefer to match even if the overall benefit of re-matching with poor entrepreneurs is large. The logic
behind inefficiency thus resembles that of Stratification Inefficiency.9
Finally, Kräkel (2017) considers a very di↵erent channel through which moral hazard leads to inefficient endogenous sorting. He studies an environment in which a firm posts an initial contract that
determines both wages and a sorting protocol (workers either endogenously sort into teams or are
randomly assigned to teams). The firm then receives interim information about the efficiency of the
matches formed and can re-negotiate the initial contract. Under endogenous sorting, workers may
form inefficient teams in order to force the firm to re-negotiate the initial contract.
Correlation and Information Acquisition. More broadly, our analysis of the information acquisition game played within teams is related to recent work defining notions of complementary and
substitutable information. In the environment we consider, lower correlation implies higher complementarity in terms of the value of information. Börgers, Hernando-Veciana, and Krähmer (2013)
define signals as complements or substitutes in terms of their value across all decision problems,
therefore requiring stronger conditions. Liang and Mu (2020) adapt the definition of Börgers et al.
(2013) to a multivariate Gaussian environment and use it characterize the learning outcomes of a
sequence of myopic players.

3.2. Model
3.2.1. Environment
There are four workers, indexed by the set N := {1, 2, 3, 4}, who each works on a project alone or
in a team with one other worker.10 The cost of forming a team with another worker is K > 0, while
working alone has no cost. Each project involves guessing a state ✓, which has a Gaussian distribution
with mean µ✓ and variance
signals with variance

2

2
✓.

Each worker can obtain unbiased, conditionally independent Gaussian

. Within a team, however, signals are correlated; ⇢ij 2 [ 1, 1] is the state-

conditional correlation coefficient between worker i’s and worker j’s signal when they work together.
The final assignment of workers to teams is described by a matching function µ : N ! N such
that the teammate of worker i’s teammate, j, is i —that is, if j = µ(i), then µ(j) = i.11 Let M

9 We note, however, that there is no analog to Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficiency in her model. A related, earlier contribution is that of Sherstyuk (1998), who shows that equal-sharing equity rules may preclude efficient heterogeneous
partnerships.
10 The analysis extends easily to the case of N workers.
11 We interpret (i, i) as a single-worker team.
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denote the set of all such functions. After teams have been formed, each worker i simultaneously
and independently chooses a number of signals to produce, ni 2 N [ {0}, at cost c(ni ), where
c : N [ {0} ! R is an increasing function satisfying increasing marginal costs, i.e. c(n)
c(n

1)

c(n

2) for any n

c(n

1)

2, and c(0) = 0.

The correlation structure in the signal-acquisition stage captures the economics of a situation in
which joint and simultaneous e↵ort is a↵ected by complementarities, while unilateral e↵ort is not.
In particular, we interpret ni as a decision by worker i to produce a single signal in each of ni
“periods”, starting from period 1; if ni

nj > 0, then workers i and j produce signals jointly in

periods t 2 {1, ..., nj }. Hence, signals drawn in these periods are conditionally correlated according
to ⇢ij . If ni > nj , however, then worker i produces a signal alone in periods t 2 {nj + 1, ..., ni }.
Consequently, in these periods, workers cannot exploit correlation between signals to learn about
the state. Figure 3.1 depicts the case in which ni = 3 and nj = 2.
Finally, after observing the signal realizations of every team member, each team takes an action
a⇤ 2 R to minimize the expected value of a quadratic loss function. Formally,
⇥
a⇤ 2 arg min E✓ (a
a2R

⇤
✓)2 | x S ,

where x S denotes the concatenation of signals observed in the team.
Period
1

Worker j

Worker i
⇢ij

Independent
2

⇢ij

Independent
3
Figure 3.1: Signal Structure when ni = 3 and nj = 2.
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3.2.2. Solution Concepts
A signal-acquisition strategy for worker i is a function mapping teammate identity to a non-negative
integer, ni : N ! N [ {0}.12 Given a strategy for each player, we denote the profile of signals chosen
in team (i, j) by n(i, j) := (ni (j), nj (i)). The payo↵ to worker i in team (i, j) given the strategy profile
n(i, j) is
vi (n(i, j); ⇢ij ) :=



⇥
Ex min E✓ (a
a2R

✓)2 | x S

⇤

c(ni (j))

K 1i6=j .

(3.1)

To ease notation, we denote ni (j) and nj (i) by ni and nj and drop the dependence of vi on ⇢ij whenever
there is no confusion that j is i’s teammate.
The strategy spaces for each player, N [ {0}, and the payo↵ functions defined in Equation 3.1
constitute a normal-form game–call it the Production Subgame.13 To account for pre-play communication, in each team (i, j), we require that the strategy profile n⇤ (i, j) is a Pareto-Efficient
Nash Equilibrium (PEN) of the Production Subgame. For the two-stage game, we introduce a
new solution concept called Coalitional Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (CSPE).
Definition 3.1. A matching µ 2 M and a collection of PEN, N ⇤ = {n⇤ (i, j)}i,j2N , is a Coalitional
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (CSPE) if there does not exist a matching, µ0 2 M, and a worker
i for which i and j = µ0 (i) are strictly better o↵ under µ0 given the PEN:
vi (n⇤ (i, j)) > vi (n⇤ (i, µ(i))), and
vj (n⇤ (i, j)) > vj (n⇤ (j, µ(j))).

A matching µ 2 M and a collection of PEN, one for every feasible team, is a CSPE if no worker(s)
can form a deviating team in which, given the prescribed PEN in that team, each worker obtains a
strictly higher payo↵.
3.2.3. Brief Discussion
We comment briefly on our modeling of the production subgame and our solution concept. See
Section 3.5 for further discussion.
Diminishing marginal returns and complementarity are separate forces shaping workers’ information
acquisition strategies in our model. While acquiring more signals reduces the marginal productivity
12 We
13 If

consider pure strategies for ease of interpretation and tractability.
a worker i decides to work alone, then the Production Subgame is to be interpreted as a decision problem.
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of acquiring one’s own signals, correlation between signals across workers captures the degree of
complementarity of information. These are plausible forces in information-producing teams that,
nevertheless, are not easy to analyze separately in reduced-form production models. Our specification
allows us to analyze how moral hazard is shaped by complementarities, holding fixed individual
marginal returns.
The standard solution concept in the literature on matching with imperfectly transferable utility is
the core. A matching function and a point in the utility possibility frontier for each matched pair is
in the core if (i) no matched worker is better o↵ alone and (ii) no pair can match and pick a point in
their utility possibility frontier that makes both strictly better o↵.14 While the core is well-defined
in our environment — the set of PEN payo↵s within a team is its utility possibility frontier —
condition (ii) is problematic; if workers are free to play any PEN in a deviating team, then cycles
of re-negotiation may arise and cause the core to be empty. To circumvent this problem, we define
a new solution concept, CSPE, in which each o↵-path team plays a fixed PEN. This limits the set
of payo↵s achievable by a deviating pair of workers and enables us to prove existence (Proposition
3.2). In addition to the advantage of existence, we find CSPE both intuitive and plausible; every
core allocation is also a CSPE and those which are not are sustained by credible “o↵-path” behavior,
i.e. Pareto-Efficient Nash Equilibria.

3.3. Production Subgame Analysis
3.3.1. Preliminaries
Because each worker’s payo↵ function is quadratic, her optimal action given any signal realization
is the posterior mean. Hence, her expected payo↵ when signals are costless is the negative posterior
variance. Lemma 3.1 states these observations and provides a closed-form solution for the posterior
variance. The proof is standard, but provided in Appendix 3.6.1 for completeness.15
Lemma 3.1. Suppose workers i and j form a team and acquire (ni , nj ) signals with ni  nj . Each
worker’s optimal action is a = E (✓ | x) and the expected payo↵ of worker i is
vi (ni , nj ) = Var (✓ | (ni , nj ))

c(ni )

K 1i6=µ(i) ,

14 See Legros and Newman (2007) for a general definition in two-sided environments and Kaya and Vereshchagina
(2015) for a definition in a one-sided environment.
15 Proposition 1 of Chade and Eeckhout (2018) considers the posterior variance associated with a team composed
of n workers each acquiring a single signal. All signals have the same pairwise correlation. Our formulation captures
di↵erences in correlation across “periods” of information acquisition. This, in turn, a↵ects strategic behavior, as
outlined in Section 3.3.2.
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where x is the concatenation of realized signals and
8
< 0
⇣⇣
Var (✓ | (ni , nj )) :=
:

2ni
1+⇢ij

+ (nj

ni )

⌘

2

+

2
✓

⌘

1

if i 6= j, ni > 0, nj > 0 and ⇢ij =

1

otherwise.

The pairwise correlation coefficient ⇢ := ⇢ij , for i 6= j, measures the substitutability of information
between workers: as ⇢ increases, the value of working together decreases. For intuition, consider the
extreme cases. When ⇢ =

1, by producing (1, 1) signals, a team can match the state by choosing

an action equal to the sample average. On the other hand, when ⇢ = 1, working together to produce
(1, 1) signals is equivalent to having only one worker produce a signal. So, to rule out uninteresting
cases, we assume that the cost of a single signal satisfies the following two properties: (i) in a twoworker team in which ⇢ =

1, both workers have an incentive to produce a single signal (and so

perfectly learn the state), and (ii) in any team, at least one worker has an incentive to produce at
least one signal.
Assumption 3.1. c(1) <

2
✓
2
2
✓+

min{

2
✓,

2

}.

3.3.2. The Marginal Value of Information
To characterize PEN, we define and analyze the marginal value of information to worker i of
producing a signal in the ni -th period given that worker j produces a signal in the first nj periods.
This marginal benefit corresponds to the reduction of the ex-post variance generated by the last
signal:
MV (ni ; nj , ⇢) ⌘ Var (✓ | (ni
If ni

1, nj ))

Var (✓ | (ni , nj )).

nj , we call worker i a high producer. If the inequality is strict, we call worker j a low

producer.
Figure 3.2a illustrates the posterior variance Var (✓ | (ni , nj )) for di↵erent correlations, ⇢, and strategy
profiles, (ni , nj ), in the case in which

=

✓

= 1. In Figure 3.2a, the di↵erence between the dashed

red line and the solid black line is the marginal value of information to a high producer of producing
a signal in period two, while the di↵erence between the dotted blue line and the dashed red line
is the marginal value of information to a low producer of producing a signal in period two, given
that the high producer is already producing one in the first two periods. The former di↵erence is
represented by the solid, red line in Figure 3.2b, while the latter is represented by the dashed, blue
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Figure 3.2: Ex-post Variance and Marginal Values.
line in Figure 3.2b.
We make three observations about the figures, which generalize beyond the parameterization we
consider, and which we exploit in proving our main characterization result. First, the marginal
value of information to the high producer is strictly increasing in ⇢. This happens because the
value of the information obtained from working together with the low producer in previous periods
decreases. By concavity of the information production function, the marginal value of information
left to learn increases.
Second, the marginal value of information to a low producer is non-monotonic in ⇢. Indeed, we
see the di↵erence between the blue line and red line in Figure 3.2a is non-monotonic, and so the
blue line in Figure 3.2b is hump-shaped. The marginal value of the low producer is increasing in an
initial region for the same reason the high producer’s marginal value is increasing; when ⇢ increases,
the value of work done together in past periods decreases and so the marginal value of information
left to learn increases. However, there is another e↵ect to consider. When ⇢ increases, the value
of working together with the high producer in a future period decreases– the high producer and
low producer’s information is less complementary. After an interior cuto↵ value ⇢˜, the second e↵ect
dominates and the marginal value of information to the low producer decreases.
Third, the marginal value of a high producer is higher than the marginal value to a low producer
above a negative cuto↵ value, ⇢ˆ. It turns out that the relationship between ⇢ˆ and ⇢˜ is the key to
ordering the equilibrium correspondence in terms of symmetry. We discuss this in detail after stating
our main characterization result.
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Figure 3.3: PEN Correspondence with

2

=

2
✓

= 1 and c(n) = 0.01n2 .

3.3.3. PEN Characterization
Proposition 3.1. Let ⇢ denote the pairwise correlation between workers in a two-worker team. For
each ⇢ 2 [ 1, 1], there exists a PEN of the Production Subgame. If Assumption 3.1 is satisfied, there
exist interior cuto↵ values ⇢⇤  ⇢⇤⇤ for which the following properties hold:
1. For ⇢  ⇢⇤ , there is a unique PEN. It is symmetric and each worker produces a strictly positive
number of signals.
2. For ⇢ > ⇢⇤⇤ , generically, there is a unique PEN up to the identity of each worker. In it, one
worker produces a strictly positive number of signals and the other produces none.
If, in addition,

2

2
✓,

there exists another cuto↵ value ⇢⇤⇤⇤ for which ⇢⇤  ⇢⇤⇤⇤  ⇢⇤⇤ and the

following properties hold:
3. For ⇢ 2 (⇢⇤ , ⇢⇤⇤⇤ ], there is at least one symmetric and one asymmetric PEN.
4. For ⇢ > ⇢⇤⇤⇤ , all PEN are asymmetric.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the Proposition in a case in which

2

2
✓,

so that all four properties apply:

below ⇢⇤ ⇡ .10, the unique PEN is symmetric; above ⇢⇤⇤ ⇡ .71, there is a unique PEN, up to
identity, in which only one worker exerts e↵ort; for ⇢ 2 (⇢⇤ , ⇢⇤⇤⇤ ], where ⇢⇤⇤⇤ ⇡ 0.33, there is both
a symmetric and an asymmetric PEN; and, for ⇢ > ⇢⇤⇤⇤ all PEN are asymmetric.
The intuition for the first two properties is simple. Under Assumption 3.1, (i) (1, 1) is the unique
equilibrium when ⇢ =

1 and (ii) for any pairwise correlation, at least one worker produces at

least one signal. Since posterior variance is continuous in pairwise correlation, (i) implies that there
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exists a cuto↵, strictly above negative one, below which the unique equilibrium is (1,1), establishing
the first property of the proposition. Property (ii) implies that when ⇢ = 1 there is, generically, a
unique equilibrium, up to identity, in which only one worker produces a strictly positive number of
signals.16 As the marginal value of a low producer’s signal is close to zero for correlations near one,
continuity of the posterior variance in correlation again implies that there is a cuto↵ strictly below
one above which only one worker acquires signals.
The intuition for the last two properties is subtle. It turns out that if signals are sufficiently noisy,
2

2
✓,

then the marginal value of information for a low producer is maximized at a correlation

⇢˜ strictly below the value at which the marginal value of information for a high producer exceeds
that of the low producer, ⇢ˆ, as in Figure 3.2b. Hence, increasing ⇢ past ⇢ˆ increases the marginal
value to the high producer while decreasing the marginal value to the low producer. Behavior then
coheres with intuition; higher correlations drive equilibria to be asymmetric because high producers
have an increasing incentive to acquire more information, while low producers have a decreasing
incentive to match the signals produced by high producers. We thus obtain a strong result: there is
an intermediate cuto↵ above which all PEN are asymmetric and below which there is at least one
symmetric and one asymmetric PEN.17
We conclude our analysis by pointing out two properties satisfied by the equilibrium correspondence
in Figure 3.3, but which are not ensured by the condition

2

2
✓

alone: (i) ⇢⇤ < ⇢⇤⇤⇤ and (ii) there

is a non-trivial asymmetric equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium in which each worker produces a strictly
positive number of signals, for correlations above ⇢⇤ . The latter property is satisfied whenever a
worker produces at least three signals by herself, i.e. whenever the marginal value of a third signal
exceeds the marginal cost. Assumption 3.2 thus ensures that both (i) and (ii) are satisfied; we will
require it to prove the robustness of Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficiency.
Assumption 3.2. ⇢⇤ < ⇢⇤⇤⇤ and c(3)

c(2) < MV (3; 0, 0).18

16 The genericity qualifier rules out the case in which a worker is indi↵erent between two positive integers when
⇢ = 1 and her teammate takes zero draws.
17 If ⇢
ˆ < ⇢˜, a counterintuitive phenomena emerges. In this case, there is a region in which increasing ⇢ past ⇢ˆ
increases the marginal value for both the high producer and the low producer. Hence, if an asymmetric equilibrium
is played at some correlation ⇢ above ⇢ˆ, but below ⇢˜, it may be the case that for a higher correlation a symmetric
equilibrium may be played. Why? The increase in the value of information left to learn for the low producer might
induce her to match the high producer’s signal. If this happens, the high producer’s incentive to produce another
signal may decline enough so that she does not produce another one herself. For such an example, we direct the
reader to Online Appendix 3.9.
18 While we have not stated the condition ⇢⇤ < ⇢⇤⇤⇤ in terms of primitives, it holds whenever the cost function
is not “too convex”. For instance, if costs are linear, it is always satisfied. As our running example demonstrates,
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3.3.4. Existence of CSPE
Exploiting symmetry of the equilibrium correspondence of the Production Subgame, we provide
an algorithm that identifies a Pareto-Efficient CSPE, i.e. a CSPE that is Pareto undominated by
another CSPE.
Proposition 3.2. A Pareto-Efficient CSPE exists.
Two comments are in order. First, Proposition 3.2 generalizes to environments beyond the one
we consider; as long as the after-match game is symmetric, a CSPE exists. Second, as previously
discussed, while a CSPE exists the core may be empty. See Online Appendix 3.8 for a formal
definition of the core and an example of its emptiness.

3.4. Inefficient Sorting
Our analysis of the Production Subgame yields two important insights. First, fixing a strategy profile
within teams, reducing correlation increases the value of information the team generates. Second,
increasing correlation decreases the symmetry of equilibria; as signals become more substitutable,
the marginal value of matching a high producer’s signal decreases. We now show how these two
within-team properties influence the efficiency of sorting across teams.
3.4.1. Stratification Inefficiency
We first exposit an inefficiency, Stratification Inefficiency, that arises because two highly productive
workers, i.e. workers with low pairwise correlation, match at the expense of the two excluded workers,
whom must form a less productive team with a relatively high pairwise correlation. After illustrating
it with a numerical example, we observe that management intervention within teams cannot restore
efficient sorting. The presence of Stratification Inefficiency thus suggests that self-organizing teams
may not be an optimal organizational structure.
Suppose, for simplicity, that the parameters are as in Figure 3.3, so that all properties of Proposition
3.1 apply. Suppose further that the network in Figure 3.4a describes the correlation matrix; numbers
next to adjacent edges depict pairwise correlation. Then, the unique PEN in teams composed of
workers connected by dotted or dashed lines is the symmetric profile (2, 2) and the unique PEN (up
to identity) in teams composed of workers connected by solid lines is the asymmetric profile (0, 3).19
Corresponding payo↵s are depicted in Figure 3.4b. We argue that, if team membership costs are
however, the condition is satisfied beyond the case of linear costs.
19 This can be seen by referring back to Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.4: Stratification Inefficiency.
small enough, the unique CSPE matching pairs worker 1 (worker 3) and worker 2 (worker 4), while
the efficient matching pairs worker 1 (worker 2) and worker 3 (worker 4).
First, observe that teams (1, 4) and (2, 3) can never form in a CSPE; fixing any PEN, the worker
producing a positive number of signals would be better o↵ alone. Second, observe that worker 3 and
worker 4 must match in any CSPE. Inspecting the green line in Figure 3.4b, we see that worker 3
and worker 4 each obtains a higher payo↵ in a team together than in any PEN in any other team;
indeed, their pairwise correlation, -0.3, is the smallest among all feasible teams and all teams other
than (1, 4) and (2, 3) play the same equilibrium. But if worker 3 and worker 4 match, worker 1 and
worker 2 are left with only two options: they can either work alone or form a team together. For a
small enough team membership cost K > 0, the utility each obtains from working together exceeds
that of working alone. Hence, worker 1 and worker 2 must match in any CSPE.
While we have argued that in the unique CSPE, worker 1 (worker 3) and worker 2 (worker 4)
match, it remains to argue that matching worker 1 (worker 2) and worker 3 (worker 4) is welfare
improving. Why might this be the case? Though the most productive team, (3, 4), forms in the
CSPE matching, this comes at the cost of preventing workers 1 and 2 from joining teams with
significantly lower pairwise correlations. In particular, while the team (1, 2) produces positively
correlated signals, the teams (1, 3) and (2, 4) do not. It turns out that the gain in productivity
obtained from re-matching worker 1 with worker 3, and worker 2 with worker 4, outweighs the cost
of disrupting the most productive team (3, 4).
We now formalize the logic just described and define our first notion of inefficiency.
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Definition 3.2 (Stratification Inefficiency). A CSPE (µ, N ⇤ ) is Stratification Inefficient if
1. there exist two workers i, j 2 N , i 6= j, for which which µ(i) = j and v` (n⇤ (i, j)) is the highest
payo↵ worker ` 2 {i, j} can obtain in any PEN in any team; and,
2. there exists a matching µ0 6= µ 2 M and a collection of PEN N̂ = {n̂(i, j)}i,j2N such that,
P

v` (n⇤ (`, µ(`))) <

`2N

P

v` (n̂(`, µ0 (`))).

`2N

The first condition requires that, in any Stratification Inefficient CSPE matching, a pair of teammates
are each as well o↵ as in any other feasible team playing any other PEN, i.e. worker 3 and worker 4
in our example. The second condition requires that there exists another matching, i.e. µ̂ such that
µ̂(3) = 1 and µ̂(4) = 2 in our example, and a collection of PEN in each team that increases utilitarian
welfare. Stratification Inefficiency therefore arises because two (possibly highly productive) workers
each obtains a higher payo↵ together than in any other team, but do not internalize the “externality”
they generate on the productivity of other matches. An efficiency-minded manager, in contrast,
prefers them not to match so that she can better exploit the entire correlation matrix.
An immediate implication of our definition is that Stratification Inefficiency is a phenomenon that
can only be eliminated by a manager that actively intervenes in the assignment of workers to teams.
In particular, if two workers obtain a higher payo↵ together than in any other team playing any
PEN, there is no way to select PEN within teams to induce either to form a more efficient team.
Put di↵erently, whenever a Stratification Inefficient CSPE exists, then no efficient CSPE exists.
Observation 4. If a Stratification Inefficient CSPE exists, then no efficient CSPE exists. Hence,
no management intervention within teams can restore efficiency.
3.4.2. Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficiency
Stratification Inefficiency is not driven by free riding. Indeed, in the inefficient matching we illustrated, each worker works as hard as she would in the efficient matching. We now focus on the
implications of free riding within teams for sorting across teams. In contrast to Stratification Inefficiency, we show that the type of inefficiency that arises due to free riding can be prevented by active
management of workers within teams.
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Figure 3.5: Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficiency.
For illustration, suppose again that the parameters are as in Figure 3.3. But now, suppose the
network in Figure 3.5a describes the correlation matrix. The unique PEN in teams composed of
workers connected by blue dashed lines is the symmetric profile (2, 2), the unique PEN (up to
identity) in teams composed of workers connected by dotted red lines is the asymmetric profile
(1, 3), and the unique PEN (up to identity) in teams composed of workers connected by solid lines is
the asymmetric profile (0, 3). Corresponding payo↵s are depicted in Figure 3.5b. We argue that, if
team membership costs are small enough, there is a CSPE matching that pairs worker 1 (worker 2)
and worker 3 (worker 4), even though the efficient matching pairs worker 1 (worker 3) and worker
2 (worker 4).
To see why such a CSPE exists, consider the incentives of worker 1. She has two relevant options:
form a team with worker 2, with whom she produces uncorrelated signals, or form a team with
worker 3, with whom she produces positively correlated signals.20 In the team with worker 2,
worker 1 produces two signals in any PEN. On the other hand, in a team with worker 3, worker 1
either produces three signals (so that worker 3 produces one signal) or one signal (so that worker 3
produces three signals). In the case in which worker 1 produces three signals when matched with
worker 3, it is clear that she would rather form a team with worker 2; not only is the value of
information produced lower in the team with worker 3, she is exerting more e↵ort. But, if worker 1
produces one signal when matched with worker 3, so that she is the low producer in that team, then
she would rather form a team with worker 3; though the value of information produced is lower, she
is exerting less e↵ort (see Figure 3.5b for the payo↵ comparison).
20 Again,

teams (1, 4) and (2, 3) never form in any CSPE.
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So, for argument’s sake, fix the PEN within team (1, 3) to be the strategy profile (1, 3) so that
worker 1 would rather match with worker 3 than worker 2. Worker 3 would only deem such a team
acceptable if she could not persuade worker 4 to form a team with her. But, fixing the PEN within
team (2, 4) to be the asymmetric profile (3, 1), worker 4 prefers to work with worker 2 (worker 4 has
the “same” options as worker 1). Hence, there is a CSPE in which worker 1 matches worker 3 (and
worker 2 matches worker 4) because worker 3 (worker 2) has no better option. The CSPE outcome
is inefficient, however, because not only does the total value of information produced in the firm
increase by forming teams (1, 2) and (3, 4), but total e↵ort costs decrease weakly.21
We again formalize the logic just described and define our second notion of inefficiency.
Definition 3.3 (Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficiency). A CSPE (µ, N ⇤ ) is Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficient if
1. there exist two workers i, j 2 N , i 6= j, for which µ(i) = j, and a PEN n̂(i, i 0 ), i 0 6= i, satisfying
ni⇤ (j)n̂i 0 (i) < n̂i (i 0 )nj⇤ (i);
and,
2. there exists a matching µ̂ 2 M satisfying µ̂(i) = i 0 and a collection of PEN N̂ = {n̂(i, j)}i,j2N ,
including n̂(i, i 0 ), such that
P

v` (n⇤ (`, µ(`))) <

`2N

P

v` (n̂(`, µ0 (`))).

`2N

To understand the definition, consider again the example. Let (i, j) = (1, 3) and (i 0 , j 0 ) = (2, 4).
The manager prefers to match worker 1 with worker 2 because there is a symmetric PEN inside
the team, n̂(1, 2) = (2, 2), in which worker 1 exerts relatively more e↵ort than her partner when
compared to the “on-path” PEN, n⇤ (1, 3) = (1, 3). In particular,

n1⇤ (3)
n3⇤ (1)

=

1
3

<1=

n̂1 (2)
n̂2 (1)

so that, by

cross-multiplying, we see that the first inequality of the definition is satisfied. The second part of
the definition ensures that, upon re-matching worker 1 and worker 2 and fixing n̂(1, 2), the manager
can select a PEN and matching of the other two workers so that utilitarian welfare increases.
21 Recall, the cost of e↵ort is increasing for an individual worker and the total number of signals produced in each
team in the efficient and inefficient matching is the same.

111

Our discussion suggests a possible resolution to incentive problems in the case of Asymmetric E↵ort
Inefficiency. If a manager can assign roles to individual workers, then it may be possible to enforce
an efficient CSPE. For example, returning to Figure 3.5, if a manager designates worker 1 as a high
producer, quite literally in the terminology of our analysis, then she can enforce an efficient CSPE.
In particular, if we choose a PEN in team (1, 3) so that worker 1 is the team high producer, rather
than worker 3, then worker 1 would rather form a team with worker 2. As worker 2 prefers this
arrangement to the case in which she matches with worker 4 and is the high producer, worker 1 and
worker 2 match, leaving worker 3 and worker 4 to match.
Observation 5. If an Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficient CSPE exists, then an efficient CSPE may also
exist. In this case, a manager can select PEN within teams to restore efficiency.
3.4.3. Robustness
We finally show that the inefficiencies we identify are robust in a formal sense.
Proposition 3.3 (Robustness).
1. If Assumption 3.1 holds and K > 0 is sufficiently small, then there is an open set of correlation
parameters for which there is a Stratification Inefficient CSPE.
2. If Assumption 3.1 and 3.2 hold,

2

2
✓,

and K > 0 is sufficiently small, then there is an

open set of correlation parameters for which there is an Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficient CSPE.
The proof of Proposition 3.3 makes full use of our characterization of within-team equilibria to
construct correlations leading to inefficiency. In particular, to construct a Stratification Inefficient
CSPE, we choose four pairwise correlations strictly below ⇢⇤ , the cuto↵ below which there is a unique
and symmetric PEN, and all others above it. As long as there is no free-riding opportunity for the
workers with the lowest correlation, they must match in any CSPE (for small K > 0). However,
if the other two workers have a sufficiently high correlation, then re-matching workers can improve
welfare.
To construct an Asymmetric Inefficient CSPE, we observe that, under Assumption 3.2, there is an
open set of correlations above ⇢⇤ for which there is a non-trivial asymmetric PEN of the Production
Subgame. We then pick a worker, say worker 1, and two pairwise correlations– ⇢13 , in this open
set, and ⇢12 below ⇢⇤ –so that worker 1 prefers to free ride in the team with worker 3 than to match
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worker 2. If ⇢12 is small enough, however, the sum of utilities in the team (1, 2) exceeds that in
(1, 3), as in our illustrative example.
Moreover, in the open set of parameters we identify, a manager can always improve welfare by forcing
worker 1 to be the high producer when matched with worker 3, i.e. selecting a PEN in which she
exerts relatively more e↵ort than worker 3. We remark that such powers seem plausible in many
organizational contexts; while it may be costly to assign all workers to teams, it may not be so costly
to manage the behavior of particular workers.22

3.5. Discussion
Our paper is a first step towards understanding how research teams form absent a central authority.
We shed light on how workers’ incentives for e↵ort within teams are a↵ected by their informational
complementaries and therefore impact equilibrium sorting. Our analysis uncovers two plausible
forces leading to inefficient sorting. First, workers producing complementary information may match
and force excluded workers to form highly unproductive teams composed of workers producing
substitutable information. Hence, there is too much inequality in productivity across teams. Second,
even when it is efficient for a team composed of workers producing complementary information to
form, such a team may not arise in equilibrium if one of its members has an opportunity to form a
less productive team in which she exerts relatively less e↵ort. Hence, there is too much inequality
in e↵ort within teams. While the former inefficiency suggests conditions under which self-organized
teams are not optimal, the latter provides foundation for targeted management interventions that
designate specific workers as project leaders.
We conclude by commenting on the structure of our model leading to our results and on the extensions we have considered.
Gaussian Environment. We model information acquisition using a canonical quadratic-Gaussian
set-up; workers obtain normally distributed signals to minimize a quadratic loss function and have
normally distributed prior beliefs.23 In this environment, the expected value of the posterior distri22 A careful reader should note that while we have demonstrated that Stratification Inefficiency and Asymmetric
Inefficient CSPE occur in a range of non-trivial scenarios, we have not argued that they are the only sources of
inefficiency in our model. This claim is false precisely because welfare inefficiency may exist within a team. In
particular, a PEN may be selected within a team that is welfare dominated by another PEN. As the focus of our
analysis is on inefficient sorting, however, we do not attempt to characterize such inefficiencies. We conjecture, but
have not proven that, taking care of within-team inefficiency, the inefficiencies we have identified are exhaustive.
23 Our results generalize to the case in which the joint distribution of signals and states for any number of draws
is elliptical with finite second moments. In this case, the conditional expectation is still linear in signals and our
characterization results will possess the same qualitative features.
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bution simplifies to the negative posterior variance (Lemma 3.1). Hence, we can derive comparative
statics using a closed-form utility function. Our analysis uncovers how correlation between teammates a↵ects the symmetry of the PEN correspondence–that we can order equilibria by symmetry
in terms of correlation is the crucial property for our main inefficiency results. In Online Appendix
3.10, we consider a binary signal, binary state environment, as is common in applied theoretical
work. While the intuition that perfect negative correlation leads to perfect learning does not hold
(because such correlation is statistically infeasible), it is still the case that low correlation in stateconditional signals is desirable. Consequently, the marginal value of a draw, and hence equilibrium
predictions, satisfy the same properties as in the Gaussian case.
Draw Procedure. The procedure through which workers acquire and share information possesses two
features which deserve comment. First, workers choose numbers of signals simultaneously. Methodologically, we abstract from dynamic considerations in order to isolate the key property relevant
for team formation–namely, the relationship between correlation and the symmetry of equilibrium
strategies. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to explore the extent to which the intuitions we have provided hold in a more complex dynamic game. Towards an answer, in Online Appendix 3.11, we
study a finite extensive form game with sequential decisions. Our main conclusion is that for many,
but not all, correlations there is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the sequential game that coincides with the most symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous game. Nonetheless, it may be the
case that an equilibrium of the simultaneous game is more asymmetric than the most symmetric
equilibrium of the extensive form game. Hence, sequential decisions do not eliminate asymmetric
equilibria, the driving force behind Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficiency.
Second, the correlation between signals di↵ers across “periods”; if (ni , nj ) draws are taken in team
(i, j) with correlation ⇢, and nj > ni > 0, then the first ni signals drawn by each worker are correlated
according to ⇢ and the last nj

ni signals are conditionally independent. We assume that pairwise

correlation a↵ects the value of e↵ort within, but not across, periods in order capture the economics of
a situation in which joint and simultaneous e↵ort is a↵ected by complementarities, while unilateral
e↵ort is not. In particular, it would not be equivalent to analyze a continuous choice model in which
workers first choose precisions and then share a single signal. In this set-up, within and across period
e↵ects cannot be disentangled.24
24 Nonetheless, a kind of “continuous draw” set-up may be imagined as follows. Suppose, relative to a single signal of
fixed precision, a worker can draw many signals with lower precisions, but with the cost of information held constant.
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Size-Two Teams. We follow the matching literature in assuming that workers form teams with
at most two workers. This restriction allows us to obtain a clean characterization of within-team
equilibria; a single pairwise correlation coefficient captures intuitively the e↵ects of skill complementarity. Extending the analysis to teams of more than two workers is not without its challenges. In
subsequent work, Segura-Rodriguez (2019) shows that a team of three workers can perfectly learn
the state even if each worker produces a single signal and all three signals are highly correlated.
Characterizing within-team equilibria with many workers and exploring the implications of these
equilibria for team formation is an interesting open problem we leave for future research.
Optimality of Decentralized Sorting. Our current framework illustrates the ways in which decentralized sorting within firms may be inefficient. We have assumed throughout, however, that workers
are compensated equally for team output and that management does not play an active role in the
assignment of workers to teams. In subsequent work, Kambhampati and Segura-Rodriguez (2020)
study the problem of optimally assigning workers to teams and designing incentive contracts in the
presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. They characterize when creating incentives
in a centralized organization becomes so costly that a profit-maximizing manager prefers to allow
workers to sort themselves into teams and compensate them equally on the basis of team output
alone. Nonetheless, the environment in Kambhampati and Segura-Rodriguez (2020) is simpler than
the one considered in this paper and so their results do not directly apply. A complete analysis of
the tradeo↵ between centralization and decentralization in informational settings thus awaits future
research.

3.6. Appendix: Proofs
3.6.1. Proof of Lemma 3.1
For any measurable function g : X ! R, where X is the set of possible realizations of signals,
⇥
Ex,✓ (g (x)

⇤
✓)2 

⇥
Ex (E(✓ | x)

⇤
✓)2 =

⇥ ⇥
Ex E✓ (E(✓ | x)

✓)2 | x

⇤⇤

=

Var (✓ | x).

In Online Appendix 3.12, we analyze the limit model obtained when such precisions become arbitrarily small and
costs are adjusted. Workers can therefore be interpreted as choosing a real number of signals. In this limit model, the
equilibrium correspondence can be ordered by symmetry using pairwise correlations as in our main characterization
result, and hence our main inefficiency Propositions generalize. We do not use such a model in the main text, however,
as we have not proven that the equilibrium correspondence of the sequence of discrete-draw models converges to that
of the continuous-draw model.
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⇥
The inequality follows because E (b

⇤
✓)2 |x is minimized by setting b = E[✓|x]. The first equality

follows from the Law of Iterated Expectations. The second equality follows from the definition of
conditional variance.
Let ⌃ be the correlation matrix of joint signals x, and 1N be a N-column vector of 1s. The likelihood
✓
◆
⇥
⇤
1
1
0
2
1
function of the signals is, p(x|✓) = det(2⇡ 2 ⌃) 2 exp
(✓
·
1
x)
⌃
(✓
·
1
x)
and
N
N
2
✓
◆
⇥
⇤
1
1
the prior density is, p(✓) = (2⇡ 2 ) 2 exp
µ✓ ) 2 ✓ 2 .
2 (✓
By Bayes rule, the posterior distribution of ✓|x is proportional to,
p(x|✓)p(✓)

where B = (

2
✓

/

exp

/

exp

/

exp

✓
✓
✓

1
2

⇥

⇥
1
2
1
2

⇥

2

✓2 (

✓

✓

x)0

+ (✓ · 1N

2 0
1N ⌃ 1 1N )

+

⇤0 ⇥
A B ✓

✓

2 0
1N ⌃ 1 1N ),

+

2

µ✓ ) 2

(✓

A

1

A=B

(µ✓

⇤

◆

2

1

⌃

✓(2µ✓

2
✓

(✓ · 1N
+

2

x)
(x 0 ⌃

⇤

◆
1

1N + 10N ⌃

1

x)

,

2
✓

2 0
1N ⌃ 1 x),

+

⇤

◆

and the proportionality operator

eliminates positive constants. Since the derived expression is the kernel of a normal distribution,
Var (✓ | x) = B

1

We construct B

.
1

when workers take nj

1

ni draws. The prior covariance matrix, ⌃

, is block

diagonal with ni blocks of the form,

⌃0 =

and nj

1

⇢

⇢

1

!

,

ni scalar blocks each equal to 1. The inverse of a block diagonal matrix is equal to the block

diagonal matrix formed by inverting each block. Then, 10N ⌃

1

1N is equal to ni 102 ⌃0 1 12 + (nj

ni ).

Since,

⌃0 =
we have, 102 ⌃0 1 12 =

2
1+⇢ .

Var (✓ | ni , nj ) = B

1

1

1

1

⇢2

⇢
1

⇢

!

,

✓

2ni
+ (nj
1+⇢

Hence,

1

=

2 0
1N ⌃ 1 1N

+

2
✓
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1

=

✓

2

◆

ni ) +

2
✓

◆

1

.

Finally, if ⇢ =

1, the average of two signals equals the realized state ✓, and so the posterior variance

is zero.
3.6.2. Proof of Proposition 3.1

3.6.2.1 Existence of Nash Equilibrium
Since information production exhibits diminishing marginal returns, eventually, the marginal value
of producing a signal must be less than the marginal cost regardless of the behavior of one’s partner.
Therefore, it is without loss to bound the action space.
Lemma 3.2. There is a positive integer N̄ such that for each positive integer n

N̄, n is a not best

response by worker i to any strategy by worker j.

Proof. For ni  nj ,
Var (✓ | (ni

1, nj ))

Var (✓ | (ni , nj )) =

is strictly decreasing in nj and in ni because
Var (✓ | (ni

1, nj ))

( 11+⇢⇢ )
((

1 ⇢
1+⇢

Var (✓ | (ni , nj )) =

ni 11+⇢⇢ +nj +1

2
1+⇢

> 0. For ni

)

2
2

2+

✓

)((ni 11+⇢⇢ +nj )

2

2+

✓

)

nj + 1,
2

((nj 11+⇢⇢ +ni

is strictly decreasing in ni and in nj , again because

1 ⇢
1+⇢

1)

2+

2
✓

)((nj 11+⇢⇢ +ni )

2+

2
✓

)

> 0.

Therefore, the marginal value of worker i is strictly decreasing in nj , so that worker i’s best response
is decreasing in nj . We only need to prove that worker i’s best response to 0 draws by worker j is
finite. It suffices to show that there is an ni 2 Z+ such that Var (✓ | (ni

1, 0))

Var (✓ | (ni , 0)) is

smaller than c(1). We have

Var (✓ | (ni

1, 0))

Var (✓ | (ni , 0))

Then, it is sufficient to have ni >

2

c(1)ni

=

1
1)

2+

+ 1. When ni >

c(1)

(ni

2

2
✓

1
ni

2+

2
✓

<

2

ni (ni

1) .

+ 1 we obtain the desired inequality.

Define N̄ 2 N as the smallest value that satisfies the inequality.
Since we can bound the action space, we may redefine the game as a finite exact potential game to
show that there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Lemma 3.3. There exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the Production Subgame.

Proof. Given that no worker optimally produces a number of signals larger than N̄, we can redefine
the Production Subgame as the finite normal form game ({0, 1, ... , N̄}2 , {vi , vj }). Define the potential
function,
(ni , nj , ⇢ij ) =

Var (✓ | (ni , nj ))

c(ni )

c(nj ),

where ⇢ij is the correlation for team (i, j). It is a potential function since
vi (ni , nj )
vj (ni , nj )

vi (ni0 , nj )
vj (ni , nj0 )

=

Var (✓ | (ni , nj ))

(ni , nj , ⇢ij )

c(ni ) + Var (✓ | (ni0 , nj )) + c(ni0 )

=

Var (✓ | (ni , nj ))

c(nj ) + Var (✓ | (ni , nj0 )) + c(nj0 )

=

=

(ni0 , nj , ⇢ij )

(ni , nj0 , ⇢ij ).

(ni , nj , ⇢ij )

Hence, the redefined game is a finite exact potential game and is guaranteed to have a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium by Corollary 2.2 of Monderer and Shapley (1996).

3.6.2.2 Existence of Pareto-Efficient Nash Equilibrium
By Lemma 3.2, we can conclude that the set of Nash Equilibria is finite. Consider the subset
of equilibria that maximizes worker i’s payo↵. Choose any equilibrium that (weakly) maximizes
worker j’s payo↵ within this subset. The chosen equilibrium must be Pareto-Efficient. Hence, a
Pareto-Efficient Nash Equilibrium exists.

3.6.2.3 Comparative Statistics Preliminary Lemmas
Lemma 3.4 states that the marginal value of a signal by a high producer is increasing in ⇢.25
Lemma 3.4 (High Producer Comparative Statics in ⇢). For ni > nj , MV (ni ; nj , ⇢) is increasing in
⇢.

Proof. For ni > nj ,
@MV (ni ; nj , ⇢)
/
@⇢
25 Recall,

✓✓

1 ⇢
nj
+ ni
1+⇢

◆

2

+

2
✓

◆

+

✓✓

1 ⇢
nj
+ ni
1+⇢

◆
1

a high producer is a teammate taking weakly more draws than her partner.
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2

+

2
✓

◆

> 0.

The same property does not hold for a low producer.26 We prove the low producer’s marginal benefit
is strictly concave in the pairwise correlation ⇢ and has a unique maximizer. For the following lemmas
it is useful to define the signal-to-prior variance ratio

:=

2
2
✓

.

Lemma 3.5 (Low Producer Comparative Statics in ⇢). For ni < nj with nj

1, MV (ni + 1; nj , ⇢)

is strictly concave in ⇢ with unique maximizer,

⇢˜(ni + 1, nj , ) =

⇣

⌘2
p
ni (ni + 1)

nj +

(nj + )2 + ni (ni + 1)

.

Proof. If worker j produces nj signals, the marginal benefit of the n + 1-th signal for worker i, with
n < nj , is equal to,

MV (n + 1; nj , ⇢) =

1 ⇢
1+⇢

(

2
n 1+⇢
+nj

n+

2
+nj
)((n+1) 1+⇢

n 1+

)

.

Di↵erentiating with respect to ⇢,
2 2 (nj + )2 (1 + ⇢)2 + n(n 1)(1 ⇢)2
@MV (n + 1; nj , ⇢)
=
2
2.
@⇢
(2n + (nj n + )(1 + ⇢)) (2(n + 1) + (nj n 1 + )(1 + ⇢))

Di↵erentiating again with respect to ⇢,
@ 2 MV (n+1;nj ,⇢)
@⇢2

/ 4n(n + 1)



(nj + )2 (1 + ⇢)

+n(n + 1) 2n(nj
+(nj

n

n

1 + )(nj

n(n

1)(1

1 + ) + 2(n + 1)(nj
n + ) (2⇢

⇢)
n+ )

2) < 0.

Hence, the marginal value MV (n + 1; nj , ⇢) is strictly concave in ⇢. The unique maximizer ⇢˜ must
satisfy,
(nj + )2 (1 + ⇢˜)2 = n(n + 1)(1
26 Recall,

⇢˜)2 ,

a low producer is a teammate taking strictly fewer draws than her partner.
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a quadratic equation in ⇢ with roots,

⇢=

⇣

nj +

±

⌘2
p
n(n + 1)

(nj + )2 + n(n + 1)

.

Both solutions are negative because the denominator is negative. However, the smaller root (corresponding to the “plus” in the numerator) is less than

1 and therefore infeasible. Since n+1  nj , the
1. Set ⇢˜(n + 1, nj , ) =

other
root (corresponding
to the “minus” in the numerator) is greater than
⇣
⌘2
p
nj +
n(n+1)
(nj + )2 +n(n+1) .

We now make stepwise comparisons between the marginal value of a signal by a high producer and
the marginal value of a signal by a low producer. Workers initially produce n

1 signals. The high

producer’s marginal value is the payo↵ of producing an n-th signal. The low producer’s marginal
value is the payo↵ of producing an n-th signal, given that the high producer already produced n
signals. Lemma 3.6 states that for any number n

1 and signal-to-prior variance ratio

=

2
2
✓

,

there is a unique correlation, ⇢ˆ(n, ), below which the marginal value of the high producer is less
than the marginal value of the low producer, and above which the opposite holds.
Lemma 3.6 (High Producer-Low Producer MV Comparison 1). Fix nj > ni with nj

1 and .

Then,
MV (nj ; ni , ⇢)
|
{z
}

<

Marginal Value High Producer

if and only if,

⇢ < ⇢ˆ(ni + 1, nj , ) =

( + ni + nj ) +

MV (ni + 1; nj , ⇢)
|
{z
}

Marginal Value Low Producer

p

( + ni + nj )2 4( + nj
2( + nj ni 1)

ni

1)

< 0.

Proof. First, observe that

MV (ni + 1; nj , ⇢)

MV (nj ; ni , ⇢) () 0

( + nj

ni

1)⇢2 + ( + ni + nj )⇢ + 1.

The last inequality involves a quadratic concave function in ⇢. The roots are:

⇢+ (ni , nj ) =

( + ni + nj ) +

p
( + ni + nj )2 4( + nj
2( + nj ni 1)
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ni

1)

⇢ (ni , nj ) =

p
( + ni + nj )2 4( + nj
2( + nj ni 1)

( + ni + nj )

1 the expression inside the root is greater than ( + nj

for all ni

1. If ni = 0, the expression inside the root is equal to ( + nj
1, and if

+ nj

2, then ⇢ (0, nj ) =

1. Therefore, ⇢

1)

.

ni )2 , so that ⇢ (ni , nj ) <

When ni

⇢ (0, nj ) <

ni

2)2 . If

1

+ nj < 2 then

is an infeasible solution.

It is clear that ⇢+ (ni , nj ) < 0 for all ni and nj , and

+

⇢ (0, nj ) =

Further, when ni
1 for all nj > ni

( + 1) +
2

p
(

1)2

=

(

2
2( +nj 1)
2 2( +nj )
2( +nj 1)

>

1

if

+ nj

2

=

1

if

+ nj < 2.

1 the expression inside the root is larger than ( +nj 2)2 . Therefore, ⇢+ (ni , nj ) >
0. Then ⇢+ is a feasible solution and we set ⇢ˆ(ni + 1, nj ) = ⇢+ .

Lemma 3.7 states that if

is sufficiently large, the pairwise correlation at which the marginal value

of a low producer is maximized, ⇢˜(ni , ni , ), is less than ⇢ˆ(ni , ). We use this property in the next
section to order equilibria in terms of their symmetry.
Lemma 3.7 (High Producer-Low Producer MV Comparison 2). Fix nj > ni

1. Then for

1

⇢˜(ni + 1, nj , )  ⇢ˆ(ni + 1, nj , ).27
Proof. Define the function g (ni + 1, nj , ) := ⇢˜(ni + 1, nj , )
g (ni + 1, nj , )  0 for any nj > ni
any nj > ni

1. It suffices to show that g (ni + 1, nj , 1)  0 for

1 and any

1 and then show that

@g (ni +1,nj , )
@

⇢ˆ(ni + 1, nj , ). We want to show that

< 0 for any nj > ni

1.

We first show that g (ni + 1, nj , 1)  0. Notice,

g (ni + 1, nj , 1) =

⇣

nj + 1

p

ni (ni + 1)

⌘2

(1 + ni + nj ) +

(nj + 1)2 + ni (ni + 1)

 0,
27 For

ni = 0, ⇢˜(ni , nj , ) =

1, so the inequality is satisfied for any .
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To complete the argument, we show that (i) the left-hand side of the last expression is positive
when nj = ni + 1 and (ii) increasing in nj . To show (i), notice that when nj = ni + 1 the expression
on the left-hand side is positive if and only if

ni +

q
ni2 + 2ni

, 2(ni + 1)
,

1
(ni + 1)2

1
ni + 1

r

ni
ni + 1
q
2 ni2 + 2ni

0,

where the second and third lines are the result of taking squares on both sides and simplifying.
Clearly, the last inequality always holds. To show (ii), notice that the derivative of the left-hand

122

side with respect to nj is positive if and only if
ni + nj
(ni + 1) 1 + p
(ni + nj + 1)2

1
4(nj

ni )

!

Since nj > ni , the left-hand side of this expression is greater than

p
2 ni (ni + 1).
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.
ni +nj +1
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to show that,
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, nj2

ni
ni + 1

ni (1 + ni ),

where the second line is the result of taking squares on both sides and simplifying. But, this holds
is as long as nj
To show that

ni + 1. We have thus completed the proof that g (ni + 1, nj , 1)  0.
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The inequality follows because the first term is positive and the second term minus the third term
is non-negative: 2(ni + )2

8 if ni = 0, and greater than 2(2ni + 1)2
1,

we observe that for all

@ ⇢(n
˜ i +1,nj , )
@
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8(ni + 1) if ni > 0. Second,

ni (ni + 1) > ni , and nj

/ ni (ni + 1)

(nj + )

p

ni (ni + 1) < 0,

ni + 1.

3.6.2.4 Proof of Proposition 3.1 part 1. and 2.
By Assumption 3.1, for ⇢ =

1 and correlations close to it, both workers produce at least one signal.

Since MV (2; 1, ⇢) is close to 0, for correlations close to

1, no worker has an incentive to produce a

second signal when both are producing a single signal. Hence, there is a threshold ⇢⇤ >

1 below

which the unique equilibrium is symmetric.
As ⇢ approaches 1, the marginal benefit of matching the first signal of one’s teammate, MV (1; 1, ⇢),
approaches zero. By continuity and monotonicity of MV (1; 1, ⇢) in ⇢, there exists a unique ⇢⇤⇤ < 1
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such that MV (1; 1, ⇢⇤⇤ ) = c(1). Since, by the proof of Lemma 3.2, MV (1; n, ⇢) = c(1) is decreasing
in ⇢ when n

1, the low producer in the team has no incentive to match the high producer’s first

signal. Hence, for ⇢ > ⇢⇤⇤ one worker produces zero signals and the other produces a strictly positive
number of signals. This PEN is unique up to identity, except in the case in which the high producer
is indi↵erent between two numbers of signals.

3.6.2.5 Proof of Proposition 3.1 part 3. and 4.
For this proof, we use the Sequential Response Algorithm:
1. Set (ni0 , nj0 ) = (0, 0) and t = 1.
2. If MV (t; njt

1

, ⇢) > c(t)

If not, set nit = nit

1

c(t

1), set nit = nit

1

+ 1 and move to step 3, replacing t with t + 1.

and move to step 4, replacing t with t + 1.

3. Set njt = arg maxnnit Var (✓ | (t, n))

c(n) and go back to step 2, replacing t with t + 1.

4. (Complement E↵ect) Set (nit , njt ) = (nit

1

+ 1, njt

1

+ 1) if (i) both workers are made weakly

better o↵ and (ii) the resulting profile is a Nash equilibrium. If either (i) or (ii) is not satisfied,
set (nit , njt ) = (nit

1

, njt

1

) and move to step 5, replacing t with t + 1. Else, repeat step 4,

replacing t with t + 1.
5. (Substitution E↵ect) Consider the profile (n1t
by worker j given n1t
(n1t

1

+ 1, n2t

1

1

1

+ 1, n2t

1

n), where n2t

1

+ 1 subject to the constraint that 0  n  n2t

n is a best-response
1

. Set (n1t , n2t ) =

n) if (i) both workers are made weakly better o↵ and (ii) the resulting profile

is a Nash equilibrium. Then, repeat step 5, replacing t with t + 1. If either (i) or (ii) are not
satisfied, exit the algorithm and return (n1t

1

, n2t

1

).

The algorithm terminates in finite time for the following two reasons. First, the algorithm eventually
exits the loop between step 2 and step 3 because the marginal value of a signal approaches zero and
costs are increasing. Second, the algorithm eventually exits step 4 and step 5 because, by Lemma
3.2, there is a positive integer above which worker 1 no longer wants to produce a signal, no matter
the number of signals produced by worker 2.
Lemma 3.8. The Sequential Response Algorithm finds a PEN that minimizes |ni
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nj |.

Proof. We first claim that if step 4 is reached in iteration t + 1, then (nit , njt ) is a Nash equilibrium.
To see this, note that, after step 1, the algorithm cycles between step 2 and step 3. We make two
observations about this cycle. First, worker j either exits the loop having never produced a signal or
she matches worker i’s signal the first time step 3 is reached.28 Second, if worker j does not match
worker i’s signal in step 3, then she never increases the number of signals she acquires in any future
iteration in which step 3 is reached (her marginal value decreases each time step 3 is reached).
When step 4 is reached, worker j does not have a profitable deviation downwards by construction.
Checking that worker i has no profitable downward deviation is more involved. First, suppose step 3
was never reached. Then, worker i exits having produced zero signals and cannot reduce the number
of signals she produces further. Second, suppose step 3 was reached at least once. If during last
time step 3 was reached worker j matched worker i’s signal, then symmetry ensures that worker i
has no profitable deviation. If during the last time step 3 was reached, worker j best responded by
weakly decreasing the number of signals she produced, then the marginal value of information for
worker i is larger after j’s decision than before. Once again, worker i has no profitable downward
deviation.
We now check for profitable upward deviations. When step 4 is reached, worker i does not have
a profitable deviation upwards by construction. Moreover, njt  nit . If njt = nit , then j’s incentives
are the same as i’s and so she has no profitable deviation upwards. If njt < nit , however, she has no
incentive to produce njt +1 signals by construction. Moreover, since the marginal value of information
is decreasing in the number of signals she produces, she does not want to produce any larger number
of signals either.
then our second observation about the algorithm suggests that njt + 1 was not profitable. But, then,
any larger number of signals is also not profitable. Hence, worker j has no profitable deviation
upwards. We have thus established that the profile entering step 4 is a Nash equilibrium.
Step 4 and step 5 ensure that the algorithm finds a PEN. That this PEN is the most symmetric
follows from the incremental construction in the cycle between step 2 and step 3.
28 To understand why, consider the first time step 2 is reached. Worker i either (i) produces zero signals or (ii)
produces one signal. In case (i), the algorithm proceeds to step 4 with both workers having produced zero signals. In
case (ii), the algorithm proceeds to step 3. If worker j then matches worker i’s first signal, we are done. Otherwise,
worker j best responds by producing zero signals. But if she produces zero signals, she must exit the loop having
produced zero signals; each future iteration at which step 3 is reached, the marginal value of producing a strictly
positive number of signals decreases.
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The proof consists of two steps. First, we argue that if (n1 , n2 ) with n1 > n2 is a PEN for correlation
⇢, then for correlation ⇢0 > ⇢ there exists an equilibrium (n10 , n20 ) with n10

n1 and n20  n2 . Second,

we argue that if there is no symmetric PEN at ⇢, then for ⇢0 > ⇢ there is no symmetric PEN as well.
These two properties together imply the result.
First, suppose that for correlation ⇢ there is a PEN (n1 , n2 ) with n1 > n2 . Then, it has to be that

MV (n1 ; n2 , ⇢)

MV (n2 + 1; n1 , ⇢).

Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7 imply that ⇢ > ⇢ˆ(n2 + 1, n1 , ) > ⇢˜(n2 + 1, n1 , ). Hence, by Lemma 3.5,
for any correlation ⇢0 > ⇢, MV (n2 +1; n1 , ⇢0 ) < MV (n2 +1; n1 , ⇢). Pick ⇢0 > ⇢ and start the Sequential
Response Algorithm at step 3. Since the marginal value of draw n2 + 1 is smaller at ⇢0 than at ⇢,
the optimal response of player 2 to n1 draws is smaller than or equal to n2 when the correlation is
⇢0 instead of ⇢. Continuing with the algorithm, we find a PEN (n10 , n20 ). Since the number of signals
produced by player 1 can only increase throughout the algorithm and the marginal value of a signal
by player 2 decreases in the number of signals produced by player 1, we conclude that n10

n1 and

n20  n2 .
Second, suppose that for correlation ⇢ there is no symmetric PEN. Then, using the Sequential
Response Algorithm, there must be an iteration t at which n2t < t and n1t = t. Since player 1 has
taken draw t, it means that
MV (t; t

1, ⇢)

MV (t; t, ⇢).

Then, Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7 imply that ⇢ > ⇢ˆ(t, t, ) > ⇢˜(t, t, ). Hence, by Lemma 3.5, for any
correlation ⇢0 > ⇢, MV (t; t, ⇢0 ) < MV (t; t, ⇢). Therefore, at iteration t of the Sequential Response
Algorithm when the pairwise correlation is ⇢0 , it must be that n2t < t as well. Furthermore, it must
be that n1t = t; by Lemma 3.4, the marginal value of draw t for player 1 is larger at correlation ⇢0
than at correlation ⇢. Since (n1t , n2t ) is asymmetric, and any asymmetric profile at any iteration of
the algorithm stays asymmetric, there is no symmetric PEN.
3.6.3. Proof of Proposition 3.2
The following algorithm finds a Pareto-Efficient CSPE:
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1. There are

4
2

= 6 possible two-worker teams. Within each of these teams, select a PEN in

which the high producer obtains the highest possible payo↵. Among the set of all of these
teams, identify the team, say (1, 2), in which the high producer, say worker 1, obtains a higher
payo↵ than any high producer in any other team. If the PEN played in this team, n⇤ (1, 2),
yields the high producer a lower payo↵ than if she works alone, then in the unique CSPE each
worker is alone and chooses an optimal number of signals. If this is not the case, fix the PEN
n⇤ (1, 2) and set µ(1) = 2. Proceed to the next step.
2. Fix n⇤ (1, 3), n⇤ (1, 4), n⇤ (2, 3), and n⇤ (2, 4) so that 1 and 2 are high producers in every PEN
in every team to which they are not assigned. Fixing these PEN, worker 1 has no incentive
to deviate from her current team since, by construction, she obtains a higher payo↵ than
any high producer in any team playing any PEN. And as worker 2 obtains a weakly higher
payo↵ than worker 1 (she is acquiring weakly fewer signals), she has no incentive to deviate as
well. Therefore, neither worker 3 nor worker 4 can persuade worker 1 or worker 2 to form a
deviating team. If there is a PEN within the team (3, 4) that gives to both workers a higher
utility than working alone, let µ(3) = 4 and choose this PEN. Otherwise, let µ(3) = 3 and
µ(4) = 4 and let each choose an optimal number of signals. In either case, we obtain a CSPE
(µ, {n⇤ (i, j)}i6=j2N ). If the CSPE is Pareto-Efficient, we are done.
3. If the CSPE found in Step 2 is not Pareto-Efficient, there is another matching µ̂ 2 M and a
collection of “on-path” PEN, n̂(i, µ̂(i))i2N , such that, for each worker,

vi (n̂(i, µ̂(i)))

vi (n⇤ (i, µ(i))),

and the inequality is strict for at least one worker. Consider the profile (µ̂, {ñ(i, j)}i6=j2N )
where (ñi , ñj ) = (n̂i , n̂j ) if j = µ̂(i) and (ñi , ñj ) = (ni⇤ , nj⇤ ) otherwise. This profile is a CSPE;
on-path, each worker obtains a higher payo↵ than in the original CSPE and each worker has
the same deviations as before. If it is not Pareto-Efficient, then repeat this step until a ParetoEfficient CSPE is found. As there is a finite number of CSPE, the algorithm must end in a
finite number of iterations.
3.6.4. Proof of Proposition 3.3
We make use of the following Lemma.
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Lemma 3.9. For any correlations, there exists a K > 0 such that any worker in a size-two team in
which her partner produces a strictly positive number of signals strictly prefers that team to working
alone.

Proof. Suppose worker i and worker j play an arbitrary PEN (a, b), with a, b > 0. Suppose worker
i optimally produces c signals alone. Clearly, absent membership costs, worker i is strictly better
o↵ in a team with worker j in which (c, b) is played. But, since (a, b) is a PEN, she is weakly better
o↵ under (a, b) than (c, b), and hence strictly better o↵ under (a, b) than working alone. Hence, if
the team membership cost is below some number Kij > 0, the cost of forming the team is strictly
smaller than the benefit for both i and j. Choosing K = min Kij > 0 completes the proof.
i,j6=i

1. We select correlations ⇢12 , ⇢13 , ⇢14 , ⇢23 , ⇢24 , and ⇢34 so that there is a CSPE in which teams
(1, 2) and (3, 4) form, but for which there is a matching forming teams (1, 3) and (2, 4) and a
collection of PEN that strictly increases welfare. By Assumption 3.1, the first two results of
Proposition 3.1 apply. Hence, there exists a correlation ⇢⇤ >

1 below which there is a unique

and symmetric PEN in which each worker produces a strictly positive number of signals and
a correlation 1 > ⇢⇤⇤

⇢⇤ above which there is a unique and completely asymmetric PEN in

which one worker produces zero signals. We utilize these correlations in the proof.
First, choose ⇢12 < ⇢⇤ so that the marginal value of a signal for each worker in the unique
and symmetric PEN (n, n), n > 0, is strictly smaller than the marginal cost c(n + 1)

c(n).

Second, choose ⇢34 such that ⇢12 < ⇢34 < ⇢⇤ and the unique and symmetric PEN is (n, n) as
well; by continuity of the marginal value of information, such a correlation is guaranteed to
exist. Third, choose ⇢13 , ⇢24 2 [⇢12 , ⇢34 ] close to ⇢12 so that (n, n) is the unique PEN in teams
(1, 3) and (2, 4). Fourth, choose ⇢14 and ⇢23 greater than ⇢⇤⇤ and select an arbitrary PEN
in these teams. This ensures that teams (1, 4) and (2, 3) can never form in any CSPE; due
to membership costs, the worker producing a strictly positive number of signals would prefer
to work alone. Finally, utilizing Lemma 3.9, choose K > 0 small enough that any worker in
a size-two team in which her partner produces a strictly positive number of signals strictly
prefers that team to working alone.
By construction, the unique PEN in teams (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 4), and (3, 4) is (n, n). Fixing this
strategy profile, we observe that payo↵s for any given worker are strictly decreasing in pairwise
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correlation,

@v (n, n; ⇢)
=
@⇢
2n

2n 2
2 + (1 + ⇢)

2

< 0.

✓

Hence, worker 1 and worker 2 each obtain a higher payo↵ together than in a team with either
worker 3 or worker 4, and, by our restriction on K > 0, a strictly higher payo↵ than when
alone. Team (1, 2) must therefore form in any CSPE. This leaves worker 3 and worker 4 with
two options: form a team or work alone. But, again, the two workers prefer to form a team
by our restriction on K > 0.
Notice, however, that if ⇢13 and ⇢24 are close enough to ⇢12 , the gain from matching worker
1 (2) and worker 3 (4) (and selecting the unique PEN in these teams) strictly increases the
total sum of utilities. Hence, we shown that our original CSPE is welfare dominated. Further,
as incentives are strict everywhere, for ✏ > 0 small, there is an ✏-ball around our chosen
correlations for which the same properties are satisfied.
2. We construct an Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficient CSPE in which teams (1, 3) and (2, 4) form.
We again select correlations ⇢12 , ⇢13 , ⇢14 , ⇢23 , ⇢24 , and ⇢34 . By Assumption 3.1, the first two
properties of Proposition 3.1 hold. Hence, we can choose correlations ⇢14 and ⇢23 above ⇢⇤⇤
so that teams (1, 4) and (2, 3) never form in any CSPE. Since

2

2
✓,

the third and fourth

properties of Proposition 3.1 hold. Moreover, by Assumption 3.2, we can choose correlations
⇢13 > ⇢⇤ and ⇢24 > ⇢⇤ close to ⇢⇤ in which there is a non-trivial asymmetric PEN in which
each worker does strictly better as a low producer than in the unique PEN at ⇢⇤ . Fix these
non-trivial PEN, n⇤ (1, 3) and n⇤ (2, 4), so that worker 1 and worker 4 are the low producers in
each team. Let the payo↵ to worker 1 in this team be denoted by u1⇤ and the payo↵ to worker
4 be denoted by u4⇤ .
It remains to choose ⇢12 and ⇢34 . We claim that for any small ✏ > 0, we can find a correlation
⇢12 < ⇢⇤ such that the payo↵ to each worker in the unique symmetric PEN in team (1, 2) is
u12 2 (u1⇤ , u1⇤

✏). Why does such a correlation exist? First, observe that, at ⇢ =

1, where the

unique PEN is (1, 1), each worker obtains a higher payo↵ than u1⇤ . Next, notice that at ⇢⇤ , the
payo↵ to each worker, u, is less than u1⇤ . Any payo↵ between u and u1⇤ is attainable for some
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⇢ 2 [ 1, ⇢⇤ ) since (i) ⇢ decreases below ⇢⇤ payo↵s increase, fixing a strategy profile and (ii)
the number signals each worker produces decreases as ⇢. (ii) implies that any discontinuities
in the payo↵ correspondence must cause both workers to su↵er a decrease in payo↵s, as in
Figure 3.3, thereby eliminating the possibility that the interval (u1⇤ , u1⇤

✏) is “jumped over”.

A similar argument ensures we can find a correlation ⇢34 < ⇢⇤ such that the payo↵ to each
worker in the unique symmetric PEN in team (3, 4) is u34 2 (u4⇤ , u1⇤

✏).

We argue that the matching µ satisfying µ(1) = 3 and µ(2) = 4, together with any collection
of PEN that includes n⇤ (1, 3) and n⇤ (2, 4), is a CSPE. By construction, worker 1 (worker 4) is
strictly better o↵ playing n⇤ (1, 3) (n⇤ (2, 4)) than if they formed a team with worker 2 (worker
3) and played the unique PEN in this team. Further, worker 2 (worker 3) prefers to match
with worker 1 (worker 4) than to remain alone.
However, for ✏ > 0 small enough, it is clear that the total sum of utilities is higher when
matching worker 1 with worker 2 (worker 3 with worker 4) and playing the unique PEN in
that team. Hence, the CSPE is welfare inefficient. Moreover, in these welfare-improving teams,
worker 1 and worker 4 each exert relatively more e↵ort than their partners in the original CSPE.
Hence, the CSPE we constructed is Asymmetric E↵ort Inefficient. Again, as incentives are
strict everywhere, for ✏ > 0 small, there is an ✏-ball around our chosen correlations for which
the same properties are satisfied.

3.7. Appendix: Assortative Matching
Chade and Eeckhout (2018) study optimal matching in an information environment related to ours.
In theirs, the correlation between signals is constant, but precisions may be heterogeneous. They
show that if utilities are transferable and each worker produces only one signal, the reduced form
utility obtained from forecasting the state is submodular for a wide range of correlations. Therefore,
if teams are composed of two workers, optimal matching is negative assortative: the best worker
matches the worst worker, the second best matches the second worst, and so on.
In our environment, workers strategically choose the number of signals they produce and transfers
are not possible. Moreover, correlation varies, but precisions are held constant. To isolate the e↵ects
of the first two features of our model, we assume in this section that precisions vary, but correlation
is held to zero. Our main conclusion is that, perhaps unsurprisingly, it need not be true that the
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negative assortative matching maximizes welfare, nor that it emerges endogenously.29
Suppose each worker produces conditionally independent signals with precisions ⌧1 < ⌧2 < ... < ⌧N .
As in the main text, suppose each agent receives the quadratic loss of her team’s optimal forecast
and that a team has at most two workers. Then, if workers i and j are in a team together, and
produce ni and nj signals, the utility loss associated with their forecast is
1
.
⌧ ✓ + n i ⌧i + n j ⌧j
An application of Proposition 2 of Chade and Eeckhout (2018) implies that the posterior variance
is submodular in ni ⌧i . Consequently, negative assortative matching with respect to ni ⌧i is optimal
when workers are forced to choose one signal.
We consider what happens when i and j are free to choose the number of signals they produce.
For simplicity, suppose worker i can produce signals with unit variance, the prior variance is equal
to unity, and the cost of drawing n signals is c(n) = 0.001n2 . Figure 3.6 presents the resulting
PEN correspondence and shows that, as worker j’s signal variance increases, equilibria become
asymmetric. Why? Since each of worker j’s signals produce less information, fixing ni and nj , the
marginal value of worker j’s last signal decreases. On the other hand, the marginal value of a signal

Equilibrium strategies

for worker i increases. Both forces lead to asymmetry.

3
2
1
Symmetric
Low Variance
High Variance

0
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8

10

Signal Variance Worker j

Figure 3.6: PEN Correspondence when ⇢ij = 0 and ⌧i = 1.
29 That utilities are nontransferable is not necessary to revert their result, but we keep it to preserve the structure
of the game we study. Following our approach, the equilibrium of the production game is inherently inefficient due to
its public goods nature, while in a fully transferable world this inefficiency disappears. We focus on whether negative
assortative matching is optimal given the equilibrium played inside each team.
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Table 3.1: Parameters for Empty Core Example.
Parameter
2
2
✓

c(n)
K

Interpretation
Signal Variance
Prior Variance
Cost of m Signals
Cost of Teammate

Value
1
1
0.01n2
0.01

The implications of this behavior for team formation are stark. Suppose that there are four workers
with variances 0.25, 0.5, 1 and 1.25. If we match the best worker (the one with variance 0.25) with
the worst worker (the one with variance 1.25), the unique PEN played within the team is (2, 0);
the worst worker does not contribute at all. In contrast, when the worst worker is paired with
the worker with variance 1, the unique PEN is (2, 1). Consequently, for small team membership
costs, the optimal matching is {(0.25, 1), (0.5, 1.25)}, instead of the negative assortative matching,
{(0.25, 1.25), (0.5, 1)}. Moreover, it turns out that the optimal matching can be decentralized as a
CSPE, while the negative assortative matching cannot.

3.8. Appendix: Analysis of the Core
We first formally define the core.
Definition 3.4. A matching µ 2 M and a collection of PEN, N ⇤ = {(ni⇤ , nj⇤ )}i2N ,j=µ(i) , is in the
core if there does not exist a matching, µ̂ 2 M, a worker k with match ` = µ̂(k), and a PEN (n̂k , n̂` )
for which:
⇤
vk (n̂k , n̂` ) > vk (nk⇤ , nµ(k)
), and
⇤
v` (n̂k , n̂` ) > v` (n`⇤ , nµ(`)
).

Notice, the core coincides with the definition of a CSPE if there is a unique PEN within every
feasible team. Furthermore, every core partition is a CSPE partition. However, in contrast to a
CSPE, there may not exist any partition in the core.
We now present an example of an empty core. Suppose the four workers’ technologies are correlated
according to the network depicted in Figure 3.7 and the parameters of the model are those in Table
3.1. With positive membership costs, no worker forms a team with worker 4 in the core. We exhibit
a preference cycle among the other three workers to show that the core is empty. Suppose that team
(1, 2) forms and workers 3 and 4 work alone. Then, worker 3 and worker 1 can form a mutually
beneficial deviating team in which worker 3 is the high producer. Suppose that team (1, 3) is formed.
Then, worker 2 can make an o↵er to the high producer of team (1, 3) and form a mutually beneficial
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0.1

1
0.73

0.45

3

2
0.65

0.73

4

0.73

Correlation
0.1
0.45
0.65
0.73

PEN
(2, 2)
(1, 3)
(1, 3)
(0, 3)

Payo↵s
( 0.256, 0.256)
( 0.238, 0.318)
( 0.247, 0.327)
( 0.25, 0.34)

Figure 3.7: Empty Core.
deviating team in which worker 2 is the high producer. Suppose that team (3, 2) is formed. Then,
worker 1 can form a mutually beneficial deviating team with its high producer in which worker 1 is
the high producer. Finally, if all workers remain alone, worker 1 and worker 2 can form a team and
be made better o↵. Hence, no matching is in the core.

3.9. Appendix: PEN Characterization Conditions are Necessary
2

Consider the equilibrium correspondence presented in Figure 3.8, where

=

1
4

<1=

2
✓

violates

the sufficient condition for the third and fourth properties in Proposition 3.1. In Figure 3.8, while
for ⇢ =

0.29 there is a unique and asymmetric PEN, for a slightly higher correlation there is a

Equilibrium strategies

unique and symmetric PEN.

3

Symmetric
High
Low

2
1
0
-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

Correlation

Figure 3.8: Equilibrium Correspondence when c(m) = 0.019m,
Why does this happen? When n = 1, for ⇢ =

2

=

1
4

and

2
✓

= 1.

0.29 2 (ˆ
⇢, ⇢˜) the marginal value of a signal for a

high producer is greater than the marginal value of a signal for a low producer. We may then fix
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Worker i
H
L
p 2 + ⇢ij p(1 p)
p(1 p)(1 ⇢ij )
p(1 p)(1 ⇢ij ) (1 p)2 + ⇢ij p(1 p)

H
L

Worker j

Figure 3.9: Joint Distribution when State is High (H).
the marginal cost of a second signal so that the high producer wants to produce it. But then, if
⇢ increases, the marginal value of the low producer increases and may exceed the chosen marginal
cost, so that she wants to produce a second signal as well. If the low producer produces a second
signal, however, the high producer has no incentive to produce a third signal because the information
left to learn decreases sufficiently. Hence, a symmetric equilibrium (2, 2) is played.

3.10. Appendix: Binary States, Binary Signals
Suppose that the state ✓ is either High (H) or Low (L). For simplicity, suppose further that Pr (✓ =
H) = 12 . Each worker can produce an informative signal, with realization H or L realization, and it
equals to the true state with probability p > 12 . Figure 3.9 presents the joint distribution over signal
realizations when the state is H. If the state is L, the elements of the main diagonal are switched.
Notice that in this environment the feasible set of correlations is bounded below. In particular,
1 p
p .

statistical feasiblitiy requires that ⇢ij

Hence, when a couple compares signals and has the

most feasible negative correlation they need not learn the state; the state is revealed if HH (or LL)
is observed, but not given any other realization. Further, for any correlation, there is a positive
probability that HL or LH is observed.
Table 3.2: Expected Posterior Variance in the Two-State Model.
# signals i
0
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# signals j
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Figure 3.10: Values ⇢˜(2, p) and ⇢ˆ(2, p).
There is no simple expression for the expected posterior variance for an arbitrary profile of signals.
Nonetheless, Table 3.2 computes it for a number of cases; these values are enough to find the PEN
of the Production Subgame when each worker’s best response is bounded by three. Defining ⇢˜(t, p)
and ⇢ˆ(t, p) as in the main text, Figure 3.10 displays their values when t = 2. The figure shows that
it is still true that we have ⇢˜(2, p) > ⇢ˆ(2, p) if and only if the precision of the signal is high enough.
We suspect a similar result is true for larger t.

3.11. Appendix: Sequential versus Simultaneous Decisions
In this section, we present a finite sequential version of the game played within each team. We
assume that the total number of periods T

2M̄, where M̄ is the upper bound on best responses

described in Lemma 3.2. In each period, each worker chooses whether or not to produce a signal
ati 2 {0, 1}. Signals across periods are conditionally independent and signals in the same period are
correlated according to the pairwise correlation of teammates, ⇢. In period t, all workers observe
all actions at
ht

1

1

and signals xt

1

in periods 1, ...t

1; the public history at period t is given by

= (ar , xr )tr =11 where ar = (ar1 , ar2 ) .

Let H t

1

denote the set of feasible histories up to period t. Then, a strategy for worker i is a function
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si :

ST

t=1

Ht

1

! {0, 1}. The expected payo↵ of worker i given the history (ar , xr )T
r =1 is:

(i,j)
vi (((ar )T
r =1 ))

=

⇣

2
1+⇢ij

PT

1 2
r =1 ar ar +

1

PT

1
2
r =1 (ar + ar

2as1 ar2 )

⌘

2

+

c

2

ari

r =1

✓

We refer to the equilibrium outcome number of signals as (n1 , n2 ), where ni =

T
X

!

.

PT

i
r =1 ar .

We consider Subgame Perfect Equilibria that are not Pareto Dominated by any other Subgame Perfect Equilibrium– call such an equilibrium a Pareto-Efficient Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (PESP).
The next proposition states that, if there is a PEN in the simultaneous game in which strategies
di↵er by at most 1, there is an identical PESP outcome of the sequential game.
Proposition 3.4. Let (m1 , m2 ) be the most symmetric PEN in the simultaneous game. If |m1

m2 | <

2, there is a PESP of the sequential game with outcome (n1 , n2 ), where n1 = m1 and n2 = m2 .
Proof. After every history ht
t

(ht

1

1

each worker knows the posterior variance of ✓, which we denote by

). We define three automaton states: WN , WD1 , WD2 . WN is the state at which no worker

deviates, WD1 is the state at which worker 1 is the last deviator, and WD2 is the state at which
worker 2 is the last deviator. Consider the strategy profile

si (h

where ni ( t (ht

1

t 1

)=

(

1 if ni ( t (ht
0 otherwise

1

))

T

t

,

)) is the number of the most symmetric equilibrium given the prior variance

and without loss n1 ( t (ht

1

))

n2 ( t (ht

1

t

(ht

1

)

)). O↵ the path of play choose any Nash equilibrium

of the Subgame. If a worker deviates from the prescribed strategy profile then he takes the largest
number of signals implied by this Nash equilibrium in the subgame that follows after.
To see why no worker has an incentive to deviate, notice if worker 1 does not produce a signal when
she is prescribed to do so, then she can never produce as many signals as she was initially prescribed.
But as |n1

n2 | < 2, worker 2 cannot compensate for worker 1’s deviation. As worker 1 prefers to

produce n1 instead of n1

1 signals in the simultaneous game, she has no incentive to deviate. A

similar argument applies for worker 2.
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The following example shows why we cannot extend the proposition to all correlations. Suppose
=

✓

= 1 and c(m) = 0.05m. If ⇢ = 0.15, the only equilibrium in the simultaneous game is (3, 0).

However, in the sequential game this cannot be a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Suppose worker
1 deviates and decides to produce only one signal in each of the last two periods. Then, the best
response of worker 2 is to produce a signal in period T
1 a payo↵ of

0.367 instead of

1 or period T . This outcome gives worker

0.4.30

However, for large correlations, the same deviation is not profitable for worker 1 since worker 2 will
never want to produce a signal in period T or period T

1. If both workers produce a signal during

the same period, they would be highly correlated. Hence, worker 2 would not have incentive to
produce a signal, since the extra information that is produced by her signal is almost zero. This
observation illustrates that, for intermediate correlations, inefficiency due to asymmetric equilibria
may be smaller in the extensive game than in the simultaneous game.
Although our intuition suggests that all equilibria of the simultaneous game are more asymmetric
than all equilibria of the sequential game, this may not be true. In the following example, there is an
asymmetric equilibrium of the sequential game that is more asymmetric than the most symmetric
equilibrium of the simultaneous game. Furthermore, it is not an equilibrium of the simultaneous
game. Consider the example in Figure 3.11 in which we graph the equilibrium correspondence of
the simultaneous game. For correlation ⇢ = 0.1, the profile (3, 2) is the most symmetric equilibrium
in the simultaneous game and (4, 1) is not an equilibrium. However, in the sequential game, the
2
1
on-path sequence (ar )T
r =1 , with aT = 1, ar = 1 for r = T

4, T

3, T

2, T

1 and ari = 0 in any

other period, is consistent with a PESP. Notice, all signals are taken in di↵erent periods and (4, 1) is
the outcome number of signals. A deviation by worker 1 at period T

4 is not necessarily followed

by an increase in the number of signals by worker 2, since an extra signal by her implies acquiring
correlated information. It can be shown that a Nash equilibrium of the Subgame following such a
deviation is (3, 1). As (4, 1) is preferred by worker 1 to (3, 1), worker 1 does not have the incentive
to deviate at T

4. A similar argument applies for deviations in other periods.

3.12. Appendix: Continuous Action Space
In our model, the informativeness of a signal is scaled by its precision. In this section, we modify
the production game by making signals more imprecise and scaling the cost so that there is no “free
30 In the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, up to identity, worker 1 produces 2 signals and worker 2 produces
1 signal, with no signals taken in the same period.
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Figure 3.11: Equilibrium Strategies when c = 0.01n,

= 12 , and

✓

= 1.

lunch” e↵ect. This allows us to find a limit game where the action space is continuous.
Let us consider a sequence of games in which each signal becomes less informative. In the kth game,
k signals are equivalent to a single signal of the original game. That is, the variance in the kth game,
2
k,

is equal to k

2

, where

2

is the variance of each signal in the original game. For simplicity, we

assume that the cost of taking a signal is linear. No free lunch implies that in the kth game the cost
of a signal is kc , where c is the cost of a signal in the original game. Suppose workers i and j are in a
team together and the correlation between their signals is ⇢. Then in the kth game, if they choose
nik and njk signals, worker i’s payo↵ is given by

(i,j)
vi (nik , njk )

=

min

(

nik njk
,
k k

)

2
nk
+ i
1+⇢
k

njk
k

!

2

+

2
✓

!

1

c

nik
.
k

Notice that for any real number z and fixed ✏ > 0, there exist rational numbers k and n such
n
k

z < ✏. Therefore, the sequence of games converges to the game where player i chooses ri 2 R+
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and, if workers choose ri and rj signals, worker i’s payo↵ is given by
(i,j)

vi

2

(ri , rj ) =

where r ij = min{ri , rj }, r̄ij = max{ri , rj },

ij

(r ij (
=

2
1+⇢ij

cri ,

1) + r̄ij ) +

ij

2

=

and

2
✓

.

As in the discrete game, workers i and j’s payo↵ when in a team together depend on a factor
ij

2 [1, 1) that specifies the team’s productivity. The equilibrium correspondence is similar to the

one described in the main text and characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5.
• If

ij

< 2, the unique Nash equilibrium, up to the identity of the workers, is

• If

ij

= 2, any strategy profile such that ri + rj =

• If

ij

2, the only PEN is
ri = rj =

q

2(

q

2

✓ q
0,

2

c

◆

.

is a PEN.

c

1)

ij

c

.
ij

Proof. Suppose ri > rj . Then, the marginal value of ri for worker i is,
2

(rj (

1) + ri + )

ij

2

and the marginal value of rj for worker j is,
(
(rj (

ij

ij

1)

2

1) + ri + )

2.

< 2 the marginal value for worker j is always smaller than worker i’s marginal value, so there
q
2
is a corner solution in which rj = 0. Given rj , i’s best-response is ri =
.
c
If

ij

If

ij

= 2, the marginal value of a signal is the same for both workers. Optimally, each chooses r so

that the marginal value equals the marginal cost. Since any investment division between the workers
q
2
does not a↵ect the marginal output, any profile (ri , rj ) such that ri + rj =
is an equilibrium.
c
If

ij

> 2, it cannot be the case that ri > rj since the marginal benefit for worker j is strictly larger
139

and both workers face the same marginal cost. Hence, all equilibria are symmetric. For (r , r ) to be
an equilibrium, it must be the case that:
2

(rj (

1) + ri + )

ij

2
ri =rj

 c,

and,
(
(rj (

ij

ij

1)

2

1) + ri + )

c.

2
ri =rj

The only PEN is the profile in which r = ri = rj is maximized and satisfies the previous constraints.
Hence, the second inequality binds. Re-arranging yields the equation stated in the proposition.

The proposition implies that for negative correlations the only equilibrium is symmetric, for conditionally independent signals there is multiplicity, and for positive correlations the only equilibrium
is fully asymmetric.
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M. Kräkel. Self-organizing teams. Economics Letters, 159:195 – 197, 2017. ISSN 0165-1765. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.012. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S016517651730335X.
M. Kremer. The o-ring theory of economic development. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3):
551–575, 1993. ISSN 00335533, 15314650. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118400.
H. H. Larsen. Oticon: Unorthodox project-based management and careers in a ”spaghetti organization”. People and Strategy, 25(4):30, 2002.
E. Lawler, S. A. Mohrman, and G. C. S. Benson. Organizing for high performance : employee
involvement, tqm, reengineering, and knowledge management in the fortune 1000 : Ceo report/
edward e. lawler iii, susan albers mohrman, george benson. 2001.
E. P. Lazear. Pay equality and industrial politics. Journal of Political Economy, 97(3):561–580,
1989.
144

E. P. Lazear and S. Rosen. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political
Economy, 89(5):841–864, 1981.
E. P. Lazear and K. L. Shaw. Personnel economics: The economist’s view of human resources.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(4):91–114, Nov 2007. ISSN 0895-3309. doi: 10.1257/jep.21.
4.91. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.4.91.
P. Legros and S. A. Matthews. Efficient and nearly-efficient partnerships. The Review of Economic
Studies, 60(3):599–611, 1993.
P. Legros and A. F. Newman. Beauty is a beast, frog is a prince: Assortative matching with
nontransferabilities. Econometrica, 75(4):1073–1102, 2007. ISSN 00129682, 14680262. URL http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/4502021.
A. Liang and X. Mu. Complementary information and learning traps. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 135(1):389–448, 2020.
A. Malenko and A. Tsoy. Asymmetric information and security design under knightian uncertainty.
Unpublished manuscript, 2020.
K. Marku and S. Ocampo Diaz. Robust contracts in common agency. Unpublished manuscript,
University of Minnesota, 2019.
J. Marschak and R. Radner. Economic Theory of Teams. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.,
1972.
L. Mathevet. Supermodular mechanism design. Theoretical Economics, 5(3):403–443, 2010.
R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Optimal contracts for teams. International Economic Review, 32
(3):561–577, 1991. ISSN 00206598, 14682354. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2527107.
P. Milgrom and J. Roberts. Rationalizability, learning, and equilibrium in games with strategic
complementarities. Econometrica, pages 1255–1277, 1990.
P. Milgrom and J. Roberts. Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games. Games and
Economic Behavior, 3(1):82–100, 1991.
D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14(1):124–143,
1996.
D. Mookherjee. Decentralization, hierarchies, and incentives: A mechanism design perspective.
Journal of Economic Literature, 44(2):367–390, 2006.
B. J. Nalebu↵ and J. E. Stiglitz. Prizes and incentives: Towards a general theory of compensation
and competition. Bell Journal of Economics, 14(1):21–43, 1983. ISSN 0361915X. URL http:
//www.jstor.org/stable/3003535.
M. Ollar and A. Penta. Implementation via transfers with identical but unknown distributions.
Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series, Working Paper nÂo 1126, 2019.
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